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This dissertation argues for the hope that is found in G. C. Berkouwer’s 
doctrines of providence and bodily resurrection in relation to the terrorist attack 
on September 11, 2001, and the rising pervasiveness of the doctrine of hyper-
preterism among American Reformed circles. 
 In Part I of the dissertation, Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence is 
explained and then evaluated and applied.  By way of explanation and 
exposition, Berkouwer’s knowledge of providence is examined, along with his 
theology of providence in sustenance and government, in relation to miracles, 
and the dilemma of the existence of God and evil.  Following that is an 
evaluation and application of the doctrine to the 9/11 terrorist attack on America. 
 In Part II, a theological/doctrinal study is undertaken concerning the 
doctrine of resurrection.  Hyper-preterism is examined, along with its leading 
proponents, and placed into interaction with Berkouwer’s views of the doctrine 
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Gerrit C. Berkouwer developed a twentieth-century confessional theology in the 
Dutch Reformed tradition which presented a creative evangelical alternative to 
liberalism, scholasticism, and neo-orthodoxy. 
Berkouwer was born on June 8, 1903.  He studied theology (1922-27) at the 
Free University of Amsterdam, founded by Abraham Kuyper.  The reigning 
Dutch Reformed theology was that of Herman Bavinck, which Berkouwer 
brought into dialogue with the new German dialectical theology on which he 
published his dissertation in 1934.  Following two pastorates, Berkouwer 
lectured on contemporary theology at the Free University (1940-45) and became 
professor of systematic theology, retiring in 1973. 
Berkouwer’s theological method has been described as functional or 
relational.  The function or purpose of Scripture is to reveal how God is related to 
us.  In his fourteen-volume Studies in Dogmatics, Berkouwer set forth his 
methodology: 
 
Theology is relative to the Word of God.  This relativity is decisive for the method and 
significance of theology.  It means that theology is occupied in continuous attentive and 
obedient listening to the Word of God.  And since listening, unlike remembering, is 
always a thing of the present moment, theological questions must have relevance and 
timeliness.  Theology is not a complex system constructed for their own entertainment by 
scholars in the quiet retreat of their ivory towers.  It must have significance for the 
unquiet times; but it can achieve it’s proper relevance only in obedient attentiveness, not 
to the times first of all, but to the Word . . . . [T]heology, being ever relative, must be ever 
relevant—and is relevant only when duly relative.”1 
 
In doing theology, Berkouwer emphasized the Reformed principle of sola 
scriptura which states that Scripture is its own interpreter.  The clarity of 
Scripture is directed to its message of salvation in Jesus Christ, to whom we are 
                                                 
1  G. C. Berkouwer, Faith and Justification, Studies in Dogmatics, trans. Lewis B. Smedes (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 9. 
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called in personal relationship.  The human literary form of Scripture can be 
understood in all its time and culture-related limitation without damaging 
reverence for its universally valid message.  With this theological methodology 
and view of Scripture, Berkouwer laid down a multi-volume systematic theology 




In the New Testament biblical concept, hope is not wishful thinking; hope is not 
a whim.  When the Bible uses the word hope, it speaks of a certainty about the 
future.  It is a certainty about the future that creates such enduring strength 
within a person that it seemingly pulls that one into the future based upon the 
realities of what lie before them as they are united to Christ. 
 This hope is characteristic of believers, but not of unbelievers.  In Romans 
12:12, we read “τη ελπιδι χαιροντες” of Christians; however, in 1 Thessalonians 
4:13, we read “µη εχοντες ελπιδα” concerning unbelievers.  Bultmann states that 
ελπις (hope) “endures . . , for hope is not concerned with the realisation of a 
human dream of the future but with the confidence which, directed away from 
the world to God, waits patiently for God’s gift, and when it is received does not 
rest in possession but in the assurance that will maintain what He has given.  
Even in the consummation Christian existence, in accordance with the concept of 
God, is inconceivable without ελπις.”2 
 I do not suppose that there are any two biblical doctrines that have a 
greater impact on Christian hope than the doctrines of providence and 
resurrection.  In point of fact, were one to gut these doctrines, the question could 
                                                 
2  Bultmann, “ελπις” in Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 2, 
trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964; reprint 1993), 532. 
 3
be asked “where could hope be found?”.  Hope is one factor that makes 
providence and resurrection relevant.  If there is no doctrine of sovereign 
providence, what hope does one have temporally when it seems that the bottom 
is falling out of their world?  If there is no doctrine of the physical resurrection of 
Christ, what hope does one have eternally when at the end of her life, she goes 
down to the grave?  Providence and resurrection are not just theoretical doctrines 
constructed so that academics can play “theological ping pong,” hitting these 
doctrines back and forth over the “table” of theological journals.  No, these 
doctrines must descend down from academic articles and find their place next to 
the home that was razed by fire, the termination notice an employee just 
received, the phone call from the doctor stating that the cancer is malignant, the 
spouse that just discovered the infidelity of the other, the hospital bed, the 
funeral home, the graveside service, and the gravestone. 
 The aim of the two parts of this dissertation is to argue for the hope that is 
found in G. C. Berkouwer’s doctrines of (1) providence and (2) bodily 
resurrection against two contemporary events in America—the terrorist attack on 
September 11, 2001, and the rising pervasiveness of the doctrine of hyper-
preterism among American Reformed circles, respectively.  These events tempt 
observers to pragmatically doubt the sovereign providence of God and 
theologically doubt the future bodily resurrection of the righteous.  The terrorist 
attack on America makes one look at the real world event and ask “was God in 
control?”.  The doctrinal attack on the confessional view of the resurrection 
makes one look at the arguments put forth and ask “is there no future, bodily 
resurrection?”. 
 As Berkouwer brought the magnum opus of Dutch Reformed theology that 
was Herman Bavinck’s four-volume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek into dialogue with 
the German dialectical theology and other theological and practical issues of his 
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day, so I will seek to pull Berkouwer forward and let his published writings on 
providence and resurrection speak to these modern-day issues.  At the end, we 
will see that Berkouwer’s doctrines of providence and resurrection not only stay 
intact in relation to these events, but also provide a relevant hope for the soul 






The second volume of Berkouwer’s series in “Studies in Dogmatics,” titled The 
Providence of God,3 appraises the Reformed doctrine of the providence of God in 
the framework of twentieth-century skepticism.  Contemporary circumstances 
are perceived as a complication to the doctrine in the opening chapter.  The 
volume involves a rehearsal of the doctrine of providence in all incidents.  In 
succeeding chapters, providence is related to knowledge, sustenance, 
government, concurrence, history, and miracles.  The concluding chapter faces 
the problem of theodicy as against the liberal doctrine of a limited God who 
cannot control evil.  The volume on the whole sustains the Reformed 
conservative position (such as found in the Westminster Standards) of 
providence and thus furnishes a constructive recapitulation of these wonderful 
truths in a modern setting. 
 In this part of the dissertation, the effort will be made to address 
Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence in the light of our present world with special 
regard to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America.  Does the doctrine 
                                                 
3  Studies in Dogmatics, trans. Lewis B. Smedes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952; reprint, 1983). 
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of providence give meaning to a life that is riddled with suffering?  Or is life 
actually meaningless?  Can a world that is ravaged by wars and conflicts make 
sense?  What categories are we to bring forth when sorting through these deep 
issues of life? 
 I will attempt to give an answer to the aforementioned questions by 
examining Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence in four areas.  First, I will 
examine the knowledge of providence.  Second, I will examine providence as 
sustenance and government.  Third, I will examine providence in regard to 
mystery and miracles.  Fourth, I will discuss how Berkouwer tackles the theodicy 
question.  Once I have put forth these aspects of Berkouwer’s doctrine of 
providence, I will then examine and evaluate it and conclude by applying it 
practically, utilizing one of the most catastrophic events in American history– the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 
Berkouwer’s Doctrine of Providence 
 
The subject of providence is often discussed in theory.  However, Berkouwer 
does not formulate his providence doctrine in a vacuum.  From the very 
beginning, he endeavors to couch this doctrine right in the middle of the human 
experience.  Often, the doctrinal confession of providence seems light years away 
from the very reality that providence affects.  To avoid this danger of 
theologizing, Berkouwer sets up the doctrine within the world that would seem 
to deny it.  Berkouwer maintains, “Contemporary scientific and philosophical 
thought—as well as that of the ordinary man—is engrossed in the question of the 
meaning and purpose of the world and its history, of human life.”4 
                                                 
4  Ibid., 7. 
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 This world is ravaged with evil.  Wars, inhumanity, atrocities, crime, 
suffering—it is all too commonplace all over the planet.  How does God relate to 
such a world?  “We hear of sorrow and desperation, of distress and 
estrangement, of fate and death.  The old optimism has made room for a new 
realism; but this new realism by itself is not the real crisis of the awareness of and 
confession of guilt.  The real crisis lies in the meaning of the reality of God to this 
shattered world.”5 
 Chapter 5.1 of The Westminster Confession of Faith states, “God the great 
Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, 
actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy 
Providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and 
immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, 
power, justice, goodness, and mercy.”  But is this too simplistic, Berkouwer asks.  
He comments, “It seems as though this confession—God’s rule over all things, 
more than other confessions—were thrown into the crucible of the times.”6 
 Berkouwer makes the important point that the providence doctrine is 
usually discussed in abstract and timeless terms.7  However, the human 
experience has reached its hands upwards to grab providence, bring it down, 
and force it to reckon with real life.  As a result, our concepts of God’s 
providence, which we received from the old confessions, seem to clash with the 
devastating events of our time.  It seems as if the tragedy of our time has “won 
over” the thinking of the hoi polloi so that providence is disregarded.  As a result, 
Berkouwer sums up, “In this situation the confession of God’s Providence over 
all things seems the last thing which could justly pretend to answer the basic 
                                                 
5  Ibid., 8. 
6  Ibid., 10. 
7  Ibid. 
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questions of human existence.  The confession of God’s Providence has become, 
now more than ever, a stone of stumbling.”8 
 Though our world is full of tragedy and dread, this is where providence 
operates.  These are the very things to which providence stands over and 
controls.  Providence was never intended to be an abstract functioning in a world 
that would never make its understanding difficult.  The real world—complete 
with all its pain and suffering—is the arena of providence.  According to the 
Scriptures, this is providence’s modus operandi.  Berkouwer writes, “But we see 
here how the Scriptures frankly reveal that the Providence doctrine is not set in a 
mold, is not a calm and tensionless constant.  They tell us how this belief can go 
through the crucible, even be lost for a time and be rediscovered in the way of 
prayer and confession of guilt.”9 
 Everything hangs on whether humans can go beyond and transcend 
(through faith) their crises.  Can we get past our crises while still being within 
them?  Can we have the “perspective that overcomes the world and fills the heart 
with honest, though mysterious, repose?”10 
 Berkouwer explains that man is a stranger to God and also a stranger in 
God’s world.  He delineates three motifs which have played a role in man’s 
secularization: 1) the scientific motif, 2) the projection motif, and 3) the 
catastrophic motif.11  I will briefly describe each of these. 
 The scientific motif deals with the effect of science on man’s faith in God.  
The typical scientific mind views the providence doctrine seemingly as a mere 
platitude which flourished in some pre-modern, pre-scientific age.  However, 
                                                 
8  Ibid., 13. 
9  Ibid., 15. 
10  Ibid., 17. 
11  Ibid. 
 8
now such a doctrine would be rendered unacceptable by the enlightened, 
modern mind. 
 The projection motif has previously been defined in Marxism.  Marx 
maintained that religion was just simply constructing a chimera.  It was a 
comfort which man subjectively “summoned” to cope with life.  Along those 
same lines, providence is viewed in the projection motif as humanity simply 
subjectively projecting such a ‘truth’ as a coping mechanism associated with the 
difficulties of life.12  Berkouwer sums up the projection motif by saying, “Belief in 
providence becomes, in fact, a very dangerous affair; it is nothing but the other 
side of a lust for safety and protection against the threats to our existence.  It is a 
system of a bourgeois escapism in which man seeks to banish, above all things, 
fear.”13 
 The catastrophic motif investigates the immensity of pain and suffering in 
the human experience.  Humanity sees itself as helpless to the pains and 
struggles of its existence.  As a result, people retire to areas of sensuality, 
nihilism, or simple apathy to cope with their life situations.  In the view of these 
individuals, the providence doctrine fails to give an explanation to the dreadful 
                                                 
12  Added to Marx, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Freud also advanced a projection motif.  Feuerbach 
defined religion as subjective, egoistic, and replete with wish-projection.  He eventually came to 
the conclusion that the gods (whomever they might be) were simply objectivized, projected 
wishes.  In short, he depicted religion as “anthropologic.” 
 Nietzsche couched religion in a sort of Platonism.  In fact, he used that very term 
(Platonism) by asserting that religion did not have an earthly reality.  Instead, religion projects an 
ideal, supernatural world that is separated from and devalues the real, earthly existence. 
 Freud, similar to Feuerbach, saw religion as a projection of humanity in their attempts to 
deal with the pain which the world gave.  Due to the hurt and pain, humanity searches for a 
place of refuge.  As a result, the projection of a world was conjured up to provide a place where 
humanity might seek comfort while living in a world that seemingly did not provide any 
comfort.  “We can see how the views of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud form an important factor in 
the present crisis of the Providence doctrine” (G. C. Berkouwer, Providence, 21). 
13  Ibid. 
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reality that clutches existence in its grasp.  Berkouwer writes, “Raw reality 
assaults this comforting and optimistic confession (of providence).”14 
 
The Knowledge of Providence 
 
How can we know God’s providence?  This is the question which Berkouwer sets 
before us.  It is not a bare knowing of the doctrine of providence, but a knowing 
of providence as being true, as actually being extant.  How do we know that the 
things which befall us humans have providence as its cause? 
 Berkouwer embeds the knowledge of providence within the sphere of 
faith.  Right at the start, Berkouwer makes it clear that any knowledge we have 
concerning the providence of God is rooted in faith.  We have the knowledge of 
God’s providence by way of His revealing it to us.  And that very same doctrine 
is received and believed by us in faith. 
 But is faith simply just a re-hash of the projection motif?  Berkouwer deals 
with this issue.  He couches the argument within the confessions of the Church.15  
These confessions, according to Berkouwer, seem to receive the accusation of 
being “anthropocentric.”  Why?  It is because the creeds and confessions of the 
church hold forth the council, comfort, and care of God for man.  Sure, the creeds 
and confessions maintain the cosmic control of God over all things—yet, the 
statements on providence in these documents seem to give an emphasis to 
humanity. 
 Berkouwer answers the charges of anthropocentrism with a definite “no.”  
He writes, “The answer to all these questions must be simply that the confessions 
                                                 
14  Ibid., 23. 
15  The final Article (Art. 7) in The Westminster Confession’s chapter on providence would be one 
example: “As the Providence of God doth, in general, reach to all creatures; so, after a most 
special manner, it taketh care of his church, and disposeth all things to the good thereof.” 
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are not anthropocentric.”16  Berkouwer maintains that the providence doctrine as 
formulated in the church’s confessions is theocentric which, as a result, calls 
attention to humankind.  Because the confessions are theocentric, they bring out 
the soteriological aspect.  This soteriological facet has to do with God and man.  
Therefore, providence is set forth as theocentric, yet including the soteriological 
inclusion of man.  However, soteriological does not equal anthropocentric, 
Berkouwer would assert. 
 Berkouwer points out that the confessions continually present the 
providence of God in connection with the believer and the gift of salvation.  He 
goes on to say, “This relation between salvation and Providence is so close that it 
must have definite significance for our question as to our knowledge of 
Providence.”17 
 Can providence be known through natural theology?  Can one come to 
the knowledge of providence through natural means outside of special revelation 
in faith?  Berkouwer believes that the providence doctrine of the God of Scripture 
cannot be concluded outside of Scripture and faith.  He traces the opposing 
systems of Catholic and Barthian theology.  Catholic theology asserts that one 
can arrive at a certain level of knowledge concerning providence.  With what is 
lacking, special revelation fills.  Contrary to this, the Barthian doctrine of 
providence purports over against any natural theology that any knowledge of 
providence is to be found in revelation (i.e., revelation of God in Jesus Christ).  
Berkouwer, although objecting to Barth identifying providence with free grace 
and the idea that our knowledge of God defines and limits its nature, basically 
                                                 
16  Ibid., 34. 
17  Ibid., 35. 
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agrees that the doctrine of providence is attained by way of faith, which the 
Church’s confessions faithfully present.18 
                                                 
18  To further make his point that the providence doctrine is ascertained by faith rather than 
natural theology, Berkouwer incorporates the examples of two theological giants: Herman 
Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper (Berkouwer, Providence, 38-45). 
 Bavinck, after a discussion concerning the “witness of all peoples,” concludes that “the 
doctrine of God’s Providence is one of the ‘mixed articles’ made known to all men through God’s 
revelation in nature” (38).  Now this sounds strangely similar to the Catholic doctrine of the 
knowledge of providence which maintains that a kind of general knowledge is possible outside 
of faith, a knowledge that is first general and natural, and is later completed soteriologically.  Is 
this the idea to which Bavinck aligns himself? 
 Berkouwer makes it clear that Bavinck’s position is one that does not undermine the 
rational knowledge of God.  In other words, Bavinck (along with the majority of the Reformers) 
saw the validity of a perception of God’s providence outside the faith.  However, the end result of 
this would be a suppression and rejection of the truth of that natural revelation due to the radical 
sin nature of humanity, as Rom. 1 states.  Hence, though the providence doctrine of God might be 
perceivable, it can never be attained aright outside of faith.  Berkouwer writes, “Bavinck is 
searching for a clear formulation of the Christian Providence doctrine.  This faith, he says, relies 
not only on God’s revelation in nature, but far more on His covenant and promises.  Bavinck 
adds that the Christian faith is not a cosmological theory, but a pure confession of faith” (39, 
emphasis his).  Berkouwer goes on to sum up, “It is clear now that Bavinck does not underwrite a 
rational knowledge of God.  Rather, he insists on a faith-knowledge rooted in Scripture” (40).  So 
why did Bavinck speak of the doctrine of providence as a ‘mixed article’?  Berkouwer answers, 
“The only explanation we can offer is that he did so, not from a misunderstanding of the 
uniqueness of the Christian Providence doctrine, but from a desire to forestall a rejection of the 
equally Christian doctrine of general revelation.  He was not among those who considered 
Providence as an article of natural theology, to which the believer could then add the other 
articles unique to Christian theology” (41, emphasis his).  Bavinck’s concern in the issue was to 
hold the providence doctrine equal with the doctrine of general revelation. 
 Berkouwer sees Kuyper wrestling with an issue similar to that of Bavinck.  For Kuyper, 
he hesitated to see the doctrine of providence being formulated into an exclusive Christian 
doctrine to the negation of it in any sort of general understanding.  Kuyper did not want it to 
come to the point where it was claimed that there is no general perception of providence at all.  
However, Kuyper believed that we should be careful here and not give the providence doctrine 
away so that even the natural perception which Kuyper admitted might be allowed to erect an 
edifice which led to a general, universal ‘God-concept.’  Though Berkouwer acknowledges that 
this type of thinking might admit of an epistemological dualism on Kuyper’s part, Berkouwer 
injects that Kuyper “repudiates” such a dualism.  Berkouwer admits that it is difficult to 
understand Kuyper’s anxiousness of the providence doctrine as being construed as exclusively 
Christian.  Berkouwer goes on to explain, “We gather that what Kuyper feared was a one-sided 
denial that there was even a vague God-concept still resident in natural man, an effect of general 
revelation.  It was in the interest of refuting this denial that he hesitated to call Providence a 
specially Christian doctrine” (44).  So Kuyper, in agreement with Bavinck, presents us with a 
knowledge of God’s providence which comes from faith.  Kuyper, similar to Bavinck, speaks of 
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 Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence is exclusively found within the 
soteriological caste of the Church’s confessions.  Providence, according to 
Berkouwer, is not some bare destiny or chance.  It is not the outworking of a 
‘God-concept’ apart from special revelation and faith.  Against the background of 
the pagan ‘God-concept’ (e.g., phantoms, idols, conjecture, reasoned conclusion, 
a final or first cause, a mysterious ‘X,’ Guidance, etc.), Berkouwer writes, “For 
this reason, the soteriological orientation of the Providence doctrine in the 
confessions is decisive.  It is decisive, not as an anthropocentric abridgment of 
God’s truth, but because the atonement through the cross of Christ points the 
way to ‘the only comfort in life and death,’ yes, the comfort of Providence.”19  He 
succinctly makes the point by saying, “. . . no one can believe in the Providence 
of God without knowing the way to God through Jesus Christ.”20  Therefore, for 
Berkouwer, the key to the providence doctrine is found in Christ.  Providence, 
for the believer, is no mere projection motif.  Instead, it is knowledge derived by 
faith.21 
 
Providence as Sustenance and Government 
 
The overriding aim of Berkouwer in discussing providence with regard to 
sustenance and government is to keep these two aspects distinct, yet aligned.  He 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘mixed articles,’ yet only in point of fact to uphold both the doctrines of providence and general 
revelation. 
19  Ibid., 46. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Berkouwer expounds this point by writing, “If we are to know God’s Providence, and if our 
knowledge is to stand against the attacks of the scientific-, projection-, and catastrophic-motifs, 
then the decision must fall here, with the Scriptures.  There will always be a conflict, not only 
between the orthodox and modern christologies, but between the orthodox and modern 
confessions of the Providence of God” (Berkouwer, Providence, 49). 
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defines government as “the purpose or end to which God leads all things.”22  As 
to the aspect of sustenance, he depicts it as the “maintenance or preservation” of 
all things.23  After thus defining the two, Berkouwer then launches out to 
expound upon the aspect of sustenance. 
 In Berkouwer’s discussion of sustenance, he maintains that the creature 
must rule out any “talk of outright independence.”24  There is nothing within the 
compass of creation which is self-contained.  Everything exists within the 
immediate relation to God as regarding sustenance.  All creatures and their very 
reality abide within the hand of God. 
 Berkouwer then goes forward to distinguish the divine acts of creation 
and sustenance.  Though he distinguishes the two, He wishes to keep them 
closely related as actually two aspects of one activity.25  Creation brings into 
being that which is then sustained. 
 Berkouwer then goes into an extended discussion of the creation-rest 
motif.  In this discussion, Berkouwer brings to the fore the soteriological aspect of 
creation and sustenance.26  Thus, the rest of God, being primarily in view, 
becomes closely related to the rest which remains for the people of God.  
Berkouwer goes on to point out, “If the Sabbath has eschatological significance 
and if it was from the beginning a sign pointing to the rest that remains for God’s 
people, then the historical report that God rested on the seventh day is 
                                                 
22  Ibid., 50. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid., 51. 
25  Here, Berkouwer cites Bavinck as speaking in the spirit of the confessions when he says that 
creation passes over into sustenance . . . . This is not to say that sustenance is a less might or less 
divine act than is creation” (Berkouwer, Providence, 54). 
26  “[T]his resting of God implies much more than a mere transition from creating to sustaining.  
The Scriptures bring the resting of God into the same context as the salvation of the Lord . . . . It 
illustrates pre-eminently the close relationship existing between creation and redemption” (ibid). 
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determinative for all that follows.”27  Therefore, there is an important relation 
between the creation Sabbath and the abiding Sabbath in regard to the 
soteriological aspect. 
 Berkouwer rejects the thought of sustenance as a continual creating out of 
nothing.  He summarizes the creeds as maintaining the God’s primal act was the 
one and only which was out of nothing (ex nihilo).  Hence, afterward there is no 
more nothingness.  As a result, Berkouwer alleges, “Through divine sustenance 
the possibility of a nothingness into which the world could fall, be it for an atom 
of an instant, is absolutely excluded.”28  Berkouwer therefore rejects any theory of 
a ‘continuous creation.’  Sustenance is not a continuous calling of the word out of 
nothingness.  The sustenance aspect of providence presupposes an extant 
creation.  Speaking of Bavinck’s description of sustenance and creation, 
Berkouwer writes, “Each is a calling, though of a different nature.  Creation calls 
out of nothing into existence; sustenance calls to continued existing.”29  So 
Berkouwer sees a distinction between creation and sustenance, yet nevertheless 
rejects the idea of renewed acts of creation ex nihilo. 
 Berkouwer goes on to discuss sustenance in regard to grace.  Is the 
sustenance of creation gracious towards man or is it just merely a necessary 
backdrop by which God works soteriologically with the elect?  In this discussion, 
Berkouwer brings forward the views of Abraham Kuyper, Klass Schilder, 
Herman Hoeksema, Cornelius Van Til, and John Murray.30  Berkouwer believes 
                                                 
27  Ibid., 57. 
28  Ibid., 61. 
29  Ibid., 63. 
30  Kuyper insists that common grace must be seen in regard to God’s longsuffering and 
forbearance.  Schilder, contra Kuyper, sees no grace in the sustenance and continuance of life, nor 
in its cultural development.  Hoeksema held a similar view to that of Schilder in regard to grace.  
Coming to the discussion from a supralapsarian point of view, he maintains that there cannot be 
a favorable disposition nor any grace offered to the non-elect whatsoever.  Murray and Van Til 
hold that Scripture shows the gifts of God reflecting His disposition.  Therefore, to give a good 
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that to disregard common grace is to view sustenance as just a mere mechanical 
maintenance of creation.  Only as we see God soteriologically can the confession of 
Providence as sustenance be made. 
 The issue of providence as government views government emphasizing 
the purpose or aim which God proposes and then goes on to achieve.  God’s 
purpose is within all His activities, which would include primary and secondary 
causes.31  Though the Lord’s purpose comes through in all human activity, His 
power is not seen as an all-consuming energy that rules out all human 
movement.  However, just as important to note is that the use of human means is 
not a limiting factor to the scope or purpose of God’s activity.  How does this 
square?  Berkouwer writes, “Man’s activity falls, as the smaller of two concentric 
circles, completely within the greater circle of God’s purpose.”32  Even in sin, 
God’s activity is not limited.  As Berkouwer says, God is “conqueror even in 
man’s sin.”33 
 Berkouwer brings the providence doctrine into a christological 
understanding.  He brings the ruling of God into the realm of the kingship of 
Christ.  Berkouwer, admitting that this area can be problematic, writes, “The 
problem of whether governments rule as subject to God the Father or as subject 
to Christ as crowned by the Father has been subject to debate in non-dialectical 
Reformed circles.”34  Berkouwer sees the rule of God as existing within the rule of 
                                                                                                                                                 
gift is to have a gracious God as the giver.  Therefore, Murray and Van Til would agree that God 
does extend a measure of common grace to the reprobate. 
31  “Earthly and human factors play their part, but the problem of first and second causes is not 
experienced as a real difficulty in the light of the overshadowing power of God” (Berkouwer, 
Providence, 86). 
32  Ibid., 92. 
33  Ibid., 93 (emphasis his).  “God acts in men’s acts: in Pilate’s sentence, in Judas’s betrayal, yea, 
in everything that men do with Christ.  God’s activity embraces all these and leads them along 
His mysterious way” (96). 
34  Ibid., 107.  Berkouwer broaches this subject by tracing the thought of Kuyper.  Kuyper made a 
distinction between the regnum essentiale and regnum oeconomiam.  The regnum essentiale is that to 
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Christ since His historical ascension.  God the Father, whose providential reign 
was immediate, now works His providential government mediately in Christ. 
 Berkouwer then advances his theory of concurrence.35  The concurrence 
doctrine is an attempt to be balanced, an attempt to not short-change either 
providence nor human activity.  Berkouwer writes, “He who understands well 
the biblical teaching of God’s government knows that it is no despotism, 
compulsion, or sort of overpowering which renders real creaturely activity null 
or impossible.  He knows that it is a divine ruling in and over all creaturely 
enterprise.”36 
 Berkouwer brings in Bavinck’s argument that God posits within man the 
ability to act, but yet the choice to use correctly or misuse this ability fall to the 
individual.  Bavinck is not comfortable to leave the case here, yet he admits of the 
mystery of the conclusion of this argument.  Kuyper, on the other hand, goes 
                                                                                                                                                 
which the governors of the world belong.  They are the immediate means through which God 
works out His sovereignty as Creator.  The regnum oeconomiam is a kingdom which has a special, 
mediating character.  It is a mediation due to the disruption which resulted from it.  Kuyper 
points out that “[t]he point of contact between these two kingdoms, . . . lies in the person of the 
Mediator, who is King in the rule of grace and, at the same time, second person of the Trinity” 
(108).  Kuyper’s view is that God rules in Christ.  God the Father does not abdicate His 
providential rule with the ascension of Christ.  Instead, God’s rule is mediated through Christ.  
The change comes only in the mode of God’s rule.  God’s former immediate providential activity 
becomes mediate through Christ.  Berkouwer asserts, “The New Testament sees the ascension as 
historically unique, but at the same time it shows us that God rules the world in Christ.  The rule 
in Christ is a particular mode of the divine government” (111, emphasis his). 
35  A possible third aspect, as Berkouwer inquires. 
36  Ibid., 129 (emphasis his).  Though there is a strong attempt at a healthy balance between the 
providence of God and human responsibility and decision-making, I believe the point needs to be 
emphasized that though humans make their choices freely (anthropocentrically-speaking), those 
choices are governed (and dare I say ‘controlled’?) theocentrically.  The factors required for 
choosing are contingent.  This naturally leads to the question “contingent on what?”  In faith, it 
can be said the presenting of those choices and the making of those choices derive their efficacy 
from God.  In Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1950; reprint 1978), 259, Witsius says, “Nor does God concur only in the actions of 
second causes when they work, He also inflows into the actual causes so that they may work.  
Because the beginning of an action depends, if not more at least not less on God than does its 
progress” (emphasis mine).  
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further by saying that God not only supplies the ability to act, but goes beyond 
that by He Himself being the one who acts.  “It follows from God’s omnipresence 
that ‘He can never be unemployed and, further, that He cannot merely deposit a 
supply of power.’  The influx is not a mere provision of ability, but an active, 
personal operation.  This, according to Kuyper, brings out the specific Reformed 
character of the confession of Providence.”37  Though this seems one small step 
away from saying that God is in some way responsible and guilty of cooperating 
in sin, Berkouwer writes, “It only reminds us again that we shall never fathom 
the divine over-ruling, certainly not in regard to the sinful activity of man.”38  
How is this seeming dichotomy solved?  Berkouwer says it cannot be resolved 
rationally; it must be resolved in confession of guilt and faith.  He goes on to say, 
“There is a solution, but it is the solution of faith, which knows its own 
responsibility—as it knows the unapproachable holiness of God.  He who does 
not listen in faith to God’s voice is left with an insoluble dilemma.”39  Berkouwer 
maintains that it is impossible to explain God’s sovereign work and creaturely 
freedom.  He says that we must instead direct ourselves to Scripture which 
reveals the almighty activity of God and also teaches human responsibility. 
  
Providence and Miracles 
 
Berkouwer sees as a point of departure for the discussion of miracles in relation 
to providence the subject of naturalism and supernaturalism.  Modernism took 
                                                 
37  Ibid., 132. 
38  Ibid., 133. 
39  Ibid.  For those would attempt to put forth a “permission” doctrine to resolve this difficulty, 
Berkouwer writes, “He who accepts the idea of permission as a solution to the problem of the 
relation between God’s work and man’s sin succumbs to the natural desire for logical synthesis.  
He can thereupon arrive only at a dualistic division of labor between God and man.  And this is 
to pervert the testimony of Scripture.” (139). 
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the road of naturalism.  Naturalism viewed miracles as being “natural.”  In other 
words, God did work ‘miraculously’ in the world; however, that same work was 
in relation to nature.  Therefore, all supposed miracles were natural because the 
term “nature” encompasses the entirety of this world’s interdependent 
relationships.  Naturalism rejected the dualism of supernaturalism. 
 This modernistic view created a problem, however, with the concept of 
God working immediately within His creation.  Here, Berkouwer quotes Allard 
Pierson as saying, “Though it may be desirable to speak kind and pleasant words 
from the pulpit to attentive audiences, it is better to be silent when these words 
have meaning only in a world which is no longer and can no longer be ours.”40  
Thus, he resigned his office within the Church due to the fact that he could not 
hold to a view of supernaturalism.  However, Berkouwer points out that many 
modernists did not follow men such as Pierson.  They were hesitant to travel to 
the ‘end’ of the road to which modernism leads.  Berkouwer brings out the 
notion that human experience everywhere encounters a duality between what is 
and what ought to be, between the real and the ideal.  It was this duality that 
monism mistakenly ignored.41 
 Berkouwer notes that miracles are rejected in proportion to the extension 
of our knowledge.  The more nature becomes more ‘knowable’ and apparent to 
us (Berkouwer even uses the word “transparent”42), the more the possibility of 
the supernatural and miraculous fades. 
 Berkouwer brings the thought of Kuyper and Bavinck forward to exposit 
this subject.  Bavinck did not view a competition between the extension of 
                                                 
40  Ibid., 191. 
41  Ibid., 192.  Berkouwer puts forth the foundational element on which monism rested: “The 
absolutism of natural science was the rock on which anti-supernaturalistic monism rested.  Its 
influence has more recently been demonstrated in theology by the ‘de-mythologizing’ of the New 
Testament.” 
42  Ibid., 194. 
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human knowledge and the activity of God.43  Kuyper was in agreement with 
Bavinck.  Kuyper disagreed with supernaturalism.  However, this was far from 
putting him within the camp of the modernists.  The way in which Kuyper 
disagreed was that supernaturalism put forward a false system.44  His rejection 
was not from a modernistic, natural design, but in an attempt to maintain the 
transcendence of God over all reality.  Berkouwer summarizes: 
 
A miracle, thus, is no occasional intervention by God into the course of natural things, for 
nothing operates through any power apart from God.  A miracle means nothing more 
than that God at a given moment wills a certain thing to occur differently than it had up 
to that moment been willed by Him to occur.45 
  
Therefore, Kuyper did not deny miracles.  Instead, Kuyper refused to consider 
nature as some abstract idea where a miracle intruded.  He saw nature and 
miracles both inseparably connected to the effectual activity of God.46 
 Berkouwer adds to this the soteriological aspect.  He writes that miracles 
are “saving acts.”47  The miracle which God effectuates is not a brute act.  It is 
purposive.  These acts of God are acts not accomplished simply for the purpose 
                                                 
43  On this, Berkouwer goes on to assert, “The repudiation of this competition idea is of 
fundamental significance for the correct approach to the problem of miracles” (Berkouwer, 
Providence, 195). 
44  The “system” with which Kuyper disagreed was one which viewed nature as “a power that 
stands over against God with its own forces and laws, under Him, to be sure, in that He hinders 
it from doing anything against His will, but possessing with its powers and laws a certain 
independence beside, under, or over against God.  And that is not a pious but an ungodly 
conception, which we deeply abhor and which poisons true supernaturalism” (Berkouwer, 
Providence, 195). 
45  Ibid., 196. 
46  Berkouwer, expounding on Kuyper and Bavinck’s thoughts along with an amassed Scriptural 
apology maintains, “A miracle is not an abnormal or unnatural occurrence presupposing the 
normality of nature, but a redeeming reinstatement of the normality of world and life through 
the new dominion of God, which stands antithetically against the kingdom of this world.  
Miracles are not part of a supernatural order that intrudes upon an absolutized ‘natural’ order of 
things, thereupon creating a tension between miracles and nature.  They reveal the kingdom of 
God in opposition to the devil and his dominion” (Berkouwer, Providence, 211). 
47  Ibid., 212. 
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of accomplishing the miracle.  Contrary, they are acts that bring man to the point 
of decision—“the decision which determines life,” as Berkouwer puts it.48  Hence, 
miracles are salvific in purpose and soteriological in design.  The miracles are 
signs which point toward a decision which must be made regarding Christ.  He 
writes: 
 
God attests the proclaimed salvation through miracles and signs, even as through the 
giving of the Holy Spirit.  The signs form, according to Calvin, an approbation of the 
preaching.  They undersign the apostles’ teaching with a special affirmation; they are the 
seals of the [W]ord.  Calvin put special emphasis on the witness character of the miracles.  
But it must be remembered that the sign is rooted in the reality—in the healing, in the 
raising from the dead, and in the restoration.  This restoration and healing are, as 
realities, signs of the power of Christ and of the kingdom of redemption.  It has often 
been pointed out that Christ did not heal nearly all the sick, but that only a few were 
restored or raised from the dead by His miraculous power.  This absence of 
promiscuousness only accentuates the witness character of His miracles.49 
 
 God brings all things into being that are.  In that regard, miracles are 
works of God which He performs in a way not expected.  It goes against not 
nature, but of our own understanding and expectation of nature which has been 
facilitated by our knowledge.  Berkouwer says this “‘otherwise’ of God’s 
working” is readily found evident in Scripture and also lays a solid foundation 
concerning the witness aspect of the act.50  “This accounts for the arousal of 
amazement,” Berkouwer contends.51 
                                                 
48  Ibid., 213. 
49  Ibid., 214. 
50  Miracles are not proofs addressed to the intellect that thereby man should be convinced.  They 
do not make faith superfluous.  On the contrary, they summon men to believe.  The witness 
character of miracles puts before man the decision which he must make as to Christ.  He who 
views miracles from the standpoint of the antithesis, God—natural law, has ignored the deepest 
meaning of miracles . . . . The Divine act in miracles does not break any natural laws, as though 
they were absolute.  Miracles are inscrutable acts of God, which can be accepted as acts of God 
only through faith.  There can be no serious talk of a conflict of science.  A conflict occurs only 
when man abstracts nature, as an absolute, closed system of natural causes from God’s 
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 The providence of God concerning miracles leads to faith—faith in God, 
not in the miracles.  Miracles point to the decision of faith.  Berkouwer, 
contrasting the miracles of anti-Christ, brings forth and summarizes that “the 
decision of faith cannot lie in signs and wonders as such.”52  Miracles are God’s 
providential acting in unexpected ways which points humanity to a faith 
decision in Christ. 
 
The Theodicy Question 
 
Berkouwer couches the theodicy issue within the scope of pastoral concern.  In a 
world that is inclusive of pain, tragedy, and suffering, an explanation seems to be 
in order.  If God is sovereign and all-powerful and loving, how can these 
differing facts (i.e., God and the world in which we live) be reconciled? 
 Theodicy is the attempt by man to somehow offer a rational explanation 
concerning God and evil.  Berkouwer writes: 
 
Theodicy is a justification of God’s providential rule.  It attempts to prove that in spite of 
all enigmas and all criticisms God’s governing of the world is holy, good, and just.  
Theodicy is an attempt to defend God against all complaints or accusations by 
demonstrating the meaningfulness and purpose of God’s activity in the world and in 
human life.  It presupposes the seriousness of all sorts of doubts and criticisms and 
assumes that there are empirical facts which cause tensions and pose problems in 
connection with the Divine rule.53 
 
Theodicy is an apologetic stance by which man seeks to account for both the evil 
in the world and a loving, powerful God.  Therefore, during times of crises (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                 
Providence, and considers the possibility of miracles as meaning the possibility of a supernatural 
breaking of natural law” (Berkouwer, Providence, 216 [emphasis mine]). 
51  Ibid., 214. 
52  Ibid., 230. 
53  Ibid., 232. 
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war, economic depression, famine, injustices, etc.), the theodicy issue becomes 
acute. 
 Berkouwer begins his examination of theodicy by tracing the development 
of five forms of theodicy which have entered onto the apologetic scene.  They are 
1) dualistic theodicy, 2) harmonistic theodicy, 3) teleological theodicy, 4) the 
theodicy of Winfred Monod, and 5) christological theodicy.  I will briefly outline 
Berkouwer’s thought concerning these. 
 First, Berkouwer views dualistic theodicy as “refusing to resolve the 
contradiction between light and darkness in an original monism.”54  Hence, the 
dualism results in a refusing to attempt to resolve the seeming contradiction for 
which theodicy strives to reconcile.  Good and evil flow out from their differing 
respective fountainheads until at last the good will triumph.  Good emits from an 
eternal principle of good as does evil from an eternal principle of evil.  
Berkouwer points out that this theodicy can be found in Zoroastrianism and 
Manicheanism.  In regards to the Christian faith, Berkouwer puts forward, “A 
theodicy which is ultimately dualistic is . . . to be judged a sham solution of the 
problem of evil.  In resolving evil into an eternal principle, dualism only teases 
the mind away from evil’s present grisly reality.”55 
 Second, Berkouwer discusses the theodicy which is best represented in 
Stoicism and the philosophy of Leibniz—harmonistic theodicy.  This theodicy 
maintains that “ours is the best possible world.”56  Here, we view things from a 
God-centered point of view.  Individual situations and circumstances are seen 
within the greater purpose of God.  In all things, there is a “cosmic unity” which 
                                                 
54  Ibid., 235. 
55  Ibid., 236. 
56  Ibid. 
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entails that all things are set within a pre-established harmony.57  Berkouwer 
finds the major flaw in this theodicy in the fact that evil is inherent in creation in 
this view.  Evil resides in the nature and structure of the world.  Evil is simply 
utilitarian and functions along with the whole in complete harmony with 
creation.  Thus, the harmonistic theodicy is Liebniz’s “defense of God.”58 
 Third, the teleological theodicy has similarities to that of the harmonistic.  
They both see evil within the scope of the entire creation as opposed to just 
disconnected evils.  When viewed in this manner, things which appear in and of 
themselves evil are grouped with other events to see that the purpose was in fact 
good.  Thus, the evil in a singular circumstance is wiped away by the plurality of 
circumstances which result in the greater good.59  Berkouwer contends that this 
view is “limitlessly simple” and “does not really explain the purpose of pain, nor 
                                                 
57  Berkouwer describes the varying evils which Leibniz delineates (i.e., metaphysical, physical, 
and moral evil).  “Metaphysical evil is really imperfectness of development, physical evil is 
suffering, and moral evil is sin.”  Berkouwer traces Leibniz’s thought to the conclusion that from 
metaphysical evil flows moral evil and from moral evil issues physical evil; therefore, a world 
without evil would be inconceivable and impossible.  As a result, Leibniz could maintain that 
God is justified because He “has made the best possible world” (Berkouwer, Providence, 237-8).  
Celestine N. Bittle, God and His Creatures: Theodicy (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1953), 360-1, 
seems to hold a similar view when she writes, “The individual being thus has its own proper end 
as an individual and also an end in the order of the group and of the universe.  As an individual 
being it is less important than as a member of the group and of the universe.  God’s providence 
extends to all beings, whether they be considered as individuals or members of a higher order.  
But if God wanted the order of the physical world to be such that the inferior beings exist for the 
superior and that the well-being of the individuals be subordinated to the well-being of the 
groups and of the universe as a whole, then that is the way that the world should be.  And that 
means that physical evil is a normal feature of the world . . . the deficiencies of nature as the necessary 
result of the limited perfection of created nature and its powers.  There must be some limitation 
and some deficiency somewhere.  Hence, God can permit physical evil and indirectly will it as a 
normal feature of the order of the universe” (emphasis mine). 
58  Ibid., 239. 
59  Berkouwer defines teleological theodicy as that which “evil is considered in connection with 
the purpose, the telos, of things.  That which, when considered by itself, appears evil, takes on 
another color when one considers its results or the purpose to which it is directed” (Berkouwer, 
Providence, 239). 
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does it establish a theodicy.”60  It’s basic failure is the deficiency of grasping the 
devastating existence of sin, suffering, and death. 
 Fourth, Berkouwer discusses Wilfred Monod’s theodicy theory.  Berkouwer 
maintains that Monod takes a different view of God.  By doing this, he ‘resolves’ 
the theodicy conflict.  He divorces the “Creator God” from the “Father God” who 
is revealed in Christ.  In doing this, Monod reveals his ‘Marcionic’ colors.  
Berkouwer sums up Monod’s thought by writing, “Monod, confronted by grim 
reality, seeks to justify the Father in the face of it by saying . . . that He had 
nothing to do with it.”61 
 Fifth, Berkouwer tackles the christological theodicy of Karl Barth.  Barth, first 
of all, does not believe that God must be justified before man concerning His 
ways in His creation.  Also, he does not believe that God could be responsible for 
willing what has come to be.  Berkouwer says that, “Dogmatics, according to 
Barth, must in the nature of the case, be logically inconsistent here.”62  Berkouwer, 
however, points out that since Barth believes that God did not will these things 
to be, Barth has ipso facto committed himself to a theodicy.  Later, Barth did go on 
to say that creaturely misery was in the will of God since He willed not to forbid 
it.  Barth’s christological theodicy maintains paradoxically that “in Christ ‘the 
created world, here and now, is already perfect in all its imperfections.’”63 This is 
a kind of perfectionism in an imperfect creation which can only be seen through 
the eyes of faith in Christ.  Barth here is similar to Leibniz in considering this the 
“best of all possible worlds,” though there are many differences within the 
thought of Leibniz and Barth. 
                                                 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid., 241. 
62  Ibid. (emphasis his). 
63  Ibid., 243. 
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 So how does Berkouwer view the theodicy issue?  He maintains that we 
are not to divorce the issue from revelation, thus spiraling into a sea of 
metaphysical contemplations.  Berkouwer’s chief complaint against the Church 
in her attempt to construct a theodicy is that “it has assumed that the world and 
its events, apart from revelation, speak their own language and that their speech 
can be understood and translated by our natural reason.  God and His 
righteousness take their place, not at the beginning, but at the end of this process 
of thought.  God, as it were, the a posteriori conclusion of analytical thought.”64  
As a result, the world and God are misunderstood because it does not begin with 
revelation. 
 The Scriptures speak against speaking of the reality of the world apart 
from revelation.  “The decision of faith, which knows from the start that any 
unrighteousness in God is impossible, is decisive for any consideration of 
theodicy.”65  God is not to be brought before the bar of human reason and 
experiential reality.  Contrariwise, God is to be understood as all reality existing 
for Him. 
 One cannot approach theodicy from reality to God because reality can 
only be comprehended and understood aright in light of revelation.  Only the 
eye of faith understands correctly reality.  Any other attempt to approach God 
apologetically from the basis of experiential and empirical reality “make[s] His 
righteousness a deduction of human reason.”66  When an investigation of the 
                                                 
64  Ibid., 248 (emphasis his). 
65  Ibid. 
66  Ibid., 250.  Berkouwer further asserts, “This makes all natural theodicy, in spite of its 
apologetic intent, worthless and unacceptable.  Instead of preparing the way for fruitful 
conversation, instead of erecting a dam against the secularization of thought, theodicy only 
suggests that we try again to reach God by way of natural understanding.  It is the ironic drama 
of theodicy that it actually abets the progressive secularizing of thought by insisting that man can 
understand his world without revelation.  And the fact that one in theodicy usually concludes 
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cosmos, extracted from revelation, becomes the foundation of theodicy, 
humanity conclusively arrives at an illegitimate and unpeaceful simplification.67 
 Berkouwer maintains the incomprehensibility of God.  Even in Scripture, 
one sees the incomprehensibility of God revealed.  However, Berkouwer makes 
it clear that to not be able to comprehend God does not axiomatically mean that 
God is simply an ‘outlaw’ to whose power alone we must acquiesce.  Still, we 
cannot bring ultimate resolution to the problem of theodicy and must, as 
Berkouwer believes, regard the boundaries of our understanding and acquire 
placidity with it. 
 Berkouwer examines the short-falls of our knowledge with regard to three 
areas: 1) God’s wrath, 2) man’s guilt, and 3) the Church’s doxology.  Wrath 
emphasizes that sin cannot be traced back to God causally.  The church has 
always claimed that God is not the author of sin.  Though all causes are 
contingent on God, the Church has maintained that God’s action in sin and 
guiltiness are not the same as man’s action.  Also, Scripture speaks of God 
working in the event of sin not just in a reactionary manner.  Because man a priori 
rules out any possibility of there being sin or guiltiness in God, He cannot be 
called to account to man.  And God is not guilty of sin because holiness directs 
wrath to satisfy itself upon all evil.  Thus, as Berkouwer puts forth, theodicy is 
found in the opposite of wrath—forgiveness from wrath.  We are not caught 
                                                                                                                                                 
with an empty, abstract God concept is already a judgment against this method” (Berkouwer, 
Providence, 250). 
67  Berkouwer contends, “The apologete will have to advance into the struggle with modern 
thought from a position of faith, profoundly convinced that the logic of modern empirical 
thought, of neutral analysis and induction is the corrupted logic of sinful thinking.  A true 
apologetic must begin with the awareness that unchristian thought involves an estrangement 
from the glory of God and suppression of the truth . . . . Reality cannot be known, 
phenomenologically, in its deepest sense, apart from the light of Divine revelation” (Berkouwer, 
Providence, 253). 
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rationally between two opposing viewpoints.  Instead, we must view the limits of 
our knowledge within the gift of forgiveness. 
 Next, Berkouwer considers the limitations of man’s knowledge within the 
realm of human guilt.  Here lies a conundrum—God’s sovereignty and man’s 
responsibility.  Berkouwer maintains, “The problem of theodicy is insoluble 
outside of a faith that knows the limits of human reason.  According to 
revelation, the confidence of faith in God’s holy direction of the world is possible 
only in the recognition of guilt.  With the blessing of salvation, guilt is the more 
openly recognized and confessed.  And in this confession it becomes possible to 
honor God’s incomprehensible government of the world.”68  Again, we see the 
limits of our knowledge in regard to divine sovereignty and human 
responsibility. 
 Finally, Berkouwer considers the significance of the Church’s doxology.  
He begins by examining the praise of God’s people in Scripture.  Berkouwer 
points out that these praises and glorying do not come from a people who live 
without fear or misgivings.  They have not escaped all of life’s tragedy and 
suffering (i.e., evil).  On the contrary, it seemed that praise increased as peril and 
danger came close.  Berkouwer writes, “The remarkable fact is that all the 
questions that arise in Scripture around what we call the problem of theodicy 
have their profoundest and most definitive answer in a Hallelujah.”69  The limits 
of our knowing concerning the theodicy issue are drowned by the eye of faith 
through praise and doxology.70 
                                                 
68  Ibid., 266. 
69  Ibid., 267. 
70  Berkouwer, speaking eschatologically, writes, “The Apocalypse speaks to us with assurance 
that only by our participation in this humble, yet jubilant, chorus can the oppression of anxiety 
and dread be lifted from life in this enigmatic world.  Without this knowledge of the Lamb, 
without this knowledge of God, then, the problems are only multiplied.  They become hopelessly 
insoluble, because they must then be wrongly proposed.  We can attempt to solve them only by 
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Berkouwer’s Doctrine of Providence Examined and Applied 
 
The Doctrine Examined 
 
Berkouwer’s approach to theology was a departure from many (if not most or 
all!) of his predecessors.  De Moor points out, “When Berkhof in his ‘three 
phases’ analysis spoke about ‘the revolutionary tendency’ of Berkouwer’s 
methodology, he undoubtedly expressed a general sentiment.  Whether 
concerned or puzzled or enthused about it, all participants in the discussion 
about Berkouwer’s way of theologizing agreed that it was a rather untraditional 
one, even in comparison with the way in which Kuyper and Bavinck had 
attempted to renew Reformed theology before him.”71  An overriding theme 
within Berkouwer’s Providence of God is that of “correlation.”  Whether the 
concept is brought forth decisively or revealed implicitly, in much of 
Berkouwer’s writings, it is there.  Smedes writes: 
 
Berkouwer does not set out his methodological guidelines in any formal prolegomena to 
his theology, but they are not hard to ferret out of his various volumes.  They can be 
summed up in his word “co-relationship.”  Though he uses the term frequently, he gives 
it no systematic explanation.  It indicates that theology does not work according to its 
own inner-evolved principles, nor according to self-selected norms, nor for its own sake.  
Theology is in constant and dynamic relationship with faith and, hence, with the Word of 
                                                                                                                                                 
summoning a rationalistically construed God before the judgment of human reason, or, in 
irrationalistic reaction, by submission to the arbitrariness of the whimsical god of fate, or, as a last 
possibility, by turning the critique against God around and setting up a proud judgment against 
man himself” (Berkouwer, Providence, 273). 
71  J. C. De Moor, Towards a Biblically Theo-Logical Method: A Structural Analysis and a Further 
Elaboration of Dr. G. C. Berkouwer’s Hermeneutic-Dogmatic Method (Amsterdam: Kok-Kampen, 
1980), 45. 
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God, on the one hand, and the Church and the pulpit on the other.  Only as it lives and 
works at the center of this double polarity can theology be meaningful and relevant.72 
 
What is Berkouwer’s idea of correlation?  The correlation concept is more far-
reaching than a mere endeavor to verbalize the instrumental, receptive 
characteristic of faith or the sovereignty/human responsibility question.  Even in 
this very primal ‘Berkouwer-ian’ period, it seems to me that an anti-systematic 
outlook is being articulated which is commonplace in much of modern theology.  
‘Correlation’ was being established not so much as an explanation, but rather as 
an abnegation of the probability of an explanation.  Berkouwer sets a “real 
theology of the Word” over against a “beautiful system.”  Hence, a deflection (in 
my assessment) toward an experiential theology over against a propositional, 
rational, systematic theology.73 
 When analyzing Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence, we shall confront 
not merely theories, but realities—realities seen and understood only in faith; 
but, when thus perceived, definitive for our own lives and the life of the Church.  
Here and throughout Berkouwer’s writing, the allusion is ever-present that a 
theory cannot (a priori) correspond to reality.  Reality is a different dimension 
from logic and theories and systematics. 
 I do not believe that one should omit this close camaraderie with the neo-
orthodox accentuation on supra-history even in this early composition.  The later 
publication of A Half Century of Theology sheds some valuable light on even 
earlier antecedents of this unorthodox aspect of Berkouwer.  He begins his 
reflections on his “half century” by noting that “‘ethical theology’ was a 
                                                 
72  Lewis B. Smedes, “G. C. Berkouwer” in Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology, ed. Philip E. 
Hughes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 65-6. 
73  Of course, I would hold that theology must maintain the experiential along with the rational; 
however, I believe that theology must start with either one or the other.  Either theology is 
constructed rationally and then lived out or it is ascertained experientially and then believed.  I 
lean toward the former. 
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prominent concern for conservative theology in 1920.”  “Ethical Theology” was 
distinguished by the anti-dogma slogan: “not dead doctrine, but the living 
Lord.”74  In the following chapter (“The Era of Apologetics”), Berkouwer begins 
by criticizing the way dogmatics came “as a rounded-off and finished system,” 
and then states: “But later we came in touch with all sorts of doubts and 
uncertainty about facets of the system; problems and questions unsettled us.”75  
This anti-systematics predilection has seemed to characterize Berkouwer 
throughout, but seemed to evidence itself to a larger audience later in his 
publishing career via his subsequent writings where it seems that the seeds of 
this disposition came into bloom. 
 When Smedes sets forth Berkouwer’s correlation principle, his 
recapitulation seems to corroborate what I have just said regarding the 
faith/knowledge conflict.  Paraphrasing Berkouwer, Smedes writes: 
 
Theology is a work of faith, and all of its statements must be such as the believer can 
recognize as objects of faith.  This is perhaps the single most influential principle in 
Berkouwer’s theology.  It means that the object of theology is never the construction of a 
logically coherent system . . . . Only those matters that the believer can and ought to 
confess as his personal faith and which the Church can proclaim as the faith of the 
Gospel are the proper conclusions of theology.76 
 
“Berkouwer,” says Smedes, “declines the temptation to let deduction and 
inference determine theological conclusions: the demand for faith, not the 
dictates of logic, must characterize the kerygma.”77  Such an assessment by 
Smedes is basically an accurate observation of Berkouwer’s position. 
                                                 
74  G. C. Berkouwer, A Half Century of Theology, trans. Lewis B. Smedes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1977), 11.  It is interesting to note that Berkouwer and those who follow him seem not averse to 
throwing this slogan at Old Princeton theologians and their contemporary counterparts. 
75  Ibid., 25. 
76  Smedes, “Berkouwer” in Creative Minds, 65-6. 
77  Ibid., 69. 
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 Again, I find an up-to-date attestation of Berkouwer’s convictions in this 
regard in A Half Century of Theology—especially in a chapter titled “Faith and 
Reasonableness.”  Berkouwer is dejected with antecedent settlements and again 
finds sympathy with the same conflict in recent Roman Catholicism.  In rejecting 
the classical Reformed method, as well as a subjective, existential “leap,” I 
believe he sometimes confounds faith with knowledge of God and at other times 
seems to disconnect them.  In representing the issue as it developed in the “half 
century,” it sounds very much like a description of Berkouwer’s view: “Faith . . . 
is not against reason, though it is above reason . . . . Faith becomes defenseless, in 
a sense.  It has no defenses for itself; it has no apologia, maybe no way of giving 
answers—except private ones.”78  Here, a parallel to the reference above of 
subjectivism in Berkouwer is evidenced.  Words like “tension” and “paradox” 
are favored over “argument,” “logic,” and “good and necessary consequences.”  
There seems to be a congenial posture in Berkouwer toward the philosophy that 
a faith founded upon truth that is rational would cause faith to lose its dynamic 
and abolish true freedom.  Against this background, Berkouwer’s disavowal of 
faith as a subjective leap sounds to me somewhat hypocritical. 
 Given this increasing devotion to faith versus logic, correlation versus 
systematics, it is not demanding to ascertain why Berkouwer has increasingly 
been at odds with classical Reformed orthodoxy, whether seventeenth-century or 
the Princeton theologians.79  He is frequently affirming what I think to be a false 
                                                 
78  Berkouwer, Half Century, 147. 
79  I am well aware that some have and will seek to avert the impact of this by suggesting a clear 
disagreement between Calvin and “Calvinism,” with truth and Berkouwer on the side of Calvin.  
However, something is not true simply because Calvin said it.  And furthermore, it is a highly 
debatable judgment that Calvin, and possibly the Westminster Confession, were substantially 
different from the Reformed orthodoxy of the seventeenth century or of the “Princeton 
theologians.”  It is a highly suspicious trend that sees Calvin as a post-Kantian existentialist or 
neo-orthodox, depending on one’s perspective.  On the contrary, as Henry Krabbendam, “B. B. 
Warfield vs. G. C. Berkouwer on Scripture,” Inerrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: 
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dilemma between “logically coherent systems” and matters one confesses as 
“personal faith,” between “the dictates of logic” and “the demand for faith.”  The 
hypothesis of their incompatibility is unwarranted.  For those who function with 
that assumption, or for those who see a contradiction because they are aware 
only of an abused or errant system (which would not then be “logically 
coherent”), Berkouwer gives the appearance of a solution via the venture to 
thrust theology out of the sphere of logic and reason and into the noumenal 
domain of Kantian philosophy. 
 Berkouwer is not apprehensive of the complex and challenging issues 
when it comes to the doctrine of God’s providence.  He addresses them “head-
on” and struggles with them each in turn.  He does not avoid the contentions of 
church history.  Yet at the close of the discussion, when each group has been 
brilliantly critiqued, Berkouwer seems to assert in effect: “You’re both incorrect 
ultimately.  If you consider it ‘in faith,’ you can see the answer is more deep-
seated than you contemplated.”  At the risk of sounding polemic and maybe 
even a bit acerbic, it seems that the pith of what Berkouwer is saying is, “Arise 
with me from the confines of the ‘phenomenal’ cosmos of Historie to the 
‘noumenal’ cosmos of Geschichte.  It is an archetype which, once detected, 
becomes increasingly conspicuous in all his labors. 
 As I stated earlier, the section where Berkouwer’s correlation principle of 
viewing all theology “in faith” (as I have defined it above) seems most apparent 
is in the area of providence.80  These are crucial domains which invite some 
special consideration at this point.  In a chapter entitled “A Third Aspect,” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Zondervan, 1980), 415, points out: “There is every reason to believe that, according to Warfield, 
Berkouwer’s emphasis upon, and usage of, the concepts of ‘correlation’ would betray a strand in 
his thinking that would place him in the climate of Schleiermacher’s theology—and of neo-
orthodoxy.” 
80  I would also point out that it seems Berkouwer’s Divine Election (trans. Hugo Bekker [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960]), manifests his correlation view almost as much as The Providence of God. 
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Berkouwer considers the concept of “concurrence” as a manner to communicate 
God’s exercise of providence in the world.81  This is a determining chapter.  The 
complication arises of “whether total human dependence upon God leaves room 
for significant creaturely activity . . . .”82  Berkouwer’s interest is to avoid 
“speculation.”  Given the biblical a priori that “God is not the author of sin,” how 
does one “conceive of Divine cooperation in sin?”  “Is sin wholly a product of the 
first as well as the second cause?”83  According to Berkouwer, “the dilemma is 
usually understood as determinism or indeterminism.”84 
 Berkouwer, not fancying indeterminism, is reacting against what he feels 
is a logical outcome of all determinism—i.e., a kind of causality that disregards 
human responsibility and makes God the author of sin.85  In this reaction, he 
makes several compelling affirmations.  “The essential error of identifying the 
providence doctrine with determinism is the de-personalization of the God-
concept.”86  “The Reformed confession of Providence does not argue from the 
concept of causation.  It simply acknowledges the invincibility of God’s 
sovereign activity.”87  “. . . the use of the terms first and second causes implies 
that God is only the most important cause among equal causes . . . . This brings 
God even . . . less disguisedly down into the world-process.”88  For Berkouwer, 
                                                 
81  Berkouwer, Providence, 125-60. 
82  Ibid., 126. 
83  Ibid., 131. 
84  Ibid. 
85  De Moor writes, “Berkouwer also objected in his monograph on Divine providence to the often 
used distinction between first and second causes as a way of describing the relationship between 
God and man.  This distinction also reflects a polar way of thinking.  ‘As soon as man begins to 
schematize on the basis of causality, he immediately begins to grope in darkness.’  Then one 
either ascribes everything to God as the first cause in a deterministic fashion, or one emphasizes 
the idea that man is at any rate a second cause, next to God” (Towards a Bibilically Theo-Logical 
Method, 130, emphasis his). 
86  Berkouwer, Providence, 152. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid., 155. 
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there seems to apparently be a contradiction between Creator and cause.  
Concerning the biblical reference to Jehovah as the “first and the last,” he says, 
“The word first points to the absolute Creator, not the first cause of all things.”89  
At best, one can admit these statements if qualified.  At worst, one sees 
overstatements and false dilemmas. 
 Berkouwer apparently is assured of the inescapable dilemma, however, 
since he attempts a way out, a ‘third’ or middle way.  The problem, he says, is 
not properly delineated as determinism-indeterminism.90  The alternatives 
(determinism or indeterminism) are true alternatives only on a horizontal, 
anthropological echelon.  They pose a dilemma which is reconciled in the 
relationship that man sustains to God.  This vertical relationship between God 
and man alone gives possibility to a correct understanding of the problem of 
freedom.  Both determinism . . . and indeterminism neglect the religious aspect of 
the problem.91  “Faith knows its boundaries,” says Berkouwer.  “Rational 
conclusions . . . give way to living faith in Him.”92 
 The problem is concluded, though not rationally, in confession of guilt 
and in faith.  There is a solution, but it is the solution of faith, which discerns its 
own responsibility—as it perceives the inaccessible holiness of God.  He who 
                                                 
89  Ibid., 158. 
90  Ibid., 145. 
91  Ibid., 146.  The Kantian roots of this mentality are illustrated in a summary of Kant’s 
agnosticism in Norman L. Geisler, “Philosophical Presuppositions of Biblical Errancy,” Inerrancy, 
323: “Hence, I can know the ‘thing-to-me’ but not the ‘thing-in-itself,’  One can know what 
appears to him but not what really is.  The former Kant called phenomena and the latter, noumena.  
Between the phenomenal and the noumenal realms there is an impassable gulf fixed by the very 
nature of the knowing process” (emphasis his).  Another reason “we must remain forever 
ignorant of reality-in-itself” is this: “Whenever one attempts to apply the categories of his mind 
(such as unity or causality) to the noumenal realm, he ends in hopeless contradictions and 
antinomies.” 
92  Ibid., 159. 
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does not attend in faith to God’s expression is left with an enigmatic dilemma.93  I 
am again impacted by the conclusion that Berkouwer’s solution—the “religious” 
method “in faith” contra “rational conclusions”—has culminated in the 
subjective, noumenal sphere: neither determinism nor indeterminism!  
Berkouwer has appealed to a third way.  What that way is appears to me to 
remain ambiguous and fortified in the “storm-free harbor” of supra-history. 
 
The Doctrine Applied 
 
Now that I have examined Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence, I will seek to 
apply that doctrine to the catastrophic events which befell America on September 
11, 2001.94  The Center for Cooperative Research95 meticulously details and 
chronicles the events leading up to 9/11 along with its aftermath.  The web-site 
gives detailed, ‘time-stamped’ entries of these events allowing one to see how the 
entire situation unfolded.  I will point out those that are most germane to that 
day’s tragic events and our discussion of Providence: 
 
8:46 a.m.  Flight 11 slams into the north tower, 1 World Trade Center.  Investigators 
believe it still had about 10,000 gallons of fuel and was traveling 470 mph . . . . 
Approximately 2,662 people are killed on the ground between this crash and the crash of 
Flight 175. 
8:48 a.m.  The first news reports appear on TV and radio that a plane may have crashed 
into the W[orld] T[rade] C[enter] . . . . Many reports don’t come until a few minutes later.  
For instance, ABC first breaks into regular programming with the story at 8:52. 
8:50 a.m.  Rich “Doc” Miles, manager of United’s Chicago system operations center, 
receives a call from a mechanic at an airline maintenance center in San Francisco that 
takes in-flight calls from flight attendants about broken items.  The mechanic says a 
                                                 
93  Ibid., 133. 
94  Hereafter, “9/11.” 
95  Paul Thompson, “September 11: Minute by Minute,” Center for Cooperative Research 
[homepage on-line]: available from 
 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/main/dayof911.html; Internet; accessed May 30, 
2007.  
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female flight attendant from Flight 175 just called and said, “Oh my God.  The crew has 
been killed, a flight attendant has been stabbed.  We’ve been hijacked.”  Then the line 
went dead.  A dispatcher monitoring the flight then sends messages to the plane’s 
cockpit computer but gets no response. 
8:55 a.m.  A public announcement is broadcast inside the WTC South Tower, saying that 
the building is secure and people can return to their offices . . . . Such announcements 
continue until a few minutes before the building is hit, and may [have led] to the deaths 
of hundreds of people.  No one knows exactly what is said (though many later recall the 
phrase “the building is secure”) or who gives the authority to say it. 
Between 9:01 – 9:03 a.m.  Flight 175 is an unmarked blip to flight controllers in New York 
City.  One controller stands up in horror.  “No, he’s not going to land.  He’s going in!”  
“Oh, my God!  He’s headed for the city,” another controller shouts.  “Oh, my God!  He’s 
headed for Manhattan!” 
9:03 a.m.  Flight 175 hits the south tower, 2 World Trade Center.  Millions watch the crash 
live on television.  Approximately 2,662 people are killed on the ground between this 
crash and the crash of Flight 11 . . . . 
9:38 a.m.  Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon.  Approximately 125 on the ground are later 
determined killed or missing . . . . Flight 77 strikes the only portion of the Pentagon that 
had been recently renovated.  “It was the only area of the Pentagon with a sprinkler 
system, and it had been reconstructed with a web of steel columns and bars to withstand 
bomb blasts.  The area struck by the plane also had blast-resistant windows—2 inches 
thick and 2,500 pounds each—that stayed intact during the crash and fire.  While perhaps 
4,500 people normally would have been working in the hardest-hit areas, because of the 
renovation work, only about 800 were there . . . .”  [Los Angeles Times, 9/16/01] 
9:59 a.m.  The south tower of the World Trade Center collapses.  It was hit by Flight 175 
at 9:02. 
10:03 a.m.  According to the US government, Flight 93 crashes at 10:03. 
10:10 a.m.  All US military forces are ordered to Defcon Three (or Defcon Delta), the 
highest alert for the nuclear arsenal in 30 years. 
10:13 a.m.  Federal buildings in Washington begin evacuation.  The UN building 
evacuates first; others follow later. 
10:15 a.m.  The section of the Pentagon reportedly hit by the crash of Flight 77 collapses . . 
. . A few minutes prior to its collapse, firefighters saw warning signs and sounded a 
general evacuation tone.  No firefighters were injured. 
10:28 a.m.  The World Trade Center’s north tower collapses.  It was hit by Flight 11 at 8:46 
. . . . The death toll could have been much worse—an estimated 15,000 people made it out 
of the WTC to safety. 
11:00 a.m.  Evacuations are ordered at the tallest skyscrapers in several cities, and major 
tourist attractions are closed, including Walt Disney World, Philadelphia’s Liberty Bell 
and Independence Hall, Seattle’s Space Needle, and the Gateway Arch in St. Louis. 
11:30 a.m.  General Wesley Clark, former supreme commander of NATO, says on 
television, “This is clearly a coordinated effort.  It hasn’t been announced that its (sic) 
over . . . . Only one group has this kind of ability and that is Osama bin Laden’s.” 
12:16 p.m.  US airspace is clear except for military and emergency flights.  Only a few 
transoceanic flights were still landing in Canada . . . . At 12:30, the FAA reports about 50 
flights still flying in US airspace, but none are reporting problems. 
1:27 p.m.  A state of emergency is declared in Washington. 
4:10 p.m.  Building 7 of the WTC complex is reported on fire. 
 37
5:20 p.m.  Building 7 of the WTC complex, a 47-story tower, collapses from ancillary 
damage.  No one is killed. 
8:30 p.m.  Bush addresses the nation on live TV . . . . In what will later be called the Bush 
Doctrine, he states, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed 
these acts and those who harbor them.”96 
 
Just the recounting of these events is horrifically breathtaking.  Even for those 
who would hold to a postmodernisitic philosophy of no absolutes, one is hard-
pressed not to call such an event absolutely evil. 
 How would those who believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnipresent, loving God give an apologetic for these events?  Also, how would 
other religious leaders and pundits seek to explain the events of this tragic day?  
I have selected a representative sampling of these views from the Cable News 
Network’s97 news show Larry King Live.98  Host Larry King introduces the show 
by asking, “Seeking meaning; in the aftermath of September 11, can faith heal 
shattered hearts and lives?”  He then names the guests, which include Deepak 
Chopra, a spiritual adviser and best-selling author of How to Know God; Rabbi 
Harold Kushner, best-selling author of When Bad Things Happen to Good People; 
Bruce Wilkinson, best-selling author of The Prayer of Jabez and founder of Walk 
Through the Bible Ministries; Dr. Hathout, a scholar of Islam and senior adviser 
to the Muslim Public Affairs; and John MacArthur, the pastor of the Grace 
Community Church and also president of the Masters College and Seminary.  
The show begins by asking theodical questions such as the following: 
 
KING: Rabbi, if God is omnipotent, he could have prevented this, could he not? 
                                                 
96  Ibid. 
97  Hereafter, “CNN.” 
98  CNN Larry King Weekend, “September 11: Where Was God?,” CNN.com [homepage online]: 
available from http://www.cnn.com/transcripts/0109/29/lklw.00.html; Internet; accessed May 30, 
2007. 
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KUSHNER: No, because I think at the very outset God gave human beings the freedom 
to chose between being good people and being bad people.  And at tremendous risk to 
God’s creatures and God’s creation, he will not take that power away from us, that 
freedom, because we stop being human beings if he does.  I don’t find God in that 
terrible accident—in that act of cruelty.  I find God in the courage of firemen and police.  I 
will continue to find God in the willingness of the survivors to rebuild their lives.  
Remember, Larry, God’s promise was not that life would be fair, God’s promise was that 
even if life is unfair we would not have to face it alone, for he will be with us in the valley 
of the shadow. 
KING: Bruce, didn’t you at least for a moment say to yourself: I question my faith? 
WILKINSON: I did not find myself questioning my faith.  I began to put myself in God’s 
shoes and thought to myself, how would I feel if I was up there next to God with the 
people that are there, the angels that are there; what would I see on God’s—you know, 
his personality.  You remember in the Old Testament when the great flood occurred, 
according to the Torah of Scriptures, it says that God was grieved in his heart because 
violence filled the earth.  And I really believe what God felt at that moment is 
tremendous grief.  It was so bad at the beginning that he said I’m sorry that I made man; 
this isn’t what I had in mind for man.  I can’t imagine the grief that he must have felt. 
KING: Doctor Hathout, when we read and learn of those letters yesterday—the letter 
written by one of the people who caused this horror—and he’s a Muslim—and he 
proclaims [Allah]—that he was going to God.  How do you balance that? 
HATHOUT: Well, everybody can proclaim whatever he or she might want.  But the 
reality of the matter is God does not condone or accept that his creature could be 
destroyed in this way, and does not accept cruelty.  God is mercy and is love. 
KING: So where were they getting that from? 
HATHOUT: Well, look at how many people kill and get killed in the name of democracy 
or liberty or . . . . 
KING: Or Christianity. 
HATHOUT: Or Christianity or patriotism, or what have you.  So people have that 
twisted behavior sometimes. 
KING: Nowhere in the Koran does it say: You should kill to go to heaven? 
HATHOUT: Absolutely not. 
KING: John, do you question it?  I mean, do you question whether there is a God? 
MACARTHUR: I don’t question whether there is a God.  I don’t even question what God 
chooses to allow.  It’s not a matter of my opinion.  As a Bible teacher and one who 
believes that the Bible is the authoritative word of God, Scripture tells us that God is 
absolutely sovereign; that everything that occurs occurs within the framework of his 
purpose.  That is not to say that God creates evil.  The Bible says He does not, nor does 
He do evil, nor does he tempt anybody to do evil.  But evil exists.  It’s everywhere.  And 
God can overrule that for his own purpose.  The question is, what is his purpose in this?  
And that’s a big question.99 
 
These views are a sample representation of commonly held sentiments after the 
tragic events of 9/11.  Some believe that God was uninvolved in those events.  
                                                 
99  Ibid. 
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Still others believe that He would have prevented it if He could; however, He 
granted us free will to do what we may.100  Still others would hold a view similar 
to Berkouwer (and MacArthur’s above) that God governs and sustains all and 
everything occurs “within the framework of [H]is purpose.”101 
 With 9/11 firmly in mind, Berkouwer’s searching question seems to 
plague us: “A long series of revolutionary and catastrophic events has made an 
almost undeniable empirical fact of the meaninglessness of human life.  Not only 
has this country been ravaged by global wars of incalculable destruction but, 
with the descent of peace, new tensions and new fears have possessed our tired 
generation.  Can life then, still make sense?  Dare one call this life meaningful?”102 
                                                 
100  In my opinion, it seems that most of today’s American evangelical churches fall into this 
position.  Bruce A. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (Wheaton: 
Crossway, 2000), 61, describes the typical Arminian mindset when it comes to thinking 
theologically in regard to tragic events, such a 9/11.  Even though writing in regard to open 
theism, I believe that Ware’s points can be applied to those who are predominantly Arminian in 
their theology, yet would not describe themselves as open theists.  Ware writes: 
 
Here we have, then, a fair sampling of the openness response to human tragedy, suffering, and pain.  
Consider this listing of the most important facets of open theism’s approach: 
1. God does not know in advance the future free actions of His moral creatures. 
2. God cannot control the future free actions of His moral creatures. 
3. Tragic events occur over which God has no control. 
4. When such tragedies occur, God should not be blamed, because He was not able to prevent 
them from occurring, and He certainly did not will or cause them to occur. 
5. When such tragic events occur, God feels the pain of those who endure its suffering. 
6. God is love, and He may be trusted to always do His best to offer guidance that is intended to 
serve the well-being of others. 
7. At times, God realizes that the guidance He gave may have inadvertently and unexpectedly 
led to unwanted hardship and suffering. 
8. At times, God may repent of His own past actions, realizing that His own choices have not 
worked out well and may have led to unexpected hardship (e.g., 1 Sam. 15:11). 
9. Some suffering is gratuitous and pointless, i.e., some suffering has no positive or redeeming 
quality to it at all, so that not even God is able to bring any good from it. 
10. Regardless of whether our suffering was gratuitous, or whether God may have contributed 
inadvertently to our suffering, God always stands ready to help us rebuild our lives and offers 
us further grace, strength, direction, and counsel. 
101  Ibid. 
102  Berkouwer, Providence, 7. 
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 I believe the answer to this question is “yes.”  This life is meaningful.  
Why?  I believe the answer can be found in the theodicy which Berkouwer 
advances.  This is the pressing question: How can God and 9/11 exist?  Can an 
explanation be given? 
 An explanation can be given, but must be accepted by faith.  Similar to 
Berkouwer, I would also maintain that an omniscient, omnipotent, loving God 
presiding over a world which contains events like 9/11 is nonsensical outside of 
revelation.  I do not believe that we can simply take the events of that day and 
seek a resolution through philosophical and metaphysical speculation.  An event 
of terrorism on the level of 9/11 conducted against a free nation which is largely 
naive to such cruelty is assumed to be able to be understood, translated, and 
explained by our natural reason.  Instead of God and His righteousness taken a 
priori, they are considered at the end after the facts of 9/11 are put together.  The 
question of God and the meaning behind His activities are not at the beginning, 
but at the end of this process of rationalization.  God then becomes the final 
factor at the conclusion of analytical thought.103  Because of this, the thinking of 
the world concerning 9/11 sets itself off on an incorrect trajectory and therefore 
can never find its way to the correct conclusion (i.e., a correct theodicy). 
 To view the events of 9/11 aright, Berkouwer would have us view that evil 
from the eyes of faith.  We are not to alienate 9/11 from revelation.  “The decision 
of faith, which knows from the start that any unrighteousness in God is 
impossible, is decisive for any consideration of theodicy.”104  The tribunal of 
human reason does not have God stand before it, call Him to account, and then 
assess Him.  We must begin with Scripture that reveals “for from Him and 
through Him and to Him are all things” (Rom. 11:36, NASB).  God is sovereign 
                                                 
103  Ibid., 248. 
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and there is no sin or evil in God; we must acknowledge this at the beginning of 
our thinking.  Therefore, we could never conclude nor even investigate the 
possibility that God might have done some evil thing concerning 9/11, whether 
bound up in apathy, a lack of love, a lack of power, etc.  Whatever the case, we 
cannot conclude that there is disservice on God’s part in regard to 9/11 when we 
believe a priori that it is impossible to ascribe evil to Him. 
 Not only should 9/11 be viewed in faith, I believe Berkouwer has a very 
strong point concerning the doxological aspect of 9/11 for the Church.  Though 
we have misgivings, a lack of understanding, and possibly even a bit of fear, our 
faith in God as He is revealed in Scripture should evoke our praise and glory.  I 
will adapt a phrase from Berkouwer by pointing out, “The remarkable fact is that 
all the questions that arise in [regard to the tragic events of 9/11 and the 
justification of God] have their profoundest and most definitive answer in a 
Hallelujah.”105  Queries, hesitations, anxieties, and reservations concerning 9/11 
and other similar occurrences in our world should be resolved and engulfed by 










                                                 





G. C Berkouwer, on the first page of his chapter simply titled “Resurrection” in 
his The Return of Christ, states: “The reason that the confession of the resurrection 
of the body found a place in the creeds of the church so early is that this doctrine 
receives clear and emphatic attention in the New Testament.”106  That being the 
case, the reaction of the Christian believer on first discovering that the hyper-
preterists are, like Hymenaeus and Philetus, “saying that the resurrection has 
already taken place” (2 Tim. 2:18)107 is one of astonishment and puzzlement.  Any 
attempt to place the eschatological resurrection in the past seems to run aground 
on the fact that the Bible consistently speaks of that resurrection as a resurrection 
of the body, and who can reasonably affirm that such a resurrection has already 
happened?  Hyper-preterists refer scornfully to this as the “bones-are-still-in-the-
graves” objection,108 but it is clearly biblical and destructive of hyper-preterist 
theology.  As G. C. Berkouwer notes, “Against the background of these tensions 
(the denial of the resurrection in Corinth and the teaching of Hymenaeus and 
Philetus) the expectation of the resurrection is clear and imposing.”109 
 Thus we may sympathize with Geerhardus Vos’s judgment: “Bodily the 
resurrection certainly is, and every attempt to dephysicize it . . . amounts to an 
exegetical tour de force so desperate as to be not worth losing many words 
                                                 
106 G. C. Berkouwer, The Return of Christ, Studies in Dogmatics, trans. James Van Oosterom 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 170. 
107 Perhaps most hyper-preterists today would insist that 2 Tim. 2:18 does not fairly represent 
their teaching, because, although the general resurrection took place in A.D. 70, each Christian 
still experiences a certain kind of “resurrection” at his or her death. 
108 This is the title of chapter 6 in John Noē, Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion (Bradford, PA: 
International Preterist Association, 2000), 141-50. 
109 Berkouwer, 171. 
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over.”110  Readers of 1 Corinthians 15, e.g., have agreed for two thousand years 
that the apostle Paul obviously writes in that chapter about a future bodily 
resurrection of believers grounded in the reality of the bodily resurrection of their 
covenant Head and Savior.  That being the case, why are hyper-preterists now 
denying this?111 
 To understand the motive behind the hyper-preterists’ novel 
reinterpretations of the New Testament teaching on the resurrection, we must 
remember what is their starting point and why it is their starting point.  Then we 
will be in a position to examine the hyper-preterist reinterpretations of the 
various elements of the New Testament picture of one constituent part of the 
consummation, the resurrection. 
 
The Starting Point and Apologetic Motive of Hyper-Preterism 
 
The all-controlling starting point of hyper-preterists is succinctly summed up in 
this statement by Walt Hibbard: 
 
The Second Coming promised by Jesus Christ in Matthew 24 and scheduled for 
fulfillment within that first century generation actually happened when Jesus said it 
would, and was immediately followed by the long prophesied redemptive events 
including the Resurrection of the Dead, the Judgment of the Nations, and the New 
Heavens and New Earth.112 
 
 We shall see that hyper-preterists disagree among themselves about the 
correct method of harmonizing such passages as 1 Corinthians 15 and 1 
                                                 
110 Geerhardus Vos, The Pauline Eschatology (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing, 1994), 102. 
111 Of course, hyper-preterists would deny that they are denying the doctrine of the bodily 
resurrection.  They would insist that they are simply reinterpreting it.   
112 Walt Hibbard, “A Courteous Response to Dr. Gary North’s Vitriolic Essay,” at 
www.preteristarchive.com. 
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Thessalonians 4:13-18 with this overriding metanarrative.  However, there is no 
disagreement about the metanarrative itself.  In fact, it is their unifying doctrine. 
 They insist on this metanarrative and interpret every biblical text in 
accordance with it.  They think that without it, Christians have no satisfactory 
answer to the charge of religious liberals and the irreligious skeptics that the 
two-millennium “delay” of the promised Parousia has proved Jesus and the New 
Testament writers to be mistaken about the future.  Thus, the motivation behind 
their theology and their exegesis is apologetic.  That theme is continually 
emphasized in their writings.  E.g., Ed Stevens states: 
 
If Jesus and the apostles taught immanency (as in fact they did), then a non-fulfillment 
destroys the inspiration and integrity of Christ and the apostles.  However, if it was 
fulfilled and the church only failed to understand it,113 then we can charge the mistake to 
non-inspired churchmen and leave the integrity of Christ and the apostles intact.114 
 
Our NT teaches that “the” Parousia, “the” resurrection and “the” judgment were all 
interconnected events that would occur in the lifetime of some of those listening to Jesus . 
. . . The skeptics remain, rapping their fingertips on the table, smiling at our refusal to 
answer their challenge.115 
 
A bit later, he adds “unbelieving Jews” to those whose “charge of ‘unfulfilled 
prophecy’ must be answered”: 
 
The Jews connected the Parousia, Resurrection and Judgment with the full arrival of the 
Messiah’s eternal kingdom.  They can’t buy the idea of thousands of years of transition 
period between the Messiah’s coming in humility (the Suffering Servant) and His return 
in glory and victory.116 
 
                                                 
113 Amazingly, from that very time on! 
114 Edward E. Stevens, Stevens Response to Gentry, 2nd ed. (Bradford, PA: International Preterist 
Association, 1999), 32. 
115 Edward E. Stevens, Questions About the Afterlife (Bradford, PA: International Preterist 
Association, 1999), 2-3. 
116 Ibid., 8. 
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Stevens is well aware of the intramural debates among hyper-preterists 
about the proper understanding of the resurrection accompanying the Parousia, 
and he frankly admits that “we may have difficulty explaining exactly what the 
nature of the event was.”  Nevertheless, he insists that 
 
the time of the event cannot be sidestepped without unraveling the integrity of Christ 
and the NT.  Time defines nature.  Since the resurrection event must have happened 
then, and since it didn’t occur in the physically literal manner that we have expected, we 
are forced to reinterpret the nature of fulfillment as defined by the creeds.117 
 
John Noē agrees: 
 
The necessary first step toward enhancing one’s understanding of resurrection reality is 
to grasp its biblically pinpointed time frame. 
 
. . . We should allow the immanency of expectations of Jesus and all New Testament 
writers to correct our understanding of the time, nature, and fulfillment of all kingdom 
realities, including this one resurrection event.118 
 
 Note well the flow of thought.  It is not the case that a careful exegetical 
study of a key resurrection passage of the New Testament has caused the hyper-
preterist to step back and say, “Oh my!  The inspired Paul was not teaching a 
bodily resurrection of believers at the bodily return of the Lord.  His words do 
not say that at all.  The entire church has misunderstood Paul throughout her 
history!”  Rather, “the necessary first step” (see Noē above) is to decide that the 
second coming of Christ and all that was to follow immediately upon it, 
including the resurrection of “those who belong to Him” (1 Cor. 15:23), 
happened in A.D. 70.  Then the second step is to reinterpret all the biblical 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 51. 
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passages that speak of the coming resurrection in a way that could plausibly 
have happened at that time. 
 Obviously an orthodox Christian response to hyper-preterism must 
address the prophetic “time texts” of the New Testament; however, that specific 
issue is outside the scope of this dissertation.  But it is also important to reverse 
the hyper-preterist methodology, as it were, and to see that a careful reading of 
the New Testament teaching regarding the nature of the resurrection renders 
impossible the notion that this event occurred two millennia ago. 
 Now, this indeed means that our understanding of the so-called “delay” 
of the second coming of Christ will be different from that of those who have long 
referred to it by that term.  But is that so surprising?  The apostle Peter faced such 
scoffers, and his reply to them in 2 Peter 3 is another of many New Testament 
passages that are so difficult to harmonize with hyper-preterism.  Stevens insists 
that “the only alternative” to the hyper-preterist proposal that the Parousia and 
the resurrection occurred in A.D. 70 “is to walk into the skeptics’ camp, lay down 
our armor, and unconditionally surrender to their attack on the credibility of The 
Faith.”119  Instead, he proposes that believers join the skeptics in not believing 
that there is yet to be a personal, visible, bodily return of Christ, the resurrection 
of the body, a final judgment, and “a new heaven and a new earth, the home of 
righteousness,” as described in 2 Peter 3:13.  The believer is called upon to beat 
the skeptic by joining him, by becoming himself a skeptic.  Surely Berkouwer’s 
counsel is wise and biblical at this point: 
 
But does the NT really present a crisis or impasse or disappointment? . . . [T]here are 
surely traces in the NT that indicate that His coming had been expected sooner.  But it 
does not necessarily follow from this that a crisis is inevitable.  A crisis will arise only if 
faith in God’s promises about the Parousia is lost. 
                                                 
119 Stevens, Questions About the Afterlife, 16. 
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In order to comprehend the meaning of the nearness concept, we should make it clear 
that again and again the NT stresses the fact that the time of the Lord’s return remains 
unknown to us . . . . This unknown quality demands watchfulness throughout the four 
watches of the night.  The danger lies in being unprepared for the coming of the Lord.120 
 
Note well that when Ed Stevens refers sardonically to “the skeptics [who] 
remain, rapping their fingertips on the table, smiling at our refusal to answer 
their challenge,” it is the skeptics who really control his interpretation, not only 
of the resurrection, but of virtually the entire New Testament.  That is because 
his “presupposition” is that the skeptics are correct about what the New 
Testament teaches about the timing of the events of the consummation.  And 
because of that presupposition the New Testament is radically transformed by 
the hyper-preterists into a canon for the church living in the transition period 
between Christ’s resurrection and His return in A.D. 70.  As a result, its teaching 
on almost every page must be “transposed into a different key” before it can 
speak with relevance to believers living after the year A.D. 70.121 
 Perhaps most of what should be said by way of exposition and critique of 
the hyper-preterist doctrine of the resurrection of the body can be organized 
most conveniently around an examination of 1 Corinthians 15, the most 
extensive treatment of the resurrection in the entire Bible.  First, however, by way 
of background, it will be helpful to review the meaning of “resurrection” in the 
Old Testament, in first-century Judaism, and in the Greco-Roman world in which 
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The Meaning of “Resurrection” in the Old Testament, First- 
Century Judaism, and the Greco-Roman World 
 
The key to a proper understanding of the Old Testament teaching about the 
believer’s life after death and bodily resurrection is found in the New Testament, 
in 2 Timothy 1:9-10, where Paul speaks of the gospel and the power of God, 
“who has saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, 
but according to His own purpose and grace.”  The apostle then goes on to say, 
“[This grace] now has been revealed by the appearing of our Savior Christ Jesus, 
who abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the 
gospel.”  Berkouwer writes, “The message of the gospel is not a ‘spiritual’ thing, 
but good tidings applied to man’s entire existence, his total experience.”122 
 Many Christians have been puzzled by the meagerness of Old Testament 
revelation about what lies ahead for believers when they die,123 and many false 
teachers have taken advantage of this paucity of information to fashion elaborate 
tales of the shadowy world of Hades and of Christ’s “harrowing of hell” after 
His death.  But attempts to establish a contrast between the afterlife of Old 
Testament saints and that of New Testament saints are misguided.  The simple 
truth is that very little was revealed about the afterlife before our crucified and 
risen Savior conquered death and “brought to light” what had been previously 
shrouded in deep darkness. 
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 This is not to say, however, that the concept of bodily resurrection is 
entirely missing in the Old Testament.  Berkouwer writes, “Although it cannot be 
denied that in the Israelite view of death a great deal of emphasis was placed on 
the meaning of this present life on earth, it does not follow that there was no real 
eschatological expectation.”124  The three resurrections recorded in the narrative 
of Elijah and Elisha (1 Kings 17:17-24, the widow at Zarephath’s son; 2 Kings 
4:18-37, the Shunammite’s son; 2 Kings 13:20-21, the corpse thrown into Elisha’s 
grave) were all resurrections of whole persons, body and soul.  Along with the 
bodily assumption of Elijah to heaven (2 Kings 2:11), reminiscent of God’s taking 
away of Enoch (Genesis 5:24), these events prepared God’s people for the 
concept of eschatological resurrection. 
 Ezekiel’s vision of the valley of dry bones (Ezekiel 37:1-14) is a dramatic 
description of bodily resurrection.  Bones come together, tendons reattach, flesh 
appears, skin covers the flesh, and the breath of life is breathed in again.  Hyper-
preterists are quick to correctly point out that this vision is given to Ezekiel as a 
picture of God’s restoration of His people to the land of Israel, and that 
“resurrection imagery”125 is here used metaphorically.  But it must not be 
forgotten that “the standard use of any term is presupposed by the metaphorical 
use, and we would not understand the metaphor without it.”126  For a metaphor 
to convey any meaning, there must be a concrete phenomenon behind it that 
supplies the standard of reference.  Unless Ezekiel’s readers and hearers knew 
the meaning of a literal resurrection from the grave—and in chapter 37 they are 
given a vivid description to make that meaning crystal clear—they would have 
no idea of what God meant when He promised to grant them a “resurrection” to 
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their land.  Berkouwer makes the point that “this prophecy does not deal with an 
abstract possibility, but with a divine act in restoring His people Israel.  This 
proclamation of God’s merciful power of life does not relativize the power of 
death, but makes it subservient to and contrasts it with God’s power, as the light 
of resurrection shines into the utter and despairing darkness.”127  And thus when, 
in the progress of redemption and revelation, God raised His own Son from the 
grave and promised His people a resurrection like His at His return, the meaning 
of that historical event and that future event were quite clear. 
 Other Old Testament texts indicate that the doctrine of a future 
resurrection was being progressively revealed, although never fully before 
Christ.  Difficult questions have been raised about the proper text and translation 
of Job 19:25-27, but for good reason there is remarkable agreement among the 
leading contemporary English Bibles and commentaries.  I quote here the New 
International Version, citing other versions in brackets at the key points in 
dispute: 
 
 I know that my Redeemer [Hebrew go’el; NASB margin, “Vindicator”]  
lives, 
     and that in the end [NASB, ESV, “at the last”] he will stand upon 
the earth. 
 And after my skin has been destroyed, yet 
    in [Job: NET,128 “from;” NLT margin, ESV margin, “without”] my flesh 
I will see God; 
 I myself [NLT, ESV, “for myself”] will see him 
    with my own eyes—I, and not another. 
     How my heart yearns within me! 
 
 Francis I. Andersen wisely comments that “two extremes should be 
avoided” here.129  On the one hand, the central theme of the passage—“Job’s 
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certainty of ultimate vindication”—is so loud as to be unmistakable, and cannot 
be drowned out “by the static of textual difficulties.”  On the other hand, the full, 
rich doctrine of the resurrection brought to light by the risen Christ “should not 
be read back into the passage.”  We must not overlook, however, the 
“tremendous emphasis on ‘seeing God.’”  Job repeats that point three times in 
verses 26-27, emphasizing the personal character of this seeing:130 “I shall see God 
. . . I shall see for myself, and my eyes shall behold, and not another” (ESV).  And, as 
Andersen says, “the references to skin, flesh, and eyes make it clear that Job 
expects to have this experience as a man, not just as a disembodied shade, or in 
his mind’s eye.”  Interestingly, Andersen argues that the precursor of the hope 
that Job expresses in 19:25-27 is the longing he expressed earlier, in 14:13-17, that, 
should the day of his vindication not come before his death, God would “hide” 
him “in the grave” until the “time” “set” for His “renewal” and then 
“remember” him and “long for the creature [His] hands have made.”  At that 
time, God “will call” and Job “will answer” Him.  This oft-overlooked passage 
confirms that “the hope of the resurrection” eventually comes to lie “at the very 
heart of Job’s faith.”131  Berkouwer states: 
 
Nothing of the radical gravity of death is discounted; at the same time the believer 
continually retains his faith in the God of life.  The latter perspective presupposes the 
radicality and horizonlessness of what is possible from the human side.  On the basis of 
his own existence man is unable to determine the meaning of death or to reduce its 
ultimate seriousness.  But this seriousness of death remains subject to divine possibilities, 
which come into play at the point man encounters the irreversibility of death.  At this 
moment, on the border between life and death, Yahweh’s power of life becomes 
operative in Israel’s religion.  Sheol does not have the last word. 
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This power of life of Yahweh is related to resurrection, . . .132 
 
 Intimations, not merely of immortality, but of resurrection, are found in the 
Psalms (16:9-11 [Acts 2:25-27; 13:35]; 17:15;133 49:15), Isaiah (25:7-8 [1 Cor. 15:54]; 
26:19), and Hosea (13:14 [1 Cor. 15:55]), culminating in Daniel 12:1-3, where the 
reference is not merely to the oppression under Antiochus IV, but to “the time of 
the end” (Dan. 11:40), the eschatological end.134  Murray Harris notes the 
“unambiguous references to unparalleled tribulation, resurrection, and final 
reward and judgment.”135  Verse 2 reads, “Multitudes who sleep in the dust of 
the earth will awake: some to everlasting life, others to shame and everlasting 
contempt.”  Berkouwer states: 
 
What seems definitive for man in its inevitability is neither inevitable nor definitive with 
God.  He provides a return from the land from which there was no return.  Even if one is 
ill-disposed to “systematize” Israelite eschatology, he must acknowledge the impressive 
force of this message.  The raising of the dead is only mentioned very incidentally and 
enigmatically in the Old Testament . . ., unlike the New Testament, where such signs are 
central.  But in these incidental and fragmentary accounts, as in the translation of Enoch 
(Gen. 5:24) and the ascension of Elijah (2 Kings 2:1-12) there is an unambiguous 
testimony to the power of the living God.136 
 
 On the basis of such teaching in the canonical Old Testament, as well as in 
many passages in the intertestamental apocalyptic Jewish literature, mainstream 
Jews at the time of Jesus believed in a bodily resurrection of the dead at the end 
of history.  We could have assumed, even before reading the Gospels, that Jesus 
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and His followers shared that belief.137  Martha reflects that standard Jewish 
hope: “I know [Lazarus] will rise again in the resurrection at the last day” (John 
11:24).  Berkouwer states, “As it is portrayed in the gospel, the Lord saw the 
disruption of life by sickness and death as a fearful destruction . . . . He did not 
respond to his friend’s death with pacifying words about the security of the soul; 
He responded with intense prayer and a call to faith in the glory of God: ‘Did I 
not tell you that if you would believe you would see the glory of God’ (vs. 
40)?”138  It should go without saying that the Jews anticipated a resurrection of 
the body.  Murray Harris notes the consequence of that fact when he discusses the 
significance of Jesus’ empty tomb: 
 
Moreover, in Jewish thought the idea of a Resurrection . . . after death necessarily 
involved (at least) the revival of the physical body, the emptying of the grave.  No one 
could be said to be resurrected while his corpse lay in a tomb.139 
 
Up to the time of the destruction of the temple, “there was a small but highly 
placed and influential minority,” the Sadducees, who “clung to the primitive 
agnosticism” and denied the resurrection.140  But Jesus clearly opposed their 
teaching and spoke to them about the “children of the resurrection,” “those who 
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are considered worthy of taking part in that age and in the resurrection from the 
dead” (Luke 20:27-40).  Berkouwer states: 
 
There are passages in the gospels that speak more explicitly of the resurrection.  This 
comes to the fore in Christ’s dispute with the Sadducees, when He points up the flaws in 
their opposition to the doctrine of the resurrection.  Their attempt at reductio ad absurdum 
with an appeal to the Old Testament law of levirate marriage ran up against Christ’s 
wisdom.  “You are wrong, because you know neither the scriptures nor the power of 
God (Matt. 22:29).  Christ reminds them of the words of the Lord, “I am the God of 
Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob” (vs. 32; cf. Exod. 3:6).  This had 
been spoken at a time when these patriarchs had already passed away.  So the 
significance of what follows comes into focus: “He is not the God of the dead, but of the 
living.”  Though He might have cited a more explicit word about the resurrection from 
either Isaiah or Daniel, Christ sees the mystery of the resurrection wrapped up in these 
words of the living God, who, in His faithfulness and mercy, enters into communion with 
man and preserves him in that communion.  Through this communion the resurrection 
becomes real.  This contains no separate treatment of body and soul, but speaks of the 
whole man, on whom the living God bestows His mercy.  In this joyful message, which 
touches the whole man, is the most profound argument against a spiritualistic 
misinterpretation of God’s intent with respect to creation and fulfillment. 
 
The difference between the Old and New Testaments is not that the one lacks and the 
other has an eschatology.  Rather it is that only in the New Testament is the meaning of 
the reality of Yahweh’s power of life fully revealed.  The focus is no longer on what God 
can do, but on what He has done.  All the earlier incidental and fragmented references to 
resurrection center in the fact of salvation through the actual resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
the first-born from the dead.  In the proclamation of the gospel to the world, it is revealed 
that God’s power of life is not just a “possibility,” but an act of the living God, whose 
power extends beyond the limits of death and supersedes the reach of Sheol.141 
 
Jesus spoke clearly of the resurrection and Luke also records how Paul later took 
his stand before the Sanhedrin on the side of the Pharisees against the Sadducees: 
“I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee.  I stand on trial because of my hope in the 
resurrection of the dead” (Acts 23:6).  It is well to remember when we come to 
consider 1 Corinthians 15 that this is the apostle who wrote that letter. 
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 By both His words and His deeds, our Lord Jesus Christ provided clear 
instruction about resurrection even before His own triumphant resurrection, that 
resurrection which provides not only the model and the guarantee, but also the 
basis of our resurrection.  When Jesus spoke of the “temple” that He would 
“raise . . . again in three days,” the temple he spoke of, John tells us, “was His 
body” (John 2:19-21).  As the One to whom the Father has given authority to 
judge “because He is the Son of Man,” Jesus announced: “Do not marvel at this, 
for an hour [Greek ωρα] is coming when all who are in the tombs will hear His 
voice and come out, those who have done good to the resurrection of life, and 
those who have done evil to the resurrection of judgment” (John 5:28-29 ESV).  
Here Jesus clearly echoes Daniel 12:2, but interestingly He refers not to 
“multitudes who sleep in the dust of the earth,” but to “all who are in their 
graves” (NIV).  (Also interesting are the hermeneutical gymnastics in which 
hyper-preterists must engage in order to avoid the clear teaching of these verses 
regarding one coming resurrection for all, both righteous and unrighteous.) 
 John Noē seeks to redefine “resurrection” as “simply put, life from 
death.”142  But clearly that definition is too simple and not sufficiently specific.  
When Jesus granted life to the widow of Nain’s son, this “dead man” received a 
return to bodily life; he “sat up and began to talk” (Luke 7:15).  Likewise, when 
Jesus commanded the dead daughter of Jairus to “get up,” “her spirit returned 
[to her body], and at once she stood up” and was given “something to eat” (Luke 
8:54-55). 
 Lazarus’s resurrection (John 11:38-44) was clearly a bodily resurrection.  
Indeed we are beginning to see that the use of that adjective when referring to 
the raising of one who has suffered psycho-physical death is redundant.  We have 
                                                 
142  Noē, Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion, 47. 
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already noted that the term resurrection can be used figuratively in the Bible, but 
such secondary, figurative uses are based on the primary, literal meaning of 
resurrection, which refers to the actual raising of the psycho-physically dead back 
to life, despite the insistence of hyper-preterists that the phrases “bodily 
resurrection” or “resurrection of the body” do not appear in the Bible, as though 
that means that the concept does not appear in the Bible.  Lazarus was raised after 
four days to the same life he had known before his death, and thus his 
resurrection was merely a sign of the resurrection of Jesus after three days to 
imperishable, immortal, heavenly glory.  Andrew Lincoln’s insights at this point 
are worth quoting in full: 
 
[Lazarus’s] temporary restoration to normal human life points beyond itself to the full 
resurrection and eschatological life that Jesus provides.  Yet the sign also indicates that 
human bodily life is significant, because it points to the belief that eternal life will not 
finally involve an escape from the body but will entail physical resurrection.  When Jesus, 
“with a loud voice,” cries out: “Lazarus, come out!” (v. 43), this is a narrative 
embodiment of his words in 5:28-29: “For an hour is coming when all who are in their 
tombs will hear his voice and will come out.”  This sign anticipates the final resurrection.  
In so doing, however, it also anticipates the anticipation of that resurrection in Jesus’ 
resurrection.  In both cases there is a tomb and a stone has to be removed.  In both cases 
the grief and faith of women disciples are to the fore.  And in both accounts the grave 
clothes—particularly the head cloth—are singled out for mention (cf. 11:44; 20:7).  But 
here the difference is telling: Lazarus exits from the tomb still bound in these wrappings, 
whereas in Jesus’ resurrection they are left behind and rolled up, indicating Jesus’ own 
sovereignty over death . . . . And just as for the incarnate Logos divine life overcame 
death in a bodily resurrection, so for believers, too, eternal life will triumph over physical 
death through resurrection.143 
 
A final point by way of background, before turning to 1 Corinthians 15, 
can be made briefly: While belief in the eternal survival of the soul was fairly 
common in the Greco-Roman world into which the first Christians came 
                                                 
143  Andrew T. Lincoln, “’I Am the Resurrection and the Life’: The Resurrection Message of the 
Fourth Gospel,” in Life in the Face of Death: The Resurrection Message of the New Testament, ed. 
Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 140-43. 
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preaching the gospel, belief in bodily resurrection was looked upon as utter 
foolishness and rejected out of hand.  Peter Bolt summarizes his study of the 
term resurrection in the literature of this period succinctly and helpfully: “When 
‘resurrection’ proper is mentioned in nonbiblical Greek literature, it is most 
commonly in a statement of its impossibility: the dead are not raised.”144 
 C. F. Evans says, “Certainly Christians did not invent the idea of 
resurrection; the way it was thought about and the terminology for expressing 
this thought [were] already current.”145  The two verbs used by Paul in his 
Corinthians discussion, and shown to be synonymous in this connection by their 
interchangeable use in verses 20 and 22, εγηγερται and αναστασις, were already 
current in Greek literature, and that latter term in particular, αναστασις, literally 
“standing up,” or “standing again,” “meant always for these first-century men, 
Jews and Greeks alike, Josephus, Paul, and the Corinthians, resurrection of the 
body.”146  Thus Tertullian, like many other early church fathers, argued that the 
very language of resurrection (αναστασις; Latin resurrection) can apply only to 
the body, since only that can “stand up” which has previously “fallen down,” 
and the soul does not fall down as the body does; indeed, “the soul does not 
even fall into sleep along with the body, nor does it with its companion even lie 
down in repose.”147  Hyper-preterists Richard C. Leonard and Janice E. Leonard, 
in their book The Promise of His Coming, counter as follows: 
 
The New Testament term for resurrection, anastasis, is not a theological word but is 
related to the verb stēnai Paul employs in the above passage [Eph. 6:11-13].  In ancient 
                                                 
144  Peter G. Bolt, “Life, Death, and the Afterlife in the Greco-Roman World,” in Life in the Face of 
Death, ed. Longenecker, 74.  Cf. A. J. M. Wedderburn, Baptism and Resurrection (Tübingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), 181. 
145  C. F. Evans, Resurrection and the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1970), 20. 
146  Clayton R. Bowen, The Resurrection in the New Testament (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1911), 76. 
147  Tertullian, “On the Resurrection of the Flesh,” in ANF, 3:558. 
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Greek literature, stēnai is sometimes used in the sense of rising up in protest or rebellion.  
Resurrection or anastasis is literally “standing again” in defiance of enemy powers, and 
thus contains an element of vindication.148 
 
The Leonards, who seem to have no grasp of the fact that any word must be 
interpreted in its context, go on to make that supposed “element” the central 
meaning of both Christ’s resurrection and ours, thus emptying resurrection of any 
reference to the body.  Jim West well asks, “What kind of credibility can a person 
have who would argue that the Greek word for resurrection is ‘not a theological 
word’?!  The Leonards both dodge and discount the word αναστασις as it is 
used throughout the Bible.”149 
 Equally incredible is the following statement by the preterist Daniel E. 
Harden: 
 
As the book of Corinthians was written to a Greek church, and as much of our NT is 
targeted to a Greek audience, we must understand the common understanding of the 
Greek mind as well . . . . What is of note is that up to that time, not one Greek perception 
of “resurrection” had anything to do with the physical body.  The “resurrection” was a 
term that was descriptive merely of what happens to a man when he dies and leaves his 
physical body behind.  The common understanding, then, wasn’t that the physical body 
is brought back to life, but that the soul proceeds from out of the dead body.150 
 
But if that was the “common understanding of the Greek mind,” then why was 
Paul mocked by the Greek philosophers in Athens when he began to speak about 
the resurrection of the dead?  The fact is that, aside from such minority views as 
those held by Hymenaeus and Philetus (whom Paul opposes in 2 Timothy 2:18) 
and the late second-century Christian Gnostic Treatise on the Resurrection, the 
Greek world understood resurrection to refer to the body. 
                                                 
148  R. C. Leonard and J. E. Leonard, The Promise of His Coming (Chicago: Laudemont Press, 1996), 
181. 
149  Jim West, “The Allurement of Hymenaen Preterism,” at www.chalcedon.edu. 
150  Daniel E. Harden, “A Response to Mathison: Audience Relevance!” at www.preterist.org. 
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Whether they were sophisticated intellectuals or simple artisans, Greeks had one feature 
in common: resurrection was totally foreign to their worldview . . . . To a Greek the term 
resurrection would signify “reanimation” when used of persons, so that the expression 
“the resurrection of the dead” (Acts 17:32) would mean “the resuscitation of corpses,” a 
patent absurdity to an Epicurean.151 
 
The doctrine of the resurrection—first of Christ and then of His people at His 
return—was the Christian teaching most violently rejected by the pagan mind.  It 
had to be repeatedly addressed as such by the earliest Christian apologists all the 
way down to Augustine three and a half centuries later.152  Berkouwer states, 
“Nowhere in the gospel of Christ is salvation portrayed as the soul’s liberation 
from the body.”153  Nothing in the philosophy or theology of the Greeks or the 
Romans had prepared them to accept the strange new teaching that Paul 
presents in 1 Corinthians 15. 
 
1 Corinthians 15 
 
In this section, I would like to first present the essential elements of some 
representative hyper-preterist interpretations of this pivotal chapter, and then to 
consider particular errors of those interpretations as I work through Paul’s 
argument. 
 
Max King’s “Collective Body” Interpretation 
 
                                                 
151  Harris, From Grave to Glory, 41-42. 
152  H. Cornēlis, “The Resurrection of the Body and Primitive Conceptions of the Last Things,” in 
The Resurrection of the Body, by H. Cornēlis et. al., tr. M. Joselyn (Notre Dame, IN: Fides 
Publishers, 1964), 48. 
153  Berkouwer, 191. 
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The most influential hyper-preterist writer in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
Max King, who devotes 285 pages of his massive book, The Cross and the Parousia 
of Christ,154 directly to the doctrine of the resurrection (more pages than to any 
other topic).  King emphasizes that the (alleged) second coming of Christ in A.D. 
70 marked both the end (1 Cor. 15:24) of the old covenant and the old aeon 
(which had been in the process of ending since the Cross) and the beginning of 
the new covenant and the age to come, this Christian age which is “the 
consummation of the new creation in Christ,” the “new heaven and earth 
wherein dwelleth righteousness (2 Pet. 3:13)” (31).  Thus, for the church living 
after A.D. 70, all the eschatological promises of the New Testament have become 
her history, because Paul and the other New Testament writers “entertained no 
future expectations that extended beyond the time restriction of ‘that 
generation’” (33). 
 What then are we to make of the resurrection of believers, which Paul said 
would occur at Christ’s coming (1 Cor. 15:23)?  Obviously, King writes, “the 
traditional view of resurrection from biological death in untenable” (381).  Paul is 
speaking here of the establishment of the church as Christ’s resurrection body, 
“the completion of Christ’s death and resurrection” (385).  It is the church 
collectively that is raised into the new “body” of Christ and “out of the Old 
Testament Jewish system.”155  The “dead” referred to in 1 Corinthians 15:12ff, 
whose resurrection some at Corinth were denying, “in that context” must be the 
“faithful Jews of the Old Covenant” (390).  Paul is assuring the Corinthians that 
                                                 
154  Max R. King, The Cross and the Parousia of Christ: The Two Dimensions of One Age-Changing 
Eschaton (Warren, OH: Parkman Road Church of Christ, 1987).  Page references to this book will 
be given in the text. 
155  Stevens, Stevens Response to Gentry, 28.  The notion that we should see Christ as raised in His 
church, His body, is remarkably similar to the teaching of John Knox, a liberal scholar of the last 
generation.  See Robert B. Strimple, “Jesus and the Church: A Critical Study of the Christology of 
John Knox” in WJT 35 (1972): 36-64. 
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the saints who had died under the old covenant would not miss out on the defeat 
of “the powers of sin and death . . . in this new mode of existence in Christ” (417). 
 King begins the summary of his long section on “The Resurrection of the 
Dead” with this statement: “It is axiomatic that context determines content” (649, 
emphasis original)—and so it is.  So what is the contextual basis for 
understanding “the dead” in 1 Corinthians 15:12 to be “the faithful Jews of the 
Old Covenant”?  None is offered by King.  He says that “the centrality of the 
Jew-Gentile relational problem in 1 Cor. 15 is impressively clear” (472), but is it?  
King goes on to refer to New Testament texts that indicate that the early church 
faced serious questions about the place of Israel in God’s plan of salvation (most 
importantly, Romans 9-11), but he cannot show that this is the question being 
addressed in 1 Corinthians 15.  If we search for references to the Jews earlier in 
this letter, we find Paul saying in 9:20 that “to the Jews I became like a Jew, to 
win the Jews,” and in 10:11 he speaks of Israel’s Exodus experiences as 
“examples . . . written down as warnings for us.”  But is it credible that when 
Paul gets down to chapter 15 and begins speaking about “the resurrection of the 
dead,” he is introducing the question of whether the faithful Jews of the old 
covenant are to share in the new covenant blessings of Christ—even though he 
has never used the phrase “resurrection of the dead” anywhere else in this 
distinctive sense?  Note that when the apostle speaks of the Jews in chapter 9, or 
of our forefathers who were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea in 
chapter 10—or when he speaks of the Israelites in Romans 9-11—he refers to 
them in clear, straightforward, unmistakable terms. 
 The fact is that the Corinthian context cries out for a simple, 
straightforward understanding of the reference to the “resurrection of the dead” 
in verse 12.  We will examine the evidence for that later, when we consider the 
error that Paul is addressing in this chapter.  But simply notice here that the 
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phrase in question in verse 12 is the second appearance of the Greek noun νεκρων 
(“dead”) in that sentence.  The first reference is to Christ’s having been “raised 
from the dead.”  King may refer us to Romans 9:5 and to the fact that Christ is 
descended from the Israelites according to the flesh—from which he infers that 
perhaps Christ’s having been raised “from the dead” is a reference to His 
solidarity with Israel (481)—but since we have already read here in 1 Corinthians 
15 that Christ died (v. 3) and was buried (v. 4), when we then read in verse 12 
that He “has been raised from the dead,” we hardly need to reach afar afield for 
an understanding of Paul’s statement. 
 This point is crucial and must not be missed: King’s failure adequately to 
consider the context along with the immediate context in which a passage of 
Scripture appears is one of his fundamental errors.  The only “context” that he 
considers is his own concept of the overarching covenantal framework of the 
entire Bible.  For King, that schematic controls everything, so that it is impossible 
for the biblical writer, by the Spirit’s inspiration, to write straightforwardly on 
any subject in words clear enough that King cannot twist them so as to make 
them fit in with his preconceived system.  Perhaps there is no principle of biblical 
interpretation so easily abused as the familiar principle of comparing Scripture 
with Scripture (sola scriptura).  Of course the need to do that is real and vitally 
important, because there is in the ultimate sense just one author of the entire 
Bible, the Holy Spirit.  But if that method is employed without regard to the 
immediate context of each particular biblical statement, the result is to make the 






The “Immortal Spiritual Body at Death” Interpretation of Stevens, Noē, 
Harden, and Others 
 
Note that these more recent hyper-preterist writers do not reject King’s 
interpretation entirely.  John Noē writes, “Although the collective body view of 
resurrection may be hard to grasp, that’s no reason to reject it.”  Noē hastens to 
add, however: “As valid as this collective body view may be, it’s only one 
perspective of the greater and multifaceted resurrected reality.”156 
 Indeed, so “multifaceted” does the hyper-preterist doctrine of the 
“bodily” resurrection become, that the reader may soon feel hopelessly lost.  
What the apostle Paul presents as a once-for-all event at the second coming of 
Christ, actually becomes in hyper-preterist doctrine a “continuing process.”157 
 Daniel Harden is one hyper-preterist who insists that “the resurrection 
was a one-time event in which the Old Testament saints were brought out of 
Hades and finally overcame Death to be with the Lord, thanks to Christ’s 
finished work of salvation.”  Therefore, he will not use the term resurrection for 
anything that happens after Christ’s return in A.D. 70.  Harden emphasizes that 
“we today aren’t ‘resurrected’; we don’t have to wait in Hades.”  However, most 
of his hyper-preterist colleagues use the term resurrection regularly to refer to a 
series of events.  Furthermore, Harden himself writes later in his book that of the 
“three basic views of the resurrection in the New Testament . . . only the last 
(which Harden calls “the individual immortal-body-at-death resurrection view”) 
truly addresses the Corinthian concerns for their dead brethren . . . [and] 
                                                 
156  Noē, Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion, 114-15. 
157  John L. Bray, The Rapture of Christians (Lakeland, FL: John L. Bray Ministry, 1998), 11.  See also 
Leonard and Leonard, The Promise of His Coming, 171; Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 57.  
Randall E. Otto says that the hyper-preterist view is “that the resurrection indeed began with the 
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maintains the idea or thought of what was commonly meant and understood by 
the word ‘resurrection’ in the first century.”158  First we are told that what 
happens to individual believers at death should not be called a “resurrection” 
because “the resurrection was a one-time event,” and then twenty-four pages 
later we are told that only an individual “resurrection” at death satisfies the 
concerns of the passage and maintains the Greek idea of resurrection. 
 It seems that hyper-preterists maintain that, by His resurrection and 
ascension and second coming, Christ transported deceased old covenant saints 
from the shadowy realm of Hades into the heavenly presence of God (see, e.g., 
the first quotation from Harden above).  Noē agrees with King that the “dead in 
Christ” or “those who have fallen asleep” is “a pre-parousia term (1 Cor. 15:6, 18, 
51)” and “they were departed and saved Old Testament saints, and possibly 1st-
century Christians who had or would die before the eschatological resurrection 
event . . . . [T]his group was, both spiritually and in some sense physically, 
separated from fellowship with God.”159  Here again, a process is involved.  
Harden writes: 
 
The transition saints [who died after Christ’s resurrection and] before AD 70 did not have 
immortality in the presence of God when they died physically . . . . They didn’t go to 
Hades at physical death, but they did have to wait in the outer courts of the heavenly 
temple (Rev. 6, 7) or at the foot of Mt. Zion (Heb. 12) until Christ finished His High 
Priestly Yom Kippur duties in the Holy of Holies and “appeared a second time” outside 
to invite them into God’s presence (where no one had been since Adam).160 
 
                                                 
158  Daniel E. Harden, Overcoming Sproul’s Resurrection Obstacles (Bradford, PA: International 
Preterist Association, 1999), 34-35 (emphasis added), 58 (emphasis original).  We addressed above 
Harden’s mistaken statements about the Greek concept of resurrection. 
159  Noē, Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion, 53-54. 
160  Harden, Overcoming Sproul’s Resurrection Obstacles, 95. 
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Notice in such an interpretation the kind of bizarre “literalism” (which, of course, 
is anything but literal in the contextual historico-grammatical sense161) that 
hyper-preterists combine with blatantly naturalistic rationalism.  (Similarly, note 
below the hyper-preterist objections to any meaningful continuity between our 
present body and our resurrected body.)  That combination is often characteristic 
of cultic thinking.  Harden’s hermeneutic (i.e., interpretive method) is 
reminiscent of Ellen G. White’s Seventh-day Adventist “investigative judgment” 
interpretation of Daniel 8:14—although, of course, the particulars and the time 
frames proposed are quite different (for Harden, Christ’s high priestly work lasts 
forty years, from A.D. 30 to 70; for White, His work lasts 1,810 years, from A.D. 34 
to 1844).  A truly biblical hermeneutic, on the other hand, will see the writer to 
the Hebrews using tabernacle imagery to present the redemptive efficacy of 
Christ’s once-for-all atoning sacrifice. 
 As mentioned previously when introducing our survey of the Old 
Testament’s doctrine of the resurrection, very little is said in Scripture about the 
afterlife before Christ conquered death and “brought life and immortality to 
light” (2 Tim. 1:10).  John Noē remarks, “Admittedly, this is a gray area and one 
about which the Bible says little”—but it is one of which Noē makes much.  He 
even acknowledges that “the actual existence or nonexistence of Hades is still 
actively debated in religious circles,” but you would never know this by reading 
the extensive hyper-preterist expositions of this doctrine and its implications.  
Noē justifies the prominence given to this doctrine in hyper-preterism by stating 
that what is “important” is that “neither Jesus nor any New Testament writer 
                                                 
161  Few will agree with John Noē’s contention that hyper-preterism presents the Bible’s teaching 
“in its literal, face-value meaning” (Your Resurrection Body and Life, 4). 
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ever challenged or corrected this 1st-century belief in a two-compartment, hadean 
realm”162—a singularly weak argument from silence. 
 Stevens, Noē, and others now differ from Max King in their contention 
that Paul is speaking in 1 Corinthians 15:35ff, not of what Christ accomplished 
definitely in A.D. 70, but rather of what now results from that victory for each 
individual Christian, i.e., that he or she receives immediately at death (for eternal 
life in heaven) a new body, immortal and spiritual. 
 Hyper-preterist writers confusingly move back and forth between their 
two resurrection “events”—the one in A.D. 70 (which is the focal point of hyper-
preterist theology, not the resurrection of Christ forty years earlier) and the other 
at whatever moment a particular believer dies.  And to add to the confusion, 
Stevens insists that “’the general resurrection’ . . . occurs at the Parousia . . . an AD 
70 event,” just as Noē says that Jesus, in speaking of a coming hour “when all 
who are in the tombs will hear His voice and come out, those who have done 
good to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil to the resurrection 
of judgment (John 5:28-29 ESV), was referring to the “one-and-only end [that] 
came in 70 A.D.”  Indeed, from Noē’s language one would certainly think that the 
resurrection was strictly a past event: “After 70 A.D. we have the fullness of 
salvation resurrection reality.  No longer is it a future hope.  It’s our heritage.  1 
Cor. 15:51-52.  What a change this was!”163 
 One would expect that all hyper-preterists who favor the immortal-body-
at-death view would surely interpret 1 Corinthians 15:53—“For the perishable 
must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality”—in 
                                                 
162  Ibid., 43, 40. 
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terms of that view.  But no; Daniel Harden, whom we have already cited in favor 
of the immortal-body-at-death view, writes on this verse: 
 
Same concept—we have redemption today, we have immortality, despite the corrupt and 
mortal physical nature and body.  We have the salvation and eternal life through Christ, 
which nullifies and overcomes the curse of this body.  We have incorruption despite still 
being in a body that is corrupt.164 
 
 Trying to critique the hyper-preterist doctrine of the resurrection is like 
trying to hit a moving target or trying to win at the old shell game.  If you point 
out that the New Testament teaches that the eschatological resurrection will be a 
one-time event, you will be answered with reference to A.D. 70; if you point out 
that attempts to interpret passages like 1 Corinthian 15:35ff in terms of what 
happened in A.D. 70 are totally unconvincing, you will be answered (usually, but 
see Harden above) with the immortal-body-at-death interpretation.  However, 
Max King himself lists three successive stages in the resurrection of the dead165—
and he did not even propose the fourth, immortal-body-at-death stage. 
 
The Error of Some of the Corinthians 
 
Displaying proper caution, John Calvin wrote, “I myself leave undecided the 
question of what the error of the Corinthians actually was.”166  Berkouwer 
maintains: 
 
In all probability the motive of those in Corinth was similar to that of Hymenaeus and 
Philetus.  These Corinthians most likely did not intend a brute, rationalistic denial of the 
resurrection.  It could well be that in this denial Paul was confronted of the logical 
                                                 
164  Harden, “A Response to Mathison.” 
165  See King, The Cross and the Parousia, 410. 
166  John Calvin, Commentary on the First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, tr. John W 
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conclusion of the “Gnostic” heresy of 2 Timothy 2:18.  In that case, we might ask whether 
Paul was addressing himself to the background (the resurrection has already taken place) 
or to the specific results.  Judging from the way he formulates his response, the latter is 
his intent, as well as to deal with the denial of the future resurrection.  For Paul there 
were more far-reaching consequences than these doubters themselves imagined when 
they said, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die” (1 Cor. 15:32; cf. Isa. 22:13).  There 
is a sort of nihilism, which Paul counters with a warning: “Come to your right mind, and 
sin no more” (1 Cor. 15:34).  It is probable that Paul is not here giving their philosophy of 
life, but his opinion of what the inevitable consequences of the denial of the future 
resurrection are.167 
 
Even with Berkouwer’s input, we must still acknowledge that we cannot 
reconstruct with certainty the precise theology of those at Corinth whom Paul 
addresses in verse 12 (“some of you”).  That must not cause us, however, to miss 
the obvious forest for the scholars’ speculations regarding the possible trees.  
What is clear from verse 12 is that some of the Corinthians denied that there 
would be a future resurrection to which Christians could look forward.  It seems 
highly improbable, from verse 11 and from Paul’s line of argument from verse 12 
on, that they were denying the resurrection of Christ168  Thus, I find Dahl’s 
suggestion helpful, that “the trouble with them is not apostasy but muddled 
thinking.”169 
 A survey of the most frequently made suggestions regarding the error that 
prompts Paul’s argument in chapter 15 follows: 
 1.  Some (e.g., Karl Barth) have suggested that these deniers of the 
resurrection of the dead did not believe in any life after death at all, or at least 
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that Paul thought they didn’t (Bultmann).  Isn’t that indicated by verses 19 and 
32 in particular?  “If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are to be pitied 
more than all men” (v. 19).  “If the dead are not raised, ‘Let us eat and drink, for 
tomorrow we die’” (v. 32) and that’s that.  Judging from Paul’s argument in this 
chapter, it seems that, whatever the particulars of their denial of the resurrection 
may have been, a large element of Greek rationalistic skepticism was at work.  As 
we shall see, this is also true of hyper-preterism’s objections to the resurrection of 
the body. 
 2.  Others (e.g., Schweitzer, Conzelmann) have suggested that some of the 
Corinthians believed that only those still alive at the Parousia would participate 
in the eternal life of the new age that Christ would usher in then.  This might 
seem similar to the error that existed among the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 4:13ff), 
except that the worry of the Thessalonians was due to ignorance, and therefore 
could be removed simply by Paul’s giving them further instruction, whereas the 
Corinthian deniers knew of his resurrection teaching and had rejected it.  Thus, 
Paul had to bring arguments against the Corinthians to convince them of the 
error and perversity of their rejection.170 
 According to these two views, these Corinthians denied that there is any 
life after death at all.  It seems that most commentators find it difficult to believe 
that that was the Corinthians’ error, pointing especially to verse 29.  If they 
believed that death simply ended everything, why were they practicing vicarious 
baptism for the dead?  But, of course, that may have been precisely the question 
that Paul was asking them.171 
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practice in the primitive Church” (The Resurrection of the Body, 79).  Taking this passing reference 
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 The next three views are the ones most frequently suggested.  It should be 
emphasized that they are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, it is quite possible that 
any two or all three notions were at work in these Corinthian deniers of the 
resurrection. 
 3.  Many commentators remind us of the popularity among the Greeks of 
a doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which denied the possibility, or even 
desirability, of a resurrection of the body.  Dahl sees the difficulties that these 
Corinthians were having with the doctrine of the resurrection as being “such as 
one would expect to find in a Greek or Hellenistic community conditioned to 
believe that all matter . . . is either evil or illusory, and who would tend to think 
of salvation in terms of the immortality of the soul.”172  Cullmann reminds us that 
“in Athens there was no laughter until Paul spoke of the resurrection (Acts 
17:32).”  He suggests that “indeed for the Greeks who believed in the immortality 
of the soul it may have been harder to accept the Christian preaching of the 
resurrection than it was for others.”173 
 It might be thought that an obvious objection to this third suggestion is 
the fact (noted above) that Paul seems to argue that the Corinthians’ denial was 
really a denial of any future life, whether for soul or for body.  But perhaps this is 
simply Paul’s way of combating their “muddled thinking” (Dahl), by making it 
clear that, for the Christian, the pagan doctrine of immortality for the soul, but 
not for the body, is tantamount to no hope at all—and is certainly not the sure 
hope grounded in the resurrection of Christ. 
                                                                                                                                                 
at “face value,” there is no indication that the apostle endorses it.  He is merely presenting the ad 
hominem argument that the denial of the resurrection of the dead and the practice of vicarious 
baptism are inconsistent and contradictory. 
172  Ibid., 12.  John Murray writes: “Any disparaging conception of the body springs from pagan 
and anti-biblical sources and has no affinity with biblical thought” (“The Last Things,” in The 
Collected Writings of John Murray [Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 1976-82], 2:401). 
173  Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? (New York: Macmillan, 
1958), 59. 
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 4.  There is clear evidence, not only in chapter 15, but elsewhere in both 
Corinthian letters, of what might be called an “overrealized” and 
“hyperspiritualized” eschatology: the notion that with the resurrection and 
exaltation of Christ and the Pentecostal outpouring of the Spirit, the powers of 
the new age have fully arrived.  The church is now enjoying all the blessings of 
the consummation.  (Notice how the special importance of 1 Corinthians 15 as a 
refutation of the contemporary hyper-preterist error is becoming increasingly 
clear.)  Paul’s irony in 1 Corinthians 4:8 seems clearly to be directed against such 
a false outlook: “Already you have all you want!  Already you have become rich!  
You have become kings—and that without us!  How I wish that you really had 
become kings so that we might be kings with you!”  Hyper-preterists would say 
that these Corinthians were simply a few years premature in their thinking that 
the consummation had fully arrived.  Soon it would arrive, in A.D. 70.  How 
different, however, is Paul’s answer to them in 1 Corinthians 15.  Their 
eschatological error was not simply a matter of being a few years off with regard 
to the timing.  Andrew Lincoln writes: 
 
[Paul] meets the Corinthians’ preoccupation with an “over-realized” heavenly existence 
and their disparagement of the body by showing that Christ’s resurrection from the dead 
into the heavenly dimension means not only that heavenly life has been opened for the 
Corinthians now, but also that in the future their bodies will play an essential role in this 
heavenly order of existence.174 
 
 5.  This suggestion is closely related to the previous one, but not every 
proponent of that one accepts this further elaboration.  This suggestion, which 
goes back at least to Thomas Aquinas, is that the doctrine of this group at 
Corinth was essentially the same as the teaching of Hymenaeus and Philetus 
                                                 
174  Andrew T. Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet (Cambridge: University Press, 1981), 54 
(emphasis added). 
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(condemned by Paul in 2 Tim. 2:17-18), i.e., that “the resurrection has already 
taken place.”  Various possible sources for this false doctrine have been 
proposed: Hellenist philosophy, Gnosticism, the mystery religions, and even the 
teaching of the apostles themselves!  Certainly there are many passages in the 
writings of both Paul and John teaching that believers are already risen with 
Christ and possess eternal life.  There would seem to be no need to choose which 
one of them was the source of the Hymenaean (and possibly Corinthian) 
doctrine.  Clearly the Gnostic and pagan teachings may have influenced a one-
sided reading of the apostles. 
 Murray Harris says that we should not dismiss the possibility that the 
Corinthian “anti-resurrectionists” did not consider themselves to be completely 
repudiating the resurrection, but rather to be purging “the offensive element—
the association of resurrection with embodiment,” thus maintaining “a façade of 
orthodoxy.”  Thus, “these precursors of Gnosticism” were simply denying two 
aspects of resurrection: “its futurity and its somatic character.”175 
 Note again that these last three understandings of the Corinthians’ error 
are not mutually exclusive.  I myself am most impressed with the evidence for 
view 4, but “overrealized eschatology” may very well have been influenced by 
the  virtually universal Hellenistic “contempt for and depreciation of the body”176 
(view 3), and may have been expressed by proclaiming that “the resurrection has 
already taken place” (view 5). 
 Hyper-preterism is often charged with being a new form of the old heresy 
of Gnosticism.  Noē notes that many “feel that if resurrection is presented as a 
disconnect from our old earthly bodies, then that position has stepped over into 
                                                 
175  Harris, Raised Immortal, 116.  Cf. Richard B. Gaffin Jr., Resurrection and Redemption 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1978), 78. 
176  Darragh, The Resurrection of the Flesh, 55. 
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heterodoxy, like the Gnostic position of separating the physical from the 
spiritual.”177  Noē answers with Stevens that “full preterism” is not Gnostic 
because it does not affirm a “bodiless resurrection” into mere “disembodied soul 
consciousness.”178  But that answer does not address the fact that the hyper-
preterist doctrine of the resurrection presents just as complete “a disconnect from 
our old earthly bodies” as Gnosticism did.  Calling a brand new, nonphysical 
entity created (not resurrected) for the saint at death a “body” seems to give that 
word a new definition (Webster: “1.  The whole physical structure and substance 
of a man, animal, or plant”) and in no way absolves hyper-preterism from the 
charge of Gnosticism.  Later, I will address what Paul meant by the “spiritual 
body” and consider its continuity with the body we now possess. 
 Hyper-preterists profess to be completely unruffled by the charge that 
their teaching falls under Paul’s condemnation of Hymenaeus and Philetus.  
Indeed, they seek to turn this problem text into a proof text for their position.  
Harden asks in regard to 2 Thessalonians 2:1-3 as well as 2 Timothy 2:17-18: 
 
How could this errant belief of an already-come Parousia and resurrection have arisen 
within the church if the apostolic teaching of the resurrection were a physical one? . . . If 
the apostle taught such a resurrection, how could anybody possibly have come up with 
the notion that it had already happened?179 
 
And the reply could be: “In the same way that the hyper-preterists have come up 
with that ‘errant belief,’ despite the apostle’s having taught such a resurrection 
and the church having confessed her faith in such a resurrection for two 
thousand years!”  Similarly, Noē, whom we have seen to be fond of arguments 
from silence, sarcastically argues: 
                                                 
177  Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 71. 
178  Stevens, Questions About the Afterlife, 40. 
179  Harden, Overcoming Sproul’s Resurrection Obstacles, 65. 
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Interestingly, though, when the Apostle Paul was confronted by claims that the 
resurrection had already taken place (2 Tim. 2:17-18), he did not use this “bones-are-still-
in-the-graves” objection as a defense.  If this physical concept is the correct nature for this 
event, he could have easily taken a trip to the local graveyard and presented plenty of 
physical evidence to prove them wrong.  But he didn’t.  Sometimes what’s not said is as 
important as what is said.180 
 
And the reply could be: “But notice that Paul does not attempt any ‘defense’ 
against their error here.  If he had responded in the way Noē suggests, 
Hymenaeus would surely have answered Paul in precisely the same way Noē 
answers his critics—that is, by claiming that the bones being still in the grave is 
irrelevant to an unseen, ‘spiritual’ resurrection in heaven.” 
 Randall Otto acknowledges that the common hyper-preterist response to 2 
Timothy 2:7-18, which simply notes that Hymenaeus and Philetus were speaking 
of something as past that was still future at the time 2 Timothy was written, but 
which has now been past since A.D. 70181—“true as this is”— 
 
Hymenaeus and Philetus were part of the Christian community who had embraced 
proto-Gnostic tendencies and were therefore removed from the community for fear that 
they would wrongly influence the church . . . . It should already be clear that there is no 
convergence between preterism and this Gnosticism. 
 
But then Otto immediately and amazingly agrees with Stevens (saying “this is 
well brought out by Ed Stevens”) that “Paul doesn’t challenge [Hymenaeus’s and 
Philetus’s] concept of the nature of the resurrection, but rather their timing of 
it.”182  Otto does not seem to realize that if Paul did not challenge their Gnostic 
concept of the resurrection because he agreed with it, then Paul himself was 
                                                 
180  Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 70-71.. 
181  Stevens, Stevens Response to Gentry, 57; Kenneth J. Davies, “A Response to the False Witness of 
Keith Mathison,” at www.preterist.org. 
182  Randall E. Otto, Case Dismissed, 49, 51-52. 
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Gnostic.  And if the hyper-preterists agree with that Gnostic view, then they too, 
like Hymenaeus and Philetus, should be “removed from the community” for fear 
that they will “wrongly influence the church.” 
 
How Death Is Swallowed Up in Victory 
 
“Since death came through a man, the resurrection of the dead comes also 
through a man” (1 Cor. 15:21).  With these words, the apostle introduces one of 
the major themes of this passage.  Therefore, in order to understand the nature of 
the resurrection of which Paul speaks, we must understand the nature of that 
death that is to be “swallowed up in victory” (v. 54). 
 Throughout his massive book, Max King minimizes the significance of 
what we often refer to as physical death, but which is more accurately referred to 
as psycho-physical death (since it affects the whole person, and is the separation 
of the soul and body).  Immediately on the frontispiece we are told that “the 
focus of this particular volume is on the cross-determined resurrection from the 
state of sin-death.”183  And as we get into the volume, we begin to understand that 
“sin-death” is King’s code word for something very similar, it would seem, to 
what Reformed theology has referred to as “spiritual” or “moral” death (Eph. 
2:1-5; Col. 2:13).  Whether King’s term also includes what Reformed theologians 
have referred to as “judicial” death—the fact that, because of his sin, man is 
separated from God’s favor, fellowship, and blessing and is under God’s judicial 
condemnation (Rom. 5:16, 18) and, apart from Christ, will remain in that state 
forever (Rev. 20:13)—is less clear.  But what becomes very clear is that in King’s 
theology “sin-death” and man’s psycho-physical death bear no significant 
                                                 
183  Max King, The Cross and the Parousia, vi (emphasis original). 
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relationship to each another.  On page 467, King says that “biological death” is 
not “the primary meaning of death” in a verse like 1 Corinthians 15:12.  Two 
pages later, however, he states flatly that the death Paul is talking about in this 
chapter “refers not to the phenomenon of biological death, but to sin-death.”  
Thus, psycho-physical death is not only not the “primary” meaning of death in 1 
Corinthians 15, but not the meaning of death in this chapter at all.  On page 615, 
King says not only that “nowhere does Paul teach a recovery of physical 
immortality as the effect of Christ’s redemptive work,” but also that the 
theological reason for this is that psycho-physical death is simply not involved in 
“the wages of sin” (Rom. 6:23): “There is nothing in the Genesis account of 
Adam’s fall to indicate a loss of physical immortality through his sin.” 
 Stevens also insists that man was originally created mortal, as all creatures 
were, and would have died whether or not he had sinned.  Thus, neither death 
nor salvation has any relationship to man’s body: 
 
This is the very point where much misunderstanding of the nature of the resurrection 
body surfaces . . . . [P]hysical death is merely the natural consequence of being human 
and made from dust.  And the ultimate resurrection was to reverse whatever “death” 
God placed on mankind in the beginning.  If that original death was spiritual, then the 
resurrection which reverses it must also be spiritual.  We believe spiritual death (the real 
curse) can be reversed without all the physical consequences being eliminated . . . . 
Physical death seems to be a planned, “natural” consequence of being human and living 
on earth.184 
 
And Noē agrees: 
 
Physical death of the old physical body remains the natural consequence of being created 
human.  This was true for Adam and Eve.  It’s been true ever since.  Even in Christ, we 
don’t regain or reverse that which was never lost.  Hence, the elimination of physical 
death was never the focus of Jesus’ redemptive work.185 
                                                 
184  Stevens, Stevens Response to Gentry, 56-58. 
185  Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 71-72. 
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 For exegetical support, these writers appeal to the fact that Adam and Eve 
did not die biologically “in the day that” they sinned, thus proving that 
biological death was not included in their punishment (Gen. 2:17).  Geerhardus 
Vos makes the interesting suggestion here that the phrase “in the day that you 
eat of it” is simply a Hebrew idiom meaning “as surely as you eat of it.”  He asks 
us to compare 1 Kings 2:37, where King Solomon says to Shimei, “The day you 
leave and cross the Kidron Valley, you can be sure you will die;” but it was not 
until Shimei had gone across the Kidron and then returned to Jerusalem and the 
report had reached the king that Shimei was executed (vv. 38-46).186  But whether 
what Vos says about the meaning of the Hebrew idiom applies to Genesis 2:17 or 
not, surely we can say that at the very moment of man’s sin, the seeds of psycho-
physical death were sown in his body and began to go to work.187 
 The statement in Geneis 3:19—“for dust you are and to dust you will 
return”—is also misinterpreted by hyper-preterists, who insist that it points to an 
inherent necessity for man to die and return to dust simply because he was 
created from dust.  That, of course, is a misunderstanding of the force of this 
statement.  Those words appear as part of the curse upon Adam because of his 
sin.  The reason for this death is his sin.  The reason death takes this form is that 
man is dust.  Death is directed against man’s person, and therefore it must take 
                                                 
186  The whole section is worth reading in Geerhardus Vos, Biblical Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1954), 47-51. 
187  Interestingly, after just mocking that “traditional interpretation,” Noē adopts an interpretation 
that brings him right back to that understanding of the phrase.  He says that “some people, your 
author included, feel Adam and Eve were created mortal . . . . By continually eating from the tree 
of life, their mortality was suppressed and they could physically live forever.  But when they 
were cast out of the garden, they lost access to this tree and its life-perpetuating nourishment.  
Consequently as an indirect result of their expulsion, their mortality was unleashed on that very 
day, not begun” (Your Resurrection Body and Life, 23 [emphasis his]).  But what is the temporal 
difference between “unleashed” and “begun?” 
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account of the composition of his person.  If we were not dust, he could not 
return to dust.  But the reason for return to dust is not that he is dust, but that he 
has sinned (Gen. 2:17; 3:17).188 
 The mere fact that man has a body does not mean that he has to die.  
Death for man is not the debt of nature; it is the wages of sin.  That declaration is 
made in Romans 6:23,189 where Paul is reflecting on the death that was the 
consequence of the sin that “entered the world through one man” (Rom. 5:12), 
and that death clearly involved psycho-physical death (see especially 5:10 and 
14).  Of course this is considered a ridiculous idea by modern man, with his 
evolutionary presuppositions—and the hyper-preterist is always anxious to 
present reasonable doctrine to modern skeptics—but the biblical teaching would 
seem to be clear. 
 Now this does not mean that Adam would not have known any kind of 
change had he successfully passed his covenantal probation in Paradise, that he 
would not have received some additional endowment to equip him for immortal 
existence.  For his life in Eden, man was dependent, as man always is, upon the 
life-giving word and Spirit of God.  His probation would result in a decisive 
word, either of justification and life or of condemnation and death.  We know 
what the outcome was.  But had Adam obeyed and the outcome been the 
opposite, may there not have been, with the utterance of God’s word of life, an 
endowment suiting Adam for his immortal existence?  That may well be one of 
those secret, unrevealed truths that “belong to the LORD our God” (Deut. 29:29).  
But what God reveals to us and what we must affirm is that Adam was not 
                                                 
188  John Murray, “The Nature of Man,” in The Collected Writings of John Murray, 2:15. 
189  Leon Morris comments on Rom. 6:23, “Man dies, not simply as a body, but in the totality of 
his being, as a unity with physical and spiritual aspects.  Death here includes, but is more than, 
the terminus of biological existence . . . . Or perhaps we should say that the two aspects, spiritual 
and physical, are not sharply distinguished” (The Wages of Sin [London: Tyndale, 1955], 10). 
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created with the seeds of death “naturally” at work in his body.  He was not 
created as a Sein-zum-Tod, a “being-towards-death,” as the German existentialist 
Martin Heidegger describes man. 
 The hyper-preterist interpretation of Genesis 2:17 and 3:19 has to strike the 
biblical scholar as most surprising, because Christian theologians have found 
that it is easy to show that the death spoken of in the Genesis curse involves 
psycho-physical death, but that extended effort is required to show that it also 
includes judicial death and moral-spiritual death.  That the curse includes psycho-
spiritual death lies on the face of the biblical text.  Indeed, that seems to be the 
only aspect of death spoken of in the Genesis account.  Christian interpreters, 
however, have argued, correctly, that this is simply in keeping with the nature of 
the Genesis narrative as a whole, which focuses on the phenomenal reality (e.g., 
the serpent), rather than the unseen spiritual realities that lie behind the 
phenomenal (e.g., Satan).  It is only on the basis of the total revelation of 
Scripture that we learn that the death with which Adam was threatened if he 
disobeyed was threefold: psycho-physical, judicial, and moral-spiritual. 
 The point that must be emphasized and understood clearly is that we can 
never appreciate the full measure of God’s redemptive grace in Christ unless we 
appreciate the full scope of sin’s dreadful consequences for our whole person.  
John Murray comments that the psycho-physical death spoken of in Genesis 3:19 
 
is not a mere incident.  It consists in the disintegration of man’s person, and demonstrates 
as such the gravity and total abnormality of sin and of its consequence.  The body returns 
to dust and sees corruption, and the spirit, though it continues to be active, is no longer 
existent or active in its normal and natural relationship.  Death is not merely a physical 
event; it is separation of body and spirit; and disembodied existence for man is punitive 
and expresses condemnation.190 
 
                                                 
190  John Murray, “The Adamic Administration,” in The Collected Writings of John Murray, 2:57. 
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And therefore, as Dahl observes: “Since sin, death, and corruption form a 
dynamic totality together, the only salvation worth the name is a real deliverance 
from all three.”191  Max King is certainly correct when he says that orthodox 
Christian theology has taught “that the wholeness or completeness of man after 
this life hinges upon resurrection from physical death.”192  In commenting on 1 
Corinthians 15:21, Tertullian speaks for all the early church fathers: 
 
If we have life in Christ as we have death in Adam, since in Adam we find the death of 
the body, it is necessary that in Christ we have the life of the body.  Otherwise there 
would be no comparison, if the life in Christ did not attain to the same substance which 
found death in Adam.193 
 
 Oscar Cullmann’s lecture, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? 
is justly famous.  Though I could not endorse every detail of it, the overall impact 
of that lecture is certainly biblical and moving.  Cullmann begins by contrasting 
the Greek view of death and the biblical view by contrasting the attitudes of 
Socrates and Jesus in the face of impending death.  Socrates (in Plato’s Phaedo) 
“in complete peace and composure” welcomed death as ultimate release of the 
soul “from the prison of the body and back to its eternal home,” while Jesus was 
“deeply distressed and troubled” (Mark 14:33), “his sweat . . . like drops of blood 
falling to the ground” (Luke 22:44), praying, “My Father, if it is possible, may 
this cup be taken from “Me (Matt. 26:39).  Certainly Jesus’ death was unique as 
the death of the covenant head of His people, bearing the penalty for their sin.  
But the point Cullmann drives home is that “the belief in the resurrection 
                                                 
191  Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, 75-76.  Norman L. Geisler comments: “Reincarnation of 
whatever variety is not a Christian teaching . . . . [A] resurrection that fails to restore the same 
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192  King, The Cross and the Parousia, 665. 
193  Tertullian, “Against Marcion, in ANF, 3:447. 
 81
presupposes the Jewish connexion between death and sin.  Death is not 
something natural . . . . [I]t is rather something unnatural, abnormal, opposed to 
God.”  That is why Paul calls it Christ’s “last enemy” (1 Cor. 25:26).  As 
Cullmann puts it so eloquently: 
 
Only he who apprehends with the first Christians the horror of death, who takes death 
seriously as death [that is, as “the wages of sin”], can comprehend the Easter exulation of 
the primitive Christian community and understand that the whole thinking of the New 
Testament is governed by belief in the Resurrection . . . . Whoever has not grasped the 
horror of death cannot join Paul in the hymn of victory: “Death is swallowed up—in 
victory!  O death, where is thy victory?  O death, where is thy sting?” (1 Cor. 15:54f.)194  
 
 And that is a victory to be fully won at Christ’s second coming, which 
marks the end (1 Cor. 15:23-24).  As Berkouwer and G. E. Ladd remind us: 
 
The “already” element is present in [Paul’s] eschatology, but he never applies this 
“already” to the resurrection of the dead.  For that “already” is an illusion that 
completely misses the reality of true salvation and underestimates the gravity of death . . 
. . Then [at the Parousia]—and only then—the promise “death is swallowed up in 
victory” will become actuality.  Paul concludes here with the blessing from the Isaiah 
Apocalypse.  This promise has not yet become reality, but that will happen.  Old 
Testament prophecy already spoke of the swallowing up of death, but now that Paul has 
seen the foundation upon which this reality will be built, the full and profound meaning 
of this prophecy can be properly understood.195 
 
1 Cor. 15:24-26.  Here is the goal of redemption: the divine order reestablished in the 
whole of God’s creation, when all evil powers—sin, Satan, and death—will be abolished.  
God’s plan is to reunite all things in Christ, both in the visible and the invisible world 
(Eph. 1:10) . . . . Everywhere in the Bible, the ultimate destiny of man is a redeemed, 
transfigured earth, dwelling in redeemed, transfigured bodies . . . . As long as sin, evil, 
corruption, decay, violence, and death remain in the world, God’s redemptive work 
remains ever incomplete.196 
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It is God’s “very good” creation (Gen. 1:31), now groaning in sin and bondage to 
decay, that will be redeemed (Rom. 8:18-23; 2 Peter 3).  But according to hyper-
preterist theology, ongoing sin and death on this earth will never end or be 
overcome.  True to his hermeneutical premise, Noē insists that Revelation 21:5—
“I am making everything new!”—was fulfilled in A.D. 70: “It’s a done deal . . . . 
There is not an interim plan that will be superseded by something better in the 
future!”197  Noē comments: 
 
Most Christians have been led to believe that someday, yet-future, all death and evil will 
be finally destroyed and gone forever.  This, supposedly, will be part of God’s ultimate 
triumph.  But does this futuristic utopian belief line up with the Bible? . . . Far better we 
adjust our understanding of the nature of Jesus’ victory over death and what this means 
for us today, rather than adjusting the time factor to a yet-future occurrence.198 
 
 Gary North, appropriately and helpfully, likens hyper-preterism at this 
point to the ancient pagan philosophy of Manicheanism, which taught the 
eternality of the struggle between good and evil and was vigorously opposed by 
Christianity.  North notes that hyper-preterist eschatology is really an anti-
eschatology, because it insists that no truly “last things” lie ahead.  What is now 
will forever be, with Christians living on this God-created, but sin-cursed earth, 
suffering, dying, going to heaven, and a new generation of believers living, 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Cardinal Sadolet, Calvin explicitly rejects the view which reduces the Christian life to the quest 
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suffering, dying, going to heaven.  Thus, “this view grants to Satan what the 
creeds and confessions deny: influence in history forever.”199 
 Hyper-preterism’s response to North’s charge is fascinating: In sum, it is 
that Manicheanism was not actually guilty of this heresy, but hyper-preterism is: 
 
Let’s set the record straight right now: . . . Manicheans did not teach, as North leads his 
readers to believe, the doctrine of a never-ending non-victory of good over evil.  
Manicheanism had an End . . . . It was taught that when the gathering of the Particles was 
finally realized, the material cosmos would be destroyed in an inferno that would 
continue for 1,486 years.  After the universe eventually burned itself out, the separation 
of Light from Darkness would be complete.  Then the Darkness would be closed off 
forever, and eternal peace would reign in light . . . . North is right that [hyper]preterists 
believe that sin and suffering on Earth will exist forever . . . . [Hyper]preterists see no 
prophecy in the Bible that says that believers on Earth will one day be absolutely and 
literally and in every sense free from all sin and suffering.  [Hyper]preterists in fact see 
verses that teach that the existence of sin will continue forever.200 
 
Hyper-preterists evidently believe that this is an answer that will satisfy serious 
biblical exegesis.  The biblical connection between the resurrection hope and the 
hope for a new creation is expressed well by Berkouwer: 
 
The discussion of the resurrection from the dead leads us directly to a consideration of 
the “new earth.”  The link between these two aspects of the eschatological promise is the 
fact that the resurrection carnis talks about a future for the body.  This body is not an 
abstract, spiritual existence having nothing to do with the earth, but something that has a 
place and a manifold function in the earth.201 
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self-designation, of course.  But since North calls himself a preterist, I have inserted the prefix in 
Green’s text for clarity.  Walt Hibbard repeats Green’s argument in “A Courteous Response to Dr. 
Gary North’s Vitriolic Essay,” 3. 
201  Berkouwer, 211 (emphasis original).  Note that Berkouwer is an amillennialist.  In Three Views 
on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), Craig A. 
Blaising, a premillennialist, argues that amillennialism has been controlled by a “spiritual-vision” 
model of the eternal state, rather than by the “new creation” hope of the Bible (see, e.g., 143-44).  
In his response to Robert B. Strimple’s chapter on amillennialism in that the same book, Blaising 
even goes so far as to suggest regarding Strimple’s amillennial view: “Such an interpretation 
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 Paul emphasizes this cosmic redemption at the end of the age in Romans 
8:17-23, where he says that at “the redemption of our bodies” (v. 23)202 “the 
creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the 
glorious freedom of the children of God” (v. 21).  Regarding 1 Corinthians 15:20-
28, Harris comments: “Here the relation between the resurrection of man and the 
restoration of the universe is not so pronounced but it is none the less 
apparent.”203 
 Peter presents a picture of what will happen when our Lord returns that is 
in entire harmony with Paul’s teaching in Romans 8.  Both apostles depict a 
renewal of the cosmos, rather than its destruction.204  Paul speaks of the creation’s 
“pains of childbirth” (Rom. 8:22); they are birth pains, not death pains.  
Otherwise Paul could not say that the creation was subjected to frustration “in 
hope” (v. 20).  Think of the parallel that Peter draws between the future fiery 
judgment and the past judgment of the Flood.  He says that “the world of that 
                                                                                                                                                 
should cause us concern, for it moves dangerously in the direction of denying the bodily 
resurrection altogether” (153).  However, Strimple’s rebuttal of Blaising’s argument in the book 
(257-63) adequately puts that charge to rest concerning the amillennial view. 
202  Here Harden appeals to the Greek text: “Amazing how so much can be cleared up by looking 
at the original!  The phrase is apolutrōsin tou sōmatos which is actually more accurately rendered 
‘redemption from the body’!”  “This is what Paul was waiting for so eagerly, and what Christ 
brought in 70 AD”  (“A Response to Mathison”).  Anyone more familiar with Greek than Harden 
knows that the prefix απο at the beginning of the Greek word for “redemption” relates to what 
“our body” (genitive case here) is to be redeemed from—it does not say that we are to be 
redeemed from our body.  What we are to be redeemed from is left unspecified in this verse, but 
it is clear from the context and from all the New Testament that we—specifically here “our 
body”—will be redeemed from sin and death and all of their consequences.  Noē comments on 
Romans 8:23: “Like Paul . . . I’m looking forward to getting my new resurrection body 
immediately after I die” (Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion, 133).  But is that to what Paul is 
referring in this context (see vv. 17-23)? 
203  Harris, Raised Immortal, 166. 
204  Hyper-preterism is explicit in its rejection of the doctrine of a future cosmic renewal: “The 
Scriptures do not teach that our material world will experience a cataclysmic upheaval at the end 
of time/history” (Walt Hibbard, “A Courteous Response to Dr. Gary North’s Vitriolic Essay,” 2). 
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time was . . . destroyed” (2 Peter 3:6), but it was certainly not annihilated.  
Similarly, Paul calls the Christian a “new man” (Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10 KJV) and a 
“new creation” (Gal. 6:15).  The new person is the old person made new.  The 
new heavens and new earth will be the present cosmos transformed, just as 
man’s resurrected body will be the present body transformed (for those still 
living at the Parousia) or resurrected.205 
 Peter has strong language in 2 Peter 3: “The heavens will disappear with a 
roar; the elements will be destroyed by fire, and the earth and everything in it 
will be laid bare” (v. 10).  “That day will bring about the destruction of the 
heavens by fire, and the elements will melt in the heat.  But in keeping with his 
promise we are looking forward to a new heaven and a new earth, the home of 
righteousness” (vv. 12-13).  But hyper-preterists insist that Peter’s language in 2 
Peter 3 is entirely figurative.  Making the same mistake in his “word-study” 
method of exegesis that Max King makes (i.e., failing to let the immediate context 
determine how particular words are being used), Noē notes that the Greek word 
commonly translated “elements” in 2 Peter 3 (“heavenly bodies,” ESV) “is never 
used to refer to the material creation in any other New Testament occurrence or 
context,” and thus concludes that it does not have that meaning here.  Noē says: 
 
The “elements” Peter is speaking of are the “elementary principles” . . . of Judaism, that 
Old Covenant “world” or system which would soon be destroyed in the coming of “the 
day of the Lord” in A.D. 70 . . . . The melting and dissolving of Peter’s “elements” was a 
totally covenantal transformation, not a cosmic conflagration.206 
 
                                                 
205  For a fuller treatment of Romans 8 and 2 Peter 3, and many other key eschatological passages, 
see Robert B. Strimple’s presentation on “Amillennialism,” plus his responses to 
“Postmillennialism” and “Premillennialism” in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. 
Bock. 
206  Noē, Beyond the End Times, 245. 
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 The fact is that the meaning of στοιχεια (“elements”) in Paul’s letters (Gal. 
4:3, 9; Col. 2:8, 20) “is much disputed.”207  It may well be true that 2 Peter 3 is the 
only place in the New Testament where the meaning “the basic elements from 
which everything in the natural world is made, and of which it is composed” is 
found.  But instances of that usage in extrabiblical literature can certainly be 
found,208 and it is the only natural meaning in the context.  We are immediately 
inclined toward a realistic interpretation by the opening reference in this passage 
to the Flood.  The description of that watery judgment on “the world of that 
time” (v. 6) in Genesis is not a literary figure for a covenantal transition, but 
rather a literal historical narrative.  Why should we think that the fiery judgment 
reserved for “the present heavens and earth” will be any less literal than the 
Flood that corresponds to it?209  Peter warns his readers against using our human 
perspective on the passage of time to charge God with being “slow in keeping his 
promise” of the Parousia.  That day of the Lord “will come”—make no mistake 
about that—but remember this: “With the Lord a day is like a thousand years, 
and a thousand years are like a day” (vv.8-10).  Such a reminder would hardly 
have been made if the Parousia was coming in just a few years.  Finally, 
throughout this passage, Peter directs our minds to the created cosmos.  As 
Gentry observes, 
 
The reference to the unraveling and conflagration of the heavens and the earth is 
expressly tied to the material creation . . . . Peter expressly refers to the material creation 
order: “from the beginning of creation” (3:4; cf. Gen. 1:1) . . . . He seems clearly to be 
defining the “heavens and earth” to which he is referring.  He is not contemplating the 
destruction of the old Jewish order, but the material heavens and the earth.210 
                                                 
207  BAG, 776. 
208  See ibid. and other sources for references. 
209  See M. A. Genevois, “The Faith and Christian Thought,” in The Resurrection of the Body, by H. 
Cornélis et. al., 272. 




The Resurrection of Christ 
 
Berkouwer states, “Throughout its history, the Christian church has always held 
to the unity of the two Testaments and the continuity of God’s dealing with man.  
Thus it is no devaluation of the Old Testament to say that the expectation of the 
resurrection is squarely founded on the resurrection of Jesus Christ.”211  The 
resurrection of Christ, of which Paul writes in 1 Corinthians 15, is clearly a bodily 
resurrection.  Indeed, as noted earlier, to use that adjective in such a context 
seems quite redundant.  Raymond E. Brown comments that “the concept of 
resurrection from the grave . . . is certainly what resurrection meant to the Jews 
of Jesus’ time . . . . It is not really accurate to claim that the NT references to the 
resurrection of Jesus are ambiguous as to whether they mean bodily 
resurrection—there was no other kind of resurrection.”212  Paul speaks of a 
resurrection that followed on the third day after burial (v. 4), and it is only the 
body that is buried. 
 R. C. Sproul reminds us that the gospel records reveal that the tomb was 
empty, thus laying “great stress on the continuity of the body that was placed in 
the tomb with the body that was raised.  It was not a body.  It was the same 
body.”213  Murray Harris (from whom hyper-preterists claimed to have learned to 
think in terms of a “spiritual” resurrection) agrees: “The empty tomb . . . is the 
presupposition of belief in Jesus’ resurrection, a guarantee of the continuity 
between the earthly Jesus and the risen Lord and a protection against a 
                                                 
211  Berkouwer, 181-82. 
212  Raymond E. Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1973), 70.  William Milligan comments: “If Jesus only lived in the spirit after death, it 
would be an abuse of language to call such an entirely new life a resurrection” (The Resurrection of 
Our Lord [New York: Macmillan, 1917], 9). 
213  R. C. Sproul, The Last Days According to Jesus (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 163. 
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spiritualized view of resurrection.”214  The gospels of Luke and of John in 
particular lay special emphasis on the physical character of Christ’s risen body.  
How could words be clearer than our Lord’s challenge to the “frightened” 
disciples who thought “they saw a ghost” standing among them? 
 
Why are you troubled, and why do doubts rise in your minds?  Look at my hands and 
my feet.  It is I myself!  Touch me and see; a ghost does not have flesh and bones, as you 
see I have.  (Luke 24:38-39) 
 
And when “they still did not believe it,” He asked for food and “ate it in their 
presence” (vv. 41-43).  Compare John 20:17, 27 and Acts 1:4 and 10:41, where 
Peter speaks of “us who ate and drank with him after he rose from the dead.”  
The Westminster Confession of Faith simply echoes this biblical emphasis on the 
continuity between Christ’s premortem and postresurrection body when it 
affirms that “on the third day He arose from the dead, with the same body in which 
He suffered, with which also He ascended into heaven . . . and shall return, to 
judge men and angels, at the end of the world” (8:4).215 
 Above I alluded to the claim of hyper-preterists that they are simply 
agreeing with Murray Harris’s concept of resurrection.216  Professor Harris is an 
evangelical believer and is not to be charged with the errors of hyper-preterism.  
Unfortunately, however, he has made statements that have confused rather than 
                                                 
214  Harris, Raised Immortal, 43. 
215  The Confession of Faith and the Larger Catechisms (Glasgow: The Publications Committee of the 
Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, 1970), 48-49 (emphasis added).  The proof text cited for the 
phrase I have italicized is John 20:25, which speaks of the nail prints in the hands of the risen 
Jesus.  It would seem that those scars were marks, not of disfigurement, but rather of the highest 
honor, as eternal reminders to His people of the atoning suffering and death of the Lamb of God. 
216  E.g., Randall E. Otto: “With Harris we affirm the basically immaterial and invisible nature of 
Christ’s glorified resurrection body” (Coming in the Clouds: An Evangelical Case for the Invisibility of 
Christ at His Second Coming [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994], 248).  Cf. Stevens, 
Stevens Response to Gentry, 52, 110, id., Questions About the Afterlife, 41; Harden, Overcoming 
Sproul’s Resurrection Obstacles, 40; Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 69; id., Shattering the ‘Left 
Behind’ Delusion, 140. 
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clarified the issues.  I quoted above Harris’s clear affirmation of the continuity 
between the body of Jesus laid in the tomb and the body that arose and left the 
tomb, and he points to the passage in Luke 24 (see above) where Jesus “allay(s) 
their fears that he was some ghostly apparition.”  And yet what stands out in his 
discussion is his insistence that “after his resurrection his essential state was one of 
invisibility and therefore immateriality.”  He speaks of “this change into a spiritual 
mode of being” and appeals to Paul’s reference to a “spiritual body,” even 
though at other points Harris indicates that he is well aware of the fact that 
Paul’s use of the Greek term πνευµατικον in 1 Corinthians 15:44 is not a reference 
to that which is invisible, immaterial, or nonbodily.217 
 Like many others in recent years, Harris reminds us that Jesus’ actual 
resurrection “was not witnessed” by anyone.  Why does Harris remind us of that 
fact?  What is the point he is making?  Most of the others who have called 
attention to this fact (e.g., Rudolf Bultmann and Max King) have raised the point 
in the interests of their skepticism.  And the response to be made to them is that 
God was present in that tomb, the God who has told His people by His Holy 
Spirit in His Word what happened there: that Jesus arose and left the tomb. 
 Harris concludes that when we examine the Gospels and Acts “we 
discover two distinct sets of information, one stressing the material nature of his 
[resurrection] body, the other suggesting its nonmaterial character.”  The first set 
of texts indicate that 
 
he was recognized by his followers . . . because of such individual features as his tone of 
voice, his bodily movements, and the marks of crucifixion.  When he appeared, Jesus 
stood on terra firma, was not suspended in the air; his body was solid, not ephemeral, and 
tangible, not immaterial. 
 
                                                 
217  Harris, Raised Immortal, 53 (emphasis original), 56-57. 
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And yet because of the other set of texts—which indicate that the risen Jesus 
came and stood among them “though the doors were locked” (John 20:19, 26), 
that “God . . . caused him to be seen” (Acts 10:41), and then that He suddenly 
“disappeared from their sight” (Luke 24:31)—Harris concludes that “in his 
resurrected state Jesus possessed a ‘spiritual body’ which could be expressed in 
an immaterial or a material mode.”218 
 However, the features of Jesus’ resurrection appearances that Harris 
appeals to here are not unique to Jesus’ life after His resurrection.  Before His 
death, Jesus walked on the Sea of Galilee (Mark 6:49), was transfigured before 
the disciples’ eyes (Luke 9:28-36), and “walked right through” the Nazareth mob 
that sought to throw Him over the cliff (Luke 4:30).  Indeed, such experiences are 
not even unique to Jesus.  The report of the officers after the escape of the 
apostles was: “We found the jail securely locked, with the guards standing at the 
doors; but when we opened them, we found no one inside” (Acts 5:23).  Or think 
of how “when they came up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord suddenly 
took Philip away, and the eunuch did not see him again” (Acts 8:39).  Such 
phenomena are not indicators of immateriality,219 but of supernatural power.  As 
Grudem wisely cautions us: “The [explanation] possibilities are too complex and 
our knowledge is too limited for us to consider that these texts require that Jesus 
became nonphysical.”  As a matter of fact, 
 
if the “customary form” of his resurrection body was nonphysical [as Harris claims], then 
in these repeated physical appearances Jesus would be guilty of misleading the disciples 
(and all subsequent readers of the New Testament) into thinking that his resurrection 
                                                 
218  Harris, From Grave to Glory, 139-42. 
219  Stephen T. Davis adds: “Nor do the unusual properties of the risen Jesus in some of the 
appearance accounts (e.g., the ability to appear or disappear, luminosity) entail incorporeality.  
Only a physical object can be located somewhere, can travel from point A to point B, or can glow 
luminously” (Risen Indeed [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993], 58). 
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body remained physical when it did not . . . . He did not say, “. . . flesh and bones, as you 
see that I temporarily have!”220 
 
 So irrefutable is the evidence that Jesus’ premortem body was raised, that 
even hyper-preterists realize that they cannot simply deny that.  Instead, they try 
to explain why our resurrection will not be a resurrection of our premotem 
body—even though our Savior’s was—and our present body will remain in the 
grave forever. 
 In his lengthy book, The Cross and the Parousia of Christ, King nowhere 
reflects on what he terms the “biological and historical aspects” of Christ’s death.  
On page 444 he says that those aspects of Christ’s death and resurrection “were 
important, to be sure, but the resurrection problem at Corinth was rooted in the 
theological meaning of the cross which transcended the outward, historical 
dimensions of that event.”  But nowhere in the book does King spell out the 
importance of the physical aspect of Jesus’ resurrection, and it was not until the 
Covenant Eschatology Symposium in Orlando in 1993 that it became evident that 
King is willing to see some evidential value in Jesus’ physical resurrection.  At 
that conference, however, he hastened on to emphasize that the physical aspect 
of Jesus’ resurrection was “an exception,” and that “this is not involved in the 
meaning, the theological significance, of Jesus’ resurrection,” which is spiritual 
only.  By making the physical aspect of Jesus’ resurrection “of no theological 
importance,” King tears the resurrection of the crucified and buried Jesus out of 
the gospel that Paul preached (1 Cor. 15:1-5), leaving us with “a different 
gospel—which is really no gospel at all” (Gal. 1:6-7).  The physical resurrection of 
Christ was not some “brute fact” of history that merely pointed sinners to the 
“true” (purely spiritual) resurrection.  Rather, it is authoritatively interpreted for 
                                                 
220  Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 611-13. 
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us, by the God who raised Jesus from the dead (Rom. 8:11), as the resurrection 
that was “for our justification” (Rom. 4:25).  Therefore, the issues are no less than 
the very gospel being at stake in the debate with hyper-preterism.221 
 More recent hyper-preterists offer a fuller “theological” reason why Jesus’ 
body could be resurrected from the grave, but “our physical bodies cannot be 
raised.”222  God could make use of Jesus’ earthly body and give it a heavenly, 
nonphysical form “because it wasn’t tainted by sin.  Our sinfulness negates that 
luxury.  Our bodies are subject to decay.”223  Christ’s body was not tainted by sin, 
because He was incarnated in a body that was like Adam’s before the Fall.  His 
body was fit to be raised, whereas our sinful body is not. 
 In response, we could point out that the New Testament nowhere offers 
this explanation of the difference between Christ’s resurrection and ours, but of 
course the apostles did not need to offer an explanation of the difference because 
they did not teach that there was such a difference.  Furthermore, this hyper-
preterist explanation denies the full reality of Christ’s incarnation “in the likeness 
of sinful man.”  Hyper-preterism is guilty of Christological error at this point.  It 
is in reality a form of docetic heresy.224 
                                                 
221  See John Murray’s discussion of Rom. 4:25 where “the resurrection is viewed as that which 
lays the basis for our justification,” in The Epistle to the Romans, NICNT, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1959), 154-55. 
222  Stevens, Questions About the Afterlife, 19.  Cf. 28-30, 42.  Cf. Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 
32, 69, 73. 
223  Harden, Overcoming Sproul’s Resurrection Obstacles, 30-31.  Note that Harden later says that 
“the body of the believer . . . is doomed to return to the dust from where it came, because of the 
curse of sin” (38), apparently forgetting the hyper-preterist denial that psycho-physical death is 
the result of God’s punishment of man’s sin. 
224  The effect of Steven’s christology would be to deny Jesus’ genetic connection with Mary as 
well as with the Jewish race.  This is profoundly unscriptural.  The contention that at the 
Incarnation the Logos received an unfallen body runs counter to the Westminster Confession’s 
statement that Jesus was “conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the virgin 
Mary, of her substance” (VIII:II) (emphasis added). 
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 Adolf Schlatter, in his Commentary on Romans, suggests that the Greek 
word homoiōma (“likeness”) in Romans 8:3 “is meant concretely; it says of 
Christ’s body that it was made just like ours.  Docetic ideas should not be 
intruded.”225  Note that Paul does not say that Christ was sent in the nature of 
sinful man, because He was absolutely sinless (Heb. 4:15; John 8:46; 2 Cor. 5:21; 1 
Peter 2:22).  Yet Paul does say, with the boldness of the Spirit’s inspiration, that 
Christ came not only in the flesh, not only like men, but like men who are 
sinners.  And thus He bore in His very likeness, in His human body, the marks of 
sin and its ravages.  He did not come in the likeness of Adam before the Fall.  
Unlike Adam before the Fall, He knew pain, hardship, suffering, tears, and 
death.  In Romans 8:3, we are given a special insight into the depth of our Lord’s 
humiliation.  In Philippians 3:21, Paul calls our present bodies “our lowly 
bodies.”  He goes on to say that Christ will “transform” these bodies to be “like 
his glorious body.”  But Christ at His first coming came not in that glorious body 
of His exaltation, but in the likeness of sinful man. 
 In this discussion of Christ’s resurrection thus far, we have emphasized 
the continuity between the body that was laid in the tomb and the body that was 
raised, because this is what is minimized by hyper-preterists—indeed denied, as 
far as any “theological importance” is concerned.  But of course the New 
Testament also lays great stress on the wonderful discontinuity between Christ’s 
body before His resurrection and His body after it.  Christ’s resurrection was 
indeed the firstfruits of eschatological resurrection (1 Cor. 15:20), because He was 
the first to be raised, never to die again.  And His resurrection body was that 
“glorious body” of which Paul speaks in Philippians 3:21—imperishable, 
glorious, powerful, heavenly (1 Cor. 15:42-47).  John Murray writes: 
                                                 
225  Quoted by J. Schneider, “homoiōma,” in TDNT, 5:195, n. 40.  For examples of such a concrete 
use of homoiōma with reference to the body, see Phil. 2:7 and Rev. 9:7. 
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Christ by his resurrection has established the realm of the resurrection, a realm 
pneumatically conditioned and constituted [v. 44, “a spiritual body”] . . . . The body that 
was raised from the tomb on the third day was the same body as was laid in the tomb.  
But it was endowed with new qualities.  So it is with the resurrection of believers.  There 
is unity and continuity.  The usage of Scripture with respect to both Christ and believers 
is noteworthy in this respect.  It was not a body that was laid in the tomb of Jesus: it was 
he as respects his body.  He was buried, he lay in a tomb, and he rose from the dead.  So it 
is with believers . . . . The difficulty of forming a concrete idea of the resurrection body is 
no valid objection to the reality.226 
 
The Resurrection of Believers 
 
In 1 Corinthians 15:12, Paul begins to address the “muddled thinking” of the 
Corinthians (see above).  They were apparently accepting the resurrection of 
Christ from the dead (bodily, as we have seen), but rejecting such a resurrection 
for Christians—precisely the error of hyper-preterism.  However, as Berkouwer 
puts it, “The resurrection of believers is the outcome and an indication of the 
power of Christ’s resurrection.  The link between the two is most clearly 
expressed in the phrase ‘the first-born from the dead.’  The ‘priority’ that Christ 
has implies a sequel.”227 
 Throughout his letters, the apostle uses a variety of images to portray this 
fundamental truth of salvation: the redeeming experience of our Savior, our 
covenant Head, is the pattern and firm guarantee of what lies ahead for us.  He 
died, was buried, and was raised from the dead—and His people will follow the 
same pattern—“but each in his own turn: Christ, the firstfruits; then, when he 
comes, those who belong to him” (1 Cor. 15:23).  Since His “children have flesh 
and blood, he too shared in their humanity so that by his death he might destroy 
him who holds the power of death” (Heb. 2:14).  In His earthly ministry, He had 
                                                 
226  Murray, “The Last Things,” in The Collected Writings of John Murray, 2:411-12. 
227  Berkouwer, 182. 
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a “lowly body” like ours, but when He returns from heaven He “will transform 
our lowly bodies so that they would be like his glorious body” (Phil. 3:21).  Note 
that Christ will transform our bodies; He will not leave them in the grave, as 
hyper-preterism teaches.228  The God “who raised Christ from the dead will also 
give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit, who lives in you” (Rom. 8:11; 
cf. 1 Cor. 6:14; 2 Cor. 4:14).  Note again that the Spirit does not here say simply 
that “God will also give life to you,” but specifically “will also” (the Greek και 
here implies “just as He did for Christ”) “give life to your mortal bodies.”  Later in 
Romans 8, Paul says that “we share in his sufferings in order that we may also 
share in his glory” (v. 17).  Christ “is the head of the body, the church; he is the 
beginning and the firstborn from among the dead;” and as the “firstborn,” He 
will “have supremacy” over the others who will be raised from the dead (Col. 
1:18). 
 The vivid image Paul uses in 1 Corinthians 15:23, that of Christ as “the 
firstfruits” (αρχη) of the resurrection harvest (an image familiar from the Old 
Testament) indicates that Christ’s resurrection is not simply the guarantee that the 
resurrection of His people will follow.  His resurrection is the beginning of that 
resurrection! 
 
All people share in the death of Adam because through Adam death came into the 
world.  Similarly, all Christians share in the resurrection of Jesus because through Jesus 
resurrection came into the world (vv. 21-22).  Christians will participate in the 
resurrection of their representative, the aparchē, Jesus.229 
 
                                                 
228  Lincoln notes regarding the verb that Paul uses in Phil. 3:21: “metaschēmatizō involves not a 
creation of something entirely new but the transformation of something already there, in this case 
‘our body of humiliation’” (Paradise Now and Not Yet, 103). 
229  Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia, 51. 
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“Firstfruits” expresses the notion of organic connection and unity, the inseparability of 
the initial quantity from the whole . . . Paul views the two resurrections not so much as 
two events but as two episodes of the same event.230 
 
Messiah is the first-fruits; i.e., what has happened to him is precisely what is to happen to 
all believers, only it has happened to him first.  That is the only point of difference; in his 
case the resurrection came in three days after death, for others it is a matter of . . . years.  
But the resurrection in each case is exactly the same thing . . . . The New Testament never 
argues from a general resurrection to the Resurrection of Christ.  The argument is the 
other way about, the faith that Christ had risen being made the starting-point of the faith 
that His saints will rise with Him to newness of life.231 
 
Fundamental to Paul’s entire argument is the fact that the resurrection of 
Christ and the resurrection of Christians are “completely parallel events.”232  “For 
Paul, what will happen to Christians is what has happened to Christ and the 
resurrected bodies of believers will be like that of Christ.”233  Berkouwer points 
out: 
 
For Paul, one cannot believe in the resurrection of Christ and still doubt the resurrection 
of the dead.  The preaching of the risen Lord closes the discussion on the possibility of 
resurrection from the dead.  It erases any doubt about it.  The connection is, in fact, so 
close that “if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised” (vs. 13).  
To deny the resurrection of the dead does not just do away with the eschatological 
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Body in 1 Corinthians XV.  35-54,” NTS 21 (1975): 428. 
233  Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 34.  On page 125 of Raised Immortal, Harris writes: “Paul’s 
abbreviated answer to his own question, ‘With what kind of body do they come?’ (1 Cor. 15:35b) 
would have been, ‘With a body like Christ’s!’”  On page 147, he comments: “Paul believed that 
the resurrection body of Christ was the paradigm for that of believers (Phil. 3:21).”  And yet 
earlier in that book (44), surprisingly and disappointingly, Harris insists that “methodologically it 
is hardly appropriate to claim that the physical remains of believers will be raised and 
transformed simply because this was the experience of Christ.” 
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perspective, but with the foundation upon which the community was built as well.  
Consequently, what Paul had proclaimed is robbed of its content; it becomes vain (vs. 
14).  Paul and the other apostles turn out to be false witnesses, misrepresenting God, 
because they had preached the resurrection of Christ, “whom he did not raise if it is true 
that the dead are not raised” (vs. 15).  Moreover, those who have already died are caught 
up in a “crisis”—a wholly imaginary one!—“those who have fallen asleep in Christ have 
perished” (vs. 18).234 
 
 Readers of hyper-preterist literature should be forewarned that they will 
encounter semantic sleight of hand on this vitally important point.  Stevens tells 
his readers that he wants to put “heavy emphasis” on the fact that “it is a bodily 
resurrection for both Christ and all His saints.”  But he has already made it clear 
that for Christ it was His “selfsame body” that was “resuscitated,” whereas in 
our case “our physical bodies cannot be raised.”235  In like manner, Noē says that 
“Christ’s resurrection guarantees that our resurrection body will be like his . . . 
an imperishable, immortal, glorious, heavenly body.”  But, says Noē, ours will 
not be a resurrected body at all.  Commenting on 1 Corinthians 15:37-38, he 
insists that “the thought of a physically resurrected old body is not to be found 
here or anywhere in Scripture.”  Thus, he must acknowledge that “there is major 
discontinuity between our spiritual bodies and Christ’s resurrected body.”236  
King often stresses that the resurrection of believers is a “bodily” one, but the 
reader must always keep in mind that when King uses that term, he is referring 
to “a non-physical somatic change.”237 
 To use the terms body and bodily as the hyper-preterists do is to obfuscate 
rather than to communicate.  Berkouwer puts the issue forward in the form of 
questions: 
 
                                                 
234  Berkouwer, 183. 
235  Stevens, Questions About the Afterlife, 32 (emphasis original), 19. 
236  Noē, Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion, 129, 132, 128, 139. 
237  King, The Cross and the Parousia, 532. 
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But what are we to make of the particular expression in 1 Corinthians 15:44—“a spiritual 
body?”  Are we to deduce from this that Paul was not, after all, primarily concerned with 
an actual corporeality, but with something “spiritual?”  Does this not inevitably lead to a 
dualism between body and soul?  Can speaking of a “spiritual body” accomplish 
anything but throwing us into confusion? If the resurrection is a matter of a spiritual 
body, how much meaning is there to confessing a “resurrection of the body?”238 
 
A “nonphysical σωµα” is the same contradiction in terms as is a “nonphysical 
body.”  Stephen T. Davis says that the standard definition of our English word 
body is “a physical object,” that is, “an entity that has spatio-temporal location 
and is capable of being empirically measured, tested, or observed in some 
sense.”239  So also Robert H. Gundry, in a most important study examining the 
use of the Greek word σωµα, not only in the New Testament and the Septuagint 
literature, concludes that while σωµα (like our word body) can be used in both 
the literal and figurative senses, its uniform primary reference is to the physical 
body—the material, corporeal aspect of our person.240 
 Paul uses the word σωµα forty-six times in 1 Corinthians, more than in 
any other New Testament book.  In 10:17 and 12:13, it refers metaphorically to 
the church as the body of Christ.  In 10:16; 11:24, 27, 29, the word refers to the 
body of the incarnate Christ given for us and represented by the bread of the 
Lord’s Supper.241  In the other forty occasions on which σωµα appears in this 
letter, it refers quite simply and literally to a body, whether to the heavenly and 
earthly bodies that God has created (15:40), or to the body that will grow from 
the seed that is planted (15:37-38), or to the human body (15:35, 44).  In 15:35, 
Paul asks, “How are the dead raised?  With what kind of body will they come?”  
                                                 
238  Berkouwer, 191. 
239  Davis, Risen Indeed, 94. 
240  Robert H. Gundry, “Sōma” in Biblical Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976). 
241  This is not simply another metaphorical use of the word (contra Scott Brodeur, The Holy Spirit’s 
Agency in the Resurrection of the Dead [Rome: Editrice Pontifica Universita Gregoriana, 1996], 94), 
because this reference is, sacramentally, to the literal body of the crucified Christ. 
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In 15:44, Paul contrasts the “natural body” (σωµα ψυχικον) that is buried with 
the “spiritual body” (σωµα πνευµατικον) that is raised.  Note that in this last 
verse both the “natural” and the “spiritual” are bodies.  There is no contextual 
reason in any of these forty references to seek some meaning beyond the simple, 
literal meaning. 
 Robert Gundry wisely notes that “Paul uses sōma precisely because the 
physicality of the resurrection is central to his soteriology.”  He continues: 
 
Paul’s zeal to defend the future resurrection of the sōma is no longer [better: “not 
merely”] attributable to an anthropological concern, viz., that “if man were no longer 
sōma. . . he would no longer be man” [Bultmann].  It rather derives from a soteriological 
concern: denial of a future resurrection of the physical body will work backward to the 
conclusion that Christ was not raised physically.  That in turn, argues Paul, will take 
away the mainspring from life in the divine economy of salvation: “if there is no 
resurrection from the dead, then Christ has not been raised; if Christ has not been raised, 
then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain . . .” (1 Cor. 15:12-28).242 
  
 And, of course, it is not simply Paul’s use of the word σωµα that 
establishes the fact that our resurrection body will be our present body raised 
and transformed for the life to come.  Paul’s entire argument emphasizes the 
continuity between our present body and our resurrection body.  In his answer to 
the questions he asks in verse 35, there is also joyous emphasis on discontinuity, 
on the transcendent glory of the resurrection body, surpassing all our fondest 
hopes.  But throughout Paul’s argument it is the mortal Christian as he or she 
exists now—in his or her weakness, perishability, and dishonor—who will 
undergo this transformation.  This perishable, mortal body (whether dead or still 
living when Christ comes) must “put on” the imperishable and immortality (vv. 
52-53 ESV).  Paul does not speak of the exchange of one body for another.  The 
mortal body is raised to become immortal.  Paul says that the relationship is like 
                                                 
242  Gundry, “Sōma” in Biblical Theology, 168-69. 
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that between a seed and the plant that grows from it (vv. 37-39).  Notice how the 
subject remains the same in verses 42-44; whether Paul is describing the mortal 
body or the immortal body, it is the same body: 
 
What is sown is perishable; what is raised is imperishable.  It is sown in dishonor; it is 
raised in glory.  It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power.  It is sown a natural body; it 
is raised a spiritual body. (ESV) 
 
Paul underlines this corporeal continuity in verses 53-54 by adding the 
demonstrative pronoun tou/to (“this”).  Unfortunately, this word is entirely 
omitted from both verses in the NIV and from verse 54 in the ESV.  For clarity, I 
put the word in italics here, quoting the NASB: 
 
For this perishable must put on the imperishable, and this mortal must put on 
immortality.  But when this perishable will have put on the imperishable, and this mortal 
will have put on immortality . . . 
 
It is with good biblical support that The Westminster Confession of Faith says: 
 
At the last day, such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed: and all the dead 
shall be raised up, with the self-same bodies, and none other (although with different 
qualities), which shall be united again to their souls forever (32.2 [emphasis added]). 
 
Raymond E. Brown responds well to the modern suggestion that the continuity, 
the identity, will be personal, but not corporeal—a proposal made even by such 
evangelicals as George E. Ladd and Murray Harris:243 
 
If we would do justice to Paul, the concept of bodily resurrection should not be 
interpreted so vaguely that it loses all corporeal implications . . . . for Paul there is more 
than a continuity of personal existence—in the resurrection there is a continuity of the 
corporeal aspect of personal existence.  And so the modern suggestion that in 
                                                 
243  Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus, 129; Harris, Raised Immortal, 126. 
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resurrection the body may corrupt and the person still goes on, while it may involve a 
continuity of the “I,” would not convey Paul’s idea of the corporeality of the “I.”244 
 
 We have said that the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead was utter 
foolishness to the unbelieving first-century Greek minds; and, of course, in this 
twenty-first century it is considered no less ridiculous by unbelievers—and, sad 
to say, by the hyper-preterists.  The question Paul asked of King Agrippa and his 
court is the very question that must be put to the hyper-preterists today: “Why 
should any of you consider it incredible that God raises the dead?” (Acts 26:8). 
 The Christian reading a hyper-preterist for the first time may be startled to 
read the same objections to bodily resurrection that unbelievers have been 
scornfully presenting for two thousand years.  At the heart of the hyper-preterist 
attacks on the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is naturalistic, “the-
universe-is-a-closed-system” skepticism.  E.g., Otto says: 
 
The problems . . . are, of course, significant.  The most obvious is the perennial concern 
raised as to how human material which has long since biodegraded into the dust and 
become part of the grass which is eaten by the cows which has been consumed by 
subsequent generations of human beings can be recollected.245 
 
At what stage of maturity (child? young adult?) will the person be resurrected?  
What about the case of a believer eaten by a cannibal who is later converted—
which man gets those eaten body parts as part of his resurrected body?  Haven’t 
we learned from science about the so-called “indifference of the atom” (as well as 
all that makes up the atom)?  When the body dies and cell life disintegrates, what 
basis remains for identifying any particular atoms with any particular body?  
Hyper-preterists devote many pages to stating such objections, sometimes in 
great detail. 
                                                 
244  Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, 87. 
245  Otto, Case Dismissed, 15. 
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 Many decades ago, Justin McCann noted that “all the difficulties may be 
reduced to one, namely . . . a man can claim no material substance as his own.”  
And McCann reminded us that “it is a difficulty which is almost as old as the 
doctrine.”  All the standard objections can be found addressed by Tertullian, by 
Augustine, by Thomas Aquinas, by virtually every Christian theologian writing 
on the subject.  What was their answer?  McCann writes: “In its ultimate form it 
was simply this: that difficulties which seem to us with our limited knowledge 
and limited intelligence almost insuperable will be no difficulties to the 
omniscience and omnipotence of God.”  And then he adds: “There is really 
nothing more to be said.”246  Now, obviously, in one sense much more could be 
said, but in the final analysis this is the last word to be said: “Jesus replied, ‘What 
is impossible with men is possible with God’” (Luke 18:27). 
 Hyper-preterists like to claim they are “pure Bereans” (see Acts 17:11), 
that is, those who are ready to believe whatever the Scriptures teach.  But are 
they really Bereans when they insist that (with Otto), although “there is little 
disputing the fact that most of the early church fathers held to the resurrection of 
the very flesh in which one died,” those fathers were able to believe that only 
 
by making demands of faith which cannot be rationally explained or defended . . . . 
Contrariwise, Christian theology has always insisted on the reasonableness of the faith, 
on the importance and indeed necessity of rationally defensible demonstrations of what 
is to be believed . . . . Moreover, inasmuch as there are two books of revelation, one in 
creation and the other in Scripture, which must be coherently explained, any procedure 
which neglects consensual scientific understanding in dogmatic insistence upon a 
particular view of the resurrection body, for instance, hardly merits serious attention, let 
alone a claim to authority.247 
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 Only a view of the resurrection body that can claim a “consensus” in the 
scientific community (whether believing or unbelieving) “merits serious 
attention.”  What that view would be, I cannot imagine.  Think of what Otto’s 
criterion would mean, not simply for eschatology, but for every fundamental 
doctrine of our faith—the Trinity, the Creation, the Incarnation, the Virgin Birth, 
the Atonement—because every Christian doctrine takes a supernatural point of 
reference, namely, God.  We can’t make the mistake of thinking that Paul in 1 
Corinthians 15 was trying to present to the unbelieving Greeks a rational 
“demonstration” (in Otto’s words, “an experimental or logical proof”).  Paul was 
writing to believers (v. 11) who had in their “muddled thinking” called into 
question, as Berkouwer puts it, “the imaginability and thinkability of the 
resurrection.” 
 
Obviously, Paul did not intend to prove the resurrection of the body by this line of 
thought and make it acceptable to human understanding through “natural theology” or 
“natural cosmology.”  He is careful to guard against his readers’ forming conclusions 
based solely on human reasoning . . . . The analogies . . . function only within the 
framework of what is believed and known in Jesus Christ.248 
 
“Each in His Own Turn” and Other Phrases in Verses 23-55 
 
I want to now look briefly at the hyper-preterist interpretation of some specific 
phrases in 1 Corinthians 15:23-55.  When Paul in verse 23 says that the 
resurrection is for “each in his own turn,” he uses the Greek word ταγµατι, 
which can be used as a technical term for a body of troops, but which can also be 
used “without any special military application” to refer to any class or group, or 
                                                 
248  Berkouwer, 188, 190 (emphasis original). 
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simply to refer to an “order, turn, arrangement.”249  And we are not left as to 
speculate as to what “order” the apostle is referring to here, because he 
immediately tells us.  The order is that Christ was raised first, as “the firstfruits,” 
and “then at his coming those who belong to Christ” will be raised (v. 23, ESV).250  
Incredibly, Noē argues that there are not only these two resurrection days (when 
Christ arose and when those who belong to Him will rise at His coming), but 
innumerable resurrection days being referred to in this verse: 
 
First in this sequence was Jesus’ resurrection as the “first of the firstfruits.”  Second was 
the company of many Old Testament saints who joined with Him as part of that initial 
portion of “firstfruits.”  Third was the rest of the dead, raised forty years later at His 
parousia coming on “the last day,” . . . But after the “last day” in 70 A.D. it’s “each” or 
“every man in his own turn/order.”251 
 
From then on, it’s repeated over and over again in the lives of individual believers who 
are born, saved, die, and experience resurrection at different times.  Again, it’s “each in 
his or her own turn/order.”252 
 
 Thus Noē turns this verse into a proof text for the immortal-body-at-death 
doctrine.  But he is guilty here not only of reading much into the text that is not 
there, but also of making it say something different from what it clearly does say.  
E.g., Paul clearly speaks of Christ as “the firstfruits,” not as “the first of the 
firstfruits” (leaving room for others to also be the firstfruits).  And Paul doesn’t 
say that the resurrection of “those who belong to Christ” will occur at various 
times after Christ’s coming (παρουσια).  The Greek preposition εν cannot be 
translated “after,” as Noē translates it.  It must be translated “at” (thus, “at His 
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coming” [NASB, ESV]) or “when” (thus, “when He comes” [NIV]).  Noē 
understands Christ’s coming to have occurred in A.D. 70, but he knows that the 
resurrection of “those who belong to Christ”—even in the sense in which he 
understands that resurrection—did not take place then. 
 “The glorious appearing of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ” is still 
“the blessed hope” of the church, for which we still “wait” (Titus 2:13).  The 
resurrection of believers will take place at Christ’s coming, and not at the time of 
their individual death.  Compare 1 Thessalonians 4:16-17, where, just as in 1 
Corinthians 15:51-52, Paul also speaks of the “change” (glorification) awaiting 
those who will be alive at Christ’s return: 
 
For the Lord himself will come down from heaven, with a loud command, with the voice 
of the archangel and with the trumpet call of God, and the dead in Christ will rise first.  
After that, we who are still alive and are left will be caught up together with them in the 
clouds to meet the Lord in the air.  And so we will be with the Lord forever. 
 
 This passage causes hyper-preterists great difficulty.  Harden 
acknowledges that “the rapture is not a settled issue, even among full preterists.  
Preterists like King take it symbolically.  Some in the ‘immortal body at death’ 
camp take it literally.”  Among the latter were J. Stuart Russell and Milton Perry, 
who taught that there actually was a limited physical rapture of saints “in 
conjunction with the parousia at A.D. 70.”  But Harden admits that as for there 
being any historical record of such an extraordinary event, “the silence is 
deafening.”  Harden himself wants to interpret this passage in terms of his 
immortal-body-at-death doctrine, and so says: 
 
The process of being “snatched” or “caught away from” death and Hades and being 
“gathered in” straight to heaven began in A.D. 70 . . . . We are all snatched away when we 
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die . . . . As post-A.D. 70 believers, we won’t be resurrected out of Hades, only caught 
away on our way to Hades, snatched to be with Christ.253 
 
 Noē, however, offers a different interpretation of 1 Thessalonians 4, one 
that reads like a parody of hyper-preterist “exegesis.”  He claims that the 
“primary meaning” of the Greek word for “air” (αερα) that Paul uses in verse 17 
“is the internal breathing air (inside us) and air within our immediate proximity 
(as exhaled)—i.e. within approximately ten feet above the earth’s surface—not 
the atmosphere air . . . . In short, one’s feet don’t have to leave the ground to get 
‘caught up’ in this air (aer) with the Lord.”  Thus, according to Noē, Paul is 
referring in this verse to “individuals alive at that time and since being 
transformed by a spiritual experience,” knowing what Jesus meant about the 
kingdom of God being “’within you and among you’ (Lk. 17:21),” 
“unconsciously abiding in His presence and doing the things that please Him 
without ever having to think about doing them or forcing ourselves.”254 
 Surely such a bizarre interpretation needs no detailed refutation.  Noē has 
evidently overlooked the fact that Paul called Satan “the ruler of the kingdom of 
the air [αερος]” in Ephesians 2:2.  Did the apostle think that Satan was active 
only “within approximately ten feet above the earth’s surface?”  And when we 
read that John in his vision saw “the sun and sky . . . darkened by the smoke 
from the Abyss” (Rev. 9:2), the Greek word translated “sky” is αηρ.  Again, Noē 
would avoid such egregious errors if he would simply read words in their 
context. 
 I have noted how similar to 1 Thessalonians 4:13-18 is Paul’s teaching in 1 
Corinthians 15:51-52.  Hyper-preterists insist, however, that when Paul writes 
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that “we will not all sleep, but we will all be changed,” he is teaching definitively 
that some of those to whom he is writing will be alive at the Parousia, a clear 
pointer to the fact that that coming took place in the first century.  The hyper-
preterist cannot claim that “we” includes Paul, because Paul suffered martyrdom 
at Rome prior to A.D. 70.255  But, as Sproul observes, if “we” simply implies that 
some of those who receive the apostle’s teaching would be alive at the Second 
Coming, “then it is likewise possible that the ‘we who are alive’ can be even 
more inclusive and refers to any reader of the Corinthian text in the future.”256  
All we have to keep in mind when reading such alleged “imminency” statements 
in the New Testament is that none of the apostles knew when their Lord would 
return (Matt. 24:36); so how else would we expect them to write about that great 
day?  I have found the words good, better, best form a helpful outline in 
understanding Paul’s eschatological hope.  In his letter, Paul expresses a good: to 
live now “in the body” (Phil. 1:24-26), serving Christ and rejoicing in him; a better 
(Phil. 1:23): “to be away from the body and at home with the Lord” (2 Cor. 5:8), 
awaiting the resurrection; and a best: to be one of those still alive at the Parousia, 
who will be “clothed” (2 Cor. 5:2, 4) “in a flash, in the twinkling of an eye” (1 
Cor. 15:52) with that heavenly, immortal body as one “puts on one garment over 
another garment,” without ever dying.257 
 The apostle says that this wondrous transformation will take place “at the 
last trumpet” (1 Cor. 15:52; cf. 1 Thess. 4:16).  Harden says that “the message of 
the last trumpet” was to sound “the death knell of Old Testament Judaism,” and 
Noē says that “simply put,” the trumpet’s message was “for Christians to ‘reign 
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on earth.’”  But surely the Greek term εσχατος (“last”) must here be given its full 
eschatological force (compare Paul’s reference to death as “the last enemy” in v. 
26).  This final, eschatological trumpet sounds the passing away of the present 
order of reality—“the end” (το τελος) announced in verse 24—and the arrival of 
“a new heaven and a new earth, the home of righteousness” (2 Peter 3:13).258 
 
Paul’s Seed Metaphor 
 
There are two further elements in Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15:35-50 that 
we must consider because the hyper-preterists’ distortion of their meaning is 
foundational to their immortal-spiritual-body-at-death interpretation. 
 As noted above, Paul is not attempting to offer rational proof of the 
resurrection in these verses.  In turning these believers’ minds to the familiar 
experience of planting “a seed, perhaps of wheat or of something else” (v. 37), he 
simply wants them to see (in Berkouwer’s helpful phrase) “the imaginability and 
thinkability of the resurrection,” so that they will not form “conclusions based 
solely on human reasoning “259  Berkouwer states: 
 
Paul turns to nature for an example.  The mysterious process of sowing and reaping is 
not an automatic process that does not arouse any amazement.  What is sown is not the 
body-to-be, but the kernel of it, which does not grow by its own strength but is given a 
body by God, an individual body for each seed.  All the emphasis on this passage falls on 
the act of God, which certainly does not follow as a matter of course from the human act 
of sowing as such.  There is a miracle in the seed’s transition from kernel to body.260 
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Paul’s argument is picturesque, not scientific.  Ladd notes that the illustration of 
sowing and growing is “a rather imperfect metaphor,” since the seed only 
“seems” to die, and in actual fact “the bare kernel planted in the ground carries 
within itself the power of germination,” whereas the resurrection will be a purely 
supernatural accomplishment.261  But if it were a “perfect” metaphor (in the sense 
that Ladd is using that adjective), it would not be a metaphor at all, but rather a 
literal analogue. 
 Compare Paul’s literal analogy between “the first man Adam” and “the 
second man from heaven,” who is also “the last Adam” (vv. 45-49), which is not 
merely a figurative metaphor (basis Paul’s two literal, historical, representative 
heads—Adam, the head of the entire race descended biologically from him, and 
Christ, the head of that new people united to Him by faith.  This analogy 
therefore offers a much “tighter” comparison, the points of which, with regard to 
the resurrection, are drawn out by the apostle here in 1 Corinthians 15, and, with 
regard to justification, in Romans 5:12-19. 
 Paul was not so ignorant of the facts of botany that he thought that the 
seed actually died.  He knew, as Jesus had said, that the seed itself “sprouts and 
grows” (Mark 4:27); and thus no true resurrection takes place in the case of the 
seed.262  But, as Ladd reminds us, we simply cannot find “in the realm of nature 
adequate analogies for supernatural truth.”263  Berkouwer expounds: 
 
Obviously, Paul did not intend to prove the resurrection of the body by this line of 
thought and make it acceptable to human understanding through “natural theology” or 
“natural cosmology.”  He is careful to guard against his readers’ forming conclusions 
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based solely on human reasoning.  For that reason, in his analogy of the seed he points 
out the miraculous power of God, which gives the body to the kernel.  From the seed 
itself nothing can be expected unless one keeps his eyes open to the miracles of God.  So 
it goes with the sowing of this earthly body.  The reference to nature (for the analogy 
from creation also presupposes faith in the living God) is intended to break down all 
pretentious rationalistic questions.  He intends to expose this seemingly real and 
meaningful problem for what it is . . . . 
 
Paul does not want to make the leap from a phenomenon in nature to the resurrection of 
the dead, but in this polemical situation and on the basis of his unshakable certainty, he 
rejects all pride with reference to the mystery of God’s future act.264 
 
 The point of Paul’s illustration, however, has been clear to believers for 
two thousand years.  The figure is well-chosen to emphasize both the continuity 
between what is sown and what later appears, and the wondrous discontinuity.  
Who could imagine, looking merely at a seed, what a future plant growing from 
it would look like?  But who could deny that that seed is transformed into a 
plant?  Likewise, it is that perishable, dishonorable, weak, natural body that is 
sown that will be raised an imperishable, glorious, powerful, spiritual body (vv. 
42-44). 
 Hyper-preterists attempt to press the details of a seed growing into a plant 
in ways that Paul obviously does not—and we must always be careful to limit 
our understanding of a biblical metaphor to the purpose for which the biblical 
writer introduces it.  (E.g., the Shulamite is not described as “a rose” in Song of 
Songs 2:1 to emphasize her prickly personality.)  Stevens insists that Paul’s point 
is that “the outer shell” of the seed corresponds to our body, and it “is not 
preserved or resuscitated.”  “It dies and stays dead.”  What corresponds to the 
“inner germ” of the seed is the “inner man,” the spirit.  And at death the spirit 
receives a new, “spiritual” body (I will consider that adjective below) for its new 
heavenly life, a body “not just new in kind, but numerically as well,” which 
                                                 
264  Berkouwer, 188-89 (emphasis original). 
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simply means that it has no connection with the premortem body.265  Harden 
agrees, arguing that “the seed analogy” therefore “challenges the Reformed 
thought of psychosomatic unity, which says that man is not complete without his 
physical body.”266  Noē says that what “we modern-day Christians need” is a 
“loosening” of “our emotional attachment to the body sown”—as though early 
Christians did not have such an attachment.267  He explains: 
 
The shell or outer coat remains in the ground and decomposes . . . . Hence, when we die, 
we leave that old body behind, forever . . . . Thus, the continuity is the spiritual, not the 
physical.268 
 
Both Stevens and Noē must acknowledge, as we have seen, that this means that 
there is “a major discontinuity between our spiritual bodies and Christ’s 
resurrected body,”269 since His buried body was resurrected and transformed 
into His spiritual body.  But, of course, they can “explain” why that was possible 
for Jesus’ body, but is not possible for ours (see above). 
 Seeking to press the literalness of the seed metaphor, J. E. Gautier insists 
that since a seed is alive and not dead, the “sowing” referred to in verses 42-43 is 
our birth into this world, and “our period of dormancy is our lifetime . . . . 
[Paul’s] argument implies that to be sown is to be born, not to be buried.”270  Noē 
agrees that while “many” who read these verses “think that the natural body is 
sown when it enters the ground at the time of physical death, the problem with 
                                                 
265  Stevens, Stevens Response to Gentry, 57; Stevens, Questions About the Afterlife, 37-38. 
266  Harden, Overcoming Sproul’s Resurrection Obstacles, 99. 
267  Noē, Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion, 148. 
268  Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 68-69. 
269  Ibid., 69.  Cf. Stevens, Stevens Response to Gentry, 58. 
270  J. E. Gautier Jr., “That Ye May Keep Your Own Tradition,” at www.ourworld-
top.cs.com/preteristabcs (emphasis original).  Surprisingly, Murray Harris also says that vv. 42b-
43 refer to “the ‘sowing’ of life on earth,” although he then adds: “which terminates in death and 
burial” (“Resurrection and Immortality in the Pauline Corpus,” in Life in the Face of Death, ed. 
Longenecker, 153). 
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that is that a dead body no longer has any life in it . . . . [A] farmer does not sow a 
seed that is dead inside.”  Contrary to Gautier, however, Noē argues that the 
“sowing” refers not to natural birth, but to spiritual rebirth: “Obviously, this 
sowing is a spiritual process.  It has its beginnings when a person is born again 
and spiritually dies, not when a believer physically dies.” 
 It seems that such an absurd interpretation—who can miss the fact that, in 
the context of this chapter (i.e., the reference in verse 3 to the death, burial, and 
resurrection of Christ), Paul is referring in verses 36-38 and 42-43 to the burial 
and resurrection of the believers body?—results from pressing Paul’s seed 
metaphor in a falsely literal fashion.  However, their interpretation is not really 
literal at all.  A seed has no “immaterial inner spirit” that possesses “the 
ingredients for some or all of the future . . . spiritual body,” so that “the 
continuity is the spiritual, not the physical.”271  The continuity between seed and 
plant is, as a matter of fact, physical.  John T. Darragh, writing in 1921, already 
anticipated and answered the hyper-preterist interpretation of Paul’s metaphor: 
 
The whole point of the illustration is missed when the reader overlooks the fact that it is 
the body of a dead person that is compared to a seed . . . . That body has been sown a 
natural body, but it is to be raised a spiritual body . . . . All this is lost if we make the 
hidden life-force of the seed correspond to the soul.  For the soul is not sown in or with 
the body . . . . [T]he Apostle is speaking not of living persons but of the resurrection of 
the dead and of the bodies into which [the soul] is to return.  It is this connection that he 
illustrates by the parable of the seed.  The seed and the body are both sown, as it were.  
Both are dull, inert, devoid of signs of life.  From both spring something far surpassing 
themselves in form, in living grace and beauty . . . . It is no less important to notice the 
limits of the illustration than it is to observe what the two things are between which the 
comparison lies.  S. Paul confines himself to the contrast between the seed and the plant 
which springs from it, as showing the striking difference between the natural body and 
that spiritual body which it becomes at the resurrection.272 
 
                                                 
271  Noē, Shattering the ‘Left Behind’ Delusion, 136, 135, 139. 
272  Darragh, The Resurrection of the Flesh, 40-41. 
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 When reading Paul’s seed metaphor, we must remember another crucial 
point that was emphasized earlier.  Throughout this chapter, Paul is speaking not 
of individual “resurrections” that occur at the death of each individual believer 
down through history, but rather of a general resurrection of all those belonging 
to Christ that occurs at His coming (v. 23). 
 
“A Spiritual Body” versus “Flesh and Blood” 
 
In verse 44, the apostle writes: “It is sown a natural (ψυχικον) body, it is raised a 
spiritual (πνευµατικον) body.”  To our modern minds it may seem that Paul is 
here drawing a contrast between what is material and what is immaterial, and 
that immediately raises the question of whether “a spiritual body” is not an 
oxymoron. 
 But to class it as an oxymoron completely misunderstands the apostle’s 
use of the terms ψυχικος and πνευµατικος.  Paul refers to that which is 
πνευµατικος (“spiritual”) fifteen times in 1 Corinthians.  A study of those texts 
reveals that the adjective does not refer to that which is immaterial generally or 
to the human spirit specifically.  Rather, it refers to that which is given by the 
Holy Spirit or to the person who possesses the Holy Spirit.  The Israelites ate 
“spiritual food” and drank “spiritual drink” from a “spiritual rock” (10:3-4), but 
that doesn’t mean they couldn’t sink their teeth into that food or strike that rock.  
It means that these provisions were supernaturally given by the Holy Spirit.  The 
“spiritual gifts” discussed in chapter 12 are clearly gifts of the Holy Spirit.  And 
when Paul draws a contrast between that which is ψυχικος and that which is 
πνευµατικος, it is a contrast between that which is of this fallen, unregenerate 
world and that which is of the Holy Spirit.  The ψυχικος man in 2:14, who “does 
not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God,” is “the man without the 
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Spirit” (see the NIV), as contrasted with πνευµατικος man (v. 15), who has the 
Holy Spirit.  Compare James’s contrast between ψυχικη wisdom and the wisdom 
that comes “from heaven” (James 3:15, 17).  And note especially how Jude 
explains his reference to those who are ψυχικοι in verse 19, by adding that they 
“do not have the Spirit.” 
 By the same token, the ψυχικος body spoken of in 1 Corinthians 15:44 is 
our present, natural body—fallen, weak, and sinful (Rom. 6:6), the likeness of the 
earthly Adam (1 Cor. 15:45-49), whereas the “spiritual” body is that body raised, 
transformed, empowered, and perfectly filled and controlled by the Holy Spirit 
for the life of the age to come, in the likeness of the risen, heavenly Adam 
(Christ).  Berkouwer makes our point: 
 
Paul’s expression [“a spiritual body” in 1 Corinthians 15:44] has nothing to do with 
spiritualism.  In speaking about what God would send in the future through the miracle 
of His grace, Paul adds that the body to be raised would be a spiritual body.  For him, 
this falls in line with the distinction between the first and second Adams.  The spiritual 
body is contrasted to the physical, but Paul’s use of “spiritual” and “physical” conveys a 
specific meaning 
 
This spiritual body of the future is a matter of the gift and power of the resurrection of 
Christ.  It involves a perspective concerning reality that is wholly dominated by the 
Spirit—the Pneuma . . . . The “spiritual body” does not have to do with what we 
sometimes call “spiritualizing.”  “Spiritualizing” always presupposes a dualism, which 
in turn carries with it a devaluation of the body, which is nowhere to be found in Paul’s 
teachings.  He speaks of the body as “controlled by the pneuma.”  The Spirit is already at 
work within man’s body, but only in the resurrection will it completely rule man’s life.  
This is not a gradual process of evolution, but an entirely novel divine act in which the 
Spirit will be manifested.  It is the transition from mortality to immortality, from 
perishability to imperishability.  The transition does not disqualify the body, but it does 
indicate a break.  This break is not between the lostness of the body and the soul’s 
liberation from it, for the Spirit of God already lives within man’s concrete earthly 
existence.  At present however, there remains perishability (phthorá), weakness 
(astheneía), dishonor (atimía), and humiliation (vv. 42f., 50; cf. Phil. 3:21).  Then there will 
be imperishability as the body is raised through the power of Christ.  The spiritual body 
stands in the full light of the destruction of death.273 
 
                                                 
273  Berkouwer, 191-92 (emphasis original). 
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 Hyper-preterists sometimes indicate that they understand this.  E.g., Noē 
writes: “The terminology ‘spiritual body’ does not define its substance.  Nor does 
it necessarily mean this body is composed purely of spirit, as opposed to physical 
matter.”274  But throughout their writings they go on continually referring to “the 
spiritual body” as though Paul’s phrase did refer to a “nonphysical body” 
(whatever that might mean).275 
 Hyper-preterists likewise understand Paul’s declaration in verse 50 that 
“flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” as another apostolic denial 
of a physical resurrection.276  But again, this is an obvious distortion of Paul’s 
statement, since he immediately goes on to explain his statement: “nor does the 
perishable inherit the imperishable.”  The phrase “flesh and blood” is a Semitic 
idiom (regularly translated by the Septuagint σαρξ και αιµα) denoting earthly 
man as he is presently constituted, in his sinfulness and resulting weakness, 
decay, and ultimate death.  Thus, this phrase, like Paul’s preceding references to 
the ψυκικος body, point to the fact that the Christian as he or she is now is not 
suited for the eternal kingdom of God.  The new heaven and new earth will be 
“the home of righteousness” (2 Peter 3:13).  Although we are already justified in 
Christ (Rom. 8:1), we must still be glorified in Christ (Rom. 8:17, NASB, ESV).  As 
Paul emphasizes throughout these verses, the believer, whether dead or still 
living when Christ comes again, must be transformed (v. 52), clothed with an 
                                                 
274  Noē, Your Resurrection Body and Life, 64. 
275  Note that the Greek term ψυχικος is the adjectival form of ψυχη, the noun often translated in 
English as “soul.”  But the hyper-preterist does not suggest that Paul, in speaking of the “soulish 
body,” is teaching that our present body is somehow immaterial. 
276  E.g., see Harden, Overcoming Sproul’s Resurrection Obstacles, 29. 
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imperishable, immortal, spiritual body for the eschatological life of the 
consummation.277  Berkouwer states: 
 
The close connection of this resurrection with the resurrection of Christ is a pervasive 
Pauline theme, and there is no indication that the early church ever lost this perspective . 
. . . The church was not interested in categories of substance or isolated metaphysical 
miracles, but in the reality of the miraculous power of God towards this our flesh, this 
weak, perishable, and mortal body; in short, towards the whole man in his earthly 
existence.  Therefore, regardless of how much the eschaton was seen in relation to the 
indwelling of the Spirit, it was not yet realized, but remained the object of the 
expectation: God’s act through the power of Christ.278 
 
Berkouwer summarizes as follows: 
 
Every attempt to explain the great change of 1 Corinthians 15:51 and to concretize the 
continuity on the basis of anthropological distinctions should be rejected.  At the same 
time, every effort to detract from the reality of the miracle that comes—through Christ’s 
power—over the whole man should be resisted.  There is no room for a dualistic and 
spiritualistic interpretation that would exclude the body from the eschatological 
fulfillment. 
 
Obviously, no one is able to describe fully the great change of which Paul wrote.  But this 
does not take anything away from the emphasis Paul placed on the reality of this 
eschatological event.  This transition concerns the transition from perishability to 
imperishability, from mortality to immortality.  If we try to investigate further the mode 
of this transformation, we learn nothing more than that it will take place in a moment (en 
atómō), in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet (vs. 32). 
 
Although the final transition is God’s definitive miracle, it can never be conceived as an 
isolated cosmic problem or a question about substance.  It frees the believer from death 
and frees him for a new life in the service of God, already beginning in this life.279 
 
In this final thought, Berkouwer shows the hope that is given in the doctrine of 
the physical resurrection of the body in the eschaton.  The effects of hope are not 
                                                 
277  Anthony C. Thiselton notes that Paul’s verb in v. 50, “to inherit,” is “often used of coming into 
possession of eschatological existence, with all that this implies” (The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, NIGTC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 1291 [emphasis original]). 
278  Berkouwer, The Return of Christ, 194. 
279  Ibid., 194-95, 198 (emphasis original). 
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felt only in the future hope, but such hope gives us power for living today.  In a 
world where hearts are broken, lives are shattered, and tragedy visits us all, the 
hope of an ultimate “better tomorrow” pulls us forward in such a way that we 




 Berkouwer’s The Providence of God holds to the Reformed doctrine of the 
providence of God within the background and circumstances of our hesitations 
and pessimism.  I believe that this volume adheres to the Reformed conservative 
philosophy of providence.  As a result, it contributes a practical restatement of 
these great truths in a modern context, especially those of 9/11. 
 I have considered Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence in the light of our 
present world with special regard to the terrorist attacks on America.  I believe 
that this doctrine of providence does, in fact, give meaning to a life that can often 
be replete with hardship.  In examining Berkouwer’s doctrine of providence in 
regard to the knowledge of providence, sustenance and government, mystery 
and miracles, and theodicy, it is my opinion that we can find meaning in this life 
to the extent that we find our answers in a rational faith in the revelation of God 
which results in glory and praise. 
 In regard to hyper-preterism, Berkouwer offers a way of hope in his 
doctrine of resurrection that summarizes the way we should approach this issue: 
 
If one does not isolate in a futuristic way the eschaton from the salvation that is already 
given as the first fruits of the Spirit, who lives in the body as His temple (1 Cor. 6:19), a 
proper regard will follow for the points of contact evident in the biblical witness, where 
an immediate connection is made between the resurrection from the dead and the 
destiny of the body; the body for the Lord and the Lord for the body (1 Cor. 6:13f.). 
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How then can the eschatological expectation be fulfilled without a struggle?  The church 
is called to this struggle and thus also to “take hold of eternal life” (1 Tim. 6:12) and to 
“strive to enter by the narrow door (Luke 13:24).280 
 
A prime hyper-preterist goal is to be accepted by Christians as offering an 
orthodox Christian theology that offers a distinctive eschatological option.281  
Evangelicals have for years debated among themselves such viewpoints as 
amillennialism, premillennialism, and postmillennialism.  Why not set another 
chair at the evangelical table now and extend a warm welcome to the hyper-
preterists as fellow members of Christ’s church? 
 I have labored to show that a careful reading of the New Testament 
teaching regarding the nature of the resurrection reveals that the doctrine so 
central and essential to hyper-preterism—i.e., that the resurrection of believers is 
a past event, either entirely so (King) or at least decisively so, with individual 
“resurrections” occurring as each believer dies—is clearly unbiblical.  But other 
fundamental Christian doctrines are also at stake.  In order to maintain their 
heretical doctrine of the resurrection, hyper-preterists have devised heretical 
doctrines of creation, man, sin and its consequences, the Person and redemptive 
work of Christ, and the nature of salvation.  Much more than eschatology 
narrowly defined is at stake in this debate.  And all of these doctrinal deviations 
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